People v. Johnson, Docket No. 24116
Decision Date | 28 March 1977 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 24116 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Luther JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. 74 Mich.App. 250, 253 N.W.2d 722 |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[74 MICHAPP 251] Joseph DeVal Wilton, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., by Charles P. Kellett, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before ALLEN, P. J., and T. M. BURNS and BEASLEY, JJ.
In this case, a jury convicted defendant of armed robbery in violation of M.C.L.A. § 750.529; M.S.A. § 28.797. After sentence to a term of not less than 15 nor more than 25 years in prison, defendant appeals as of right claiming that the trial judge's instruction to the jury was coercive and unduly interfered with the jury's method of deliberation.
The record indicates that after the jury was instructed, in their absence, the court inquired of counsel and the following occurred:
Defense counsel's question is typical of the confusion engendered on the trial bench and in the trial bar by the unfortunate line of cases that give rise to this issue. It is suspected that this troublesome and confusing doctrine, that it is error for the trial judge to "suggest" that the jury start by considering the offense charged, began with People v. Lemmons, 384 Mich. 1, 178 N.W.2d 496 (1970), where a defendant, not wishing to run the risk of being found guilty of a lesser included offense on a compromise verdict, made no request for lesser included offenses. 1 As a result, the court instructed the jury that "There are only two possible verdicts as to each defendant". "You may find the defendant, naming them individually, guilty of robbery armed or not guilty". "There are no included offenses". The Supreme Court reversed, saying that the instruction did more than fail to charge upon the included offenses; that it affirmatively excluded them from the consideration of the jury and that this was error. Eventually, five years later in December of 1975, in People v. Henry, 395 Mich. 367, 372-374, 236 N.W.2d 489, 491 (1975), the Supreme Court repudiated Lemmons, saying, among other things, as follows:
In contrast with these admonitions to trial judges, is the line of cases, starting with People v. Ray, 43 Mich.App. 45, 204 N.W.2d 38 (1972). In People v. Ray, supra, at 48, 204 N.W.2d at 40, after deliberating for a time, the jury requested guidance from the court on the manner in which they should conduct their deliberation. In Ray, defendant was charged with assault with intent to rob being armed and two lesser included offenses. Part of the exchange between the judge and the jury went as follows:
In that context, this Court found that to require a unanimous agreement on defendant's innocence of the greater charge, that is, that with which the [74 MICHAPP 255] prosecution charged the defendant, before discussion of the lesser charges is permitted, was coercive, unduly restrictive and reversible.
Since the decision in Ray, this Court has refused requests to apply the Ray rule and to reverse, in the following cases: People v. James, 51 Mich.App. 777, 216 N.W.2d 473 (1974); People v. Bates, 55 Mich.App. 1, 6, 222 N.W.2d 6 (1974); People v. Freeman, 57 Mich.App. 90, 225 N.W.2d 171 (1974); People v. Szymarek, 57 Mich.App. 354, 225 N.W.2d 765 (1975); People v. Britt, 57 Mich.App. 375, 225 N.W.2d 771 (1975); People v. Walker, 58 Mich.App. 519, 228 N.W.2d 443 (1975); People v. Robert Hall, 56 Mich.App. 10, 223 N.W.2d 340 (1974); People v. Bankston, 61 Mich.App. 275, 232 N.W.2d 381 (1975); People v. Waldron, 64 Mich.App. 648, 236 N.W.2d 732 (1975); People v. Don Francisco Lopez, 65 Mich.App. 653, 237 N.W.2d 599 (1975); People v. Erwin, 70 Mich.App. 60, 245 N.W.2d 173 (1976).
Essentially, these appeals involved erroneous interpretations of Ray. It is not error for a trial judge to tell a jury that they "may" first consider the offense charged by the prosecutor and it is not error to refer to a lesser included offense, as a lesser included offense. Some suggested "structuring" of jury deliberations by the trial judge is proper and desirable. 2
[74 MICHAPP 256] Only in the controversial decision in People v. Harmon, 54 Mich.App. 393, 221 N.W.2d 176 (1974), was Ray successfully invoked to reverse. See, People v. Erwin, supra.
In the within case, the trial judge defined the included offenses and then stated as follows:
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People v. Johnson
...Initially, it must be asked whether implied coercion should be encouraged. Although one opinion, the majority in People v. Johnson, 74 Mich.App. 250, 253 N.W.2d 722 (1977), suggests its desirability, 1 this Court on three occasions has specifically discouraged impliedly coercive instruction......
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People v. Mays
...People v. Ross, 69 Mich.App. 705, 245 N.W.2d 335 (1976); People v. Shears, 73 Mich.App. 683, 252 N.W.2d 563 (1977); People v. Johnson, 74 Mich.App. 250, 253 N.W.2d 722 (1977); People v. Major, 85 Mich.App. 583, 272 N.W.2d 143 (1978); People v. Allen, 90 Mich.App. 128, 282 N.W.2d 255 ...
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People v. Handley
...agreement of innocence on the principal offense before they could commence consideration of the lesser offenses. People v. Johnson, 74 Mich.App. 250, 253 N.W.2d 722 (1977); People v. Shears, 73 Mich.App. 683, 252 N.W.2d 563 (1977); People v. Erwin, 70 Mich.App. 60, 245 N.W.2d 173 (1976); Pe......
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People v. Allen
...This type of instruction has been, to say the least, troublesome for our trial and appellate courts. See People v. Johnson, 74 Mich.App. 250, 253 N.W.2d 722 (1977). Notwithstanding our admonitions to trial judges, starting with People v. Ray, 43 Mich.App. 45, 204 N.W.2d 38 (1972), the probl......