People v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 10 March 2015
• Docket Number: B252684
• Citation: 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 850,234 Cal.App.4th 1432
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mylyn C. JOHNSON, Defendant and Appellant.

234 Cal.App.4th 1432
184 Cal.Rptr.3d 850

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent
v.
Mylyn C. JOHNSON, Defendant and Appellant.

B252684

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 8, California.

Filed March 10, 2015

Victoria H. Stafford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion

BIGELOW, P.J.

234 Cal.App.4th 1436

–This case concerns the proper interpretation of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (j)(2),¹ which, in brief, criminalizes the act of secretly filming or photographing an “identifiable person” under or through that person's clothing so as to view the person's body or undergarments, for sexual gratification, under circumstances in which the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Defendant Mylyn C. Johnson was charged with 12 counts of violating section 647, subdivision (j)(2). The jury was shown video footage defendant had recorded in which he followed women and filmed under their skirts, without their knowledge. In some cases, the resulting footage did not capture the women's faces, or their profiles. During closing arguments, the prosecution and defense advanced two competing definitions of “identifiable person.” The jury found defendant guilty on all counts under section 647, subdivision (j)(2).

On appeal, defendant contends (1) the convictions on five of the counts must be reversed because there was no evidence he filmed “identifiable” persons, in that the women could not possibly be identified from the video footage; (2) the trial court

184 Cal.Rptr.3d 855

erred in failing to sua sponte define “identifiable person” for the jury; and (3) defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the prosecutor's definition of “identifiable person.” We conclude that to establish a defendant has filmed an “identifiable person,” the prosecutor must prove that when all of the evidence is considered, it is reasonably probable someone could identify or recognize the victim; this may include the victim herself or himself. Although we conclude there was sufficient evidence adduced in this case to satisfy this standard on each of the challenged counts, we reverse the judgment as to the five challenged counts due to prejudicial instructional error.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In March 2013, Andrea M. and her sister, Raquel M., were shopping at a Target store in Lancaster. Andrea noticed defendant was following them. He was holding a black phone. At one point, defendant kneeled down and pretended to get something, then aimed the phone under Andrea's skirt. Andrea was surprised. She thought the incident was “creepy” and, with Raquel, reported it to a Target employee. A Target security employee began observing defendant through store surveillance cameras. As the security employee watched, defendant followed a woman in the store. At strategic moments, he bent down and used his phone to film under her dress. The security employee called police, then followed defendant when he left the store.

234 Cal.App.4th 1437

A Los Angeles County deputy sheriff eventually arrived and stopped defendant. Defendant was holding a phone in one hand and a tablet computer in the other. He admitted he had been in Target, and, when asked, admitted he had taken pictures up women's skirts. He conceded he did not have permission to take such pictures. Defendant was arrested. When Andrea and Raquel M. approached the deputy's patrol car for a field identification, defendant said to the deputy, “Can you tell them I'm sorry?” After receiving Miranda warnings ( Miranda v. Arizona) (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602] ), defendant told the deputy he had only photographed one woman and that this was the first time he had ever done so. However, a search of his phone revealed well over 100 “up-skirt” videos and pictures. The women in the videos appeared to be unaware they were being recorded.

One of the many videos depicted Francisca M. In February 2013, she stopped at a Walmart in Lancaster to buy a cell phone charger. She asked a man she thought worked at the store–defendant–for help. Unbeknownst to her, defendant had been following her in the store before she spoke to him. As defendant helped Francisca, he surreptitiously videotaped under her skirt. After Francisca bought the charger, defendant followed her to her car and asked if she had found what she was looking for. The license plate of her car was captured in the recorded footage, which enabled law enforcement to identify and contact her.

A detective from the sheriff's department reviewed videos from defendant's phone and the hard drive of a laptop seized from his home. There were over 2,000 videos, including “sex videos” of defendant with various women, and up-skirt videos. Although there were other non-sex-related videos, the overwhelming majority of the videos involved “sexual-related” content. The number of videos in which defendant followed a person but was unable to get an “up-skirt” shot exceeded the number of videos in which he was successful. The videos were recorded at various public places, such as Metrolink stations, Grauman's

184 Cal.Rptr.3d 856

Chinese Theater in Hollywood, the Hollywood Walk of Fame, and stores such as the Salvation Army in Lancaster and Starbucks. In general, defendant stalked his victims for several minutes, until he was able to get close enough to aim his phone “under the person's skirt or near their buttock region.”

The jury viewed a number of videos associated with the 12 counts charged under section 647, subdivision (j)(2). With the exception of the videos of Andrea and Raquel M. and Francisca M., the victims were identified only as Jane Does; law enforcement had not determined their identities. In some of the videos defendant recorded the victim's face. But in the videos associated with counts 8, 9, 11, 14, and 15, the victim's face was not visible in the recording. Instead, only shoes, legs, skirts or dresses, purses, and in a few cases, the woman's back and the back of her head, appeared on screen.

234 Cal.App.4th 1438

The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of a section 647, subdivision (j)(2) violation, including as follows: “[T]he People must prove that ... [t]he defendant willfully used a concealed camcorder, motion picture camera, or photographic camera of any type to secretly videotape, film, photograph, or record by electronic means another, identifiable person under or through the clothes being worn by that other person....” In his closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the “identifiable person” requirement:

“What does ‘an identifiable person’ mean? It simply means a person that exists, someone you can identify as a person, as opposed to a doll or something like that. It's an identifiable person. And that makes sense.... [I]f that wasn't the case, then we would–could reward people for targeting strangers as victims or for making their victims unidentifiable when they are finished with the crime, and that wouldn't make sense. So an identifiable person just means a human being.”

In the defense closing argument, defense counsel asserted the prosecutor's definition was incorrect:

“[I]t's true that that word [ (‘identifiable’) ] is not specifically defined in your instructions. So I would encourage you to ask a question about that word. But what it really means, in the context of this law, is that it is a specifically identifiable human being; in other words, what's on the video allows you to tell who that person is. Now, I'm not saying that you actually have to be able to figure it out, but there needs to be something on that video which makes that person subject to identification. Obviously, the most easy way is if there's a face. We've seen that there's other ways.... Maybe there's a license plate in another video. But on counts 8, 11, 14, and 15, there is nothing. There is nothing in those videos that would ever allow you to identify that woman. There is nothing–you don't see her face, and there's nothing else. So he has one interpretation, I have another. Ultimately, as the judge has instructed you, it is the court that answers any questions about the law. So when you see eventually that ‘identifiable’ means it's actually–you can tell if it's a specific person or not, you will see that counts 8, 11, 14, and 15 have not been proven and Mr. Johnson is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.”

In rebuttal, the prosecutor urged the jury to reject defense counsel's interpretation:

“Basically, he's saying if you can't actually identify the victim, then we can't reach a guilty verdict. That is completely wrong, because, then, let's think about what that would mean. That would mean that anybody who wants to

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