People v. Jones

• Decision Date: 26 February 2009
• Docket Number: 101697.
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. EDWARD D. JONES, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

59 A.D.3d 864

873 N.Y.S.2d 773

2009 NY Slip Op 01368

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. EDWARD D. JONES, Appellant.

101697.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Third Department.

Decided February 26, 2009.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Fulton County (Giardino, J.), rendered March 17, 2008, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of manslaughter in the second degree, assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree.

KAVANAGH, J.

On the evening of March 1, 2007, defendant and David Lamphear were involved in a physical altercation during which defendant stabbed Lamphear in the abdomen with a pocket knife. Two weeks later, Lamphear died of complications that stemmed from the injury he sustained in the stabbing. Defendant was ultimately charged in a four-count indictment with manslaughter in the first and second degrees, assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. After trial, defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree, assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. County Court reduced the assault conviction to assault in the second degree^* and sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 7½ to 15 years on the manslaughter conviction and seven years on the assault conviction, with five years postrelease supervision, and time served on the criminal possession of weapon conviction. Defendant now appeals.

Defendant claims that his use of deadly physical force was justified because he was acting in self-defense when he stabbed Lamphear once in the abdomen with a pocket knife and the jury's rejection of this defense was against the weight of the evidence. We agree and because, on the evidence presented, the People have failed to meet their burden and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense, we reverse defendant's convictions for manslaughter and assault and dismiss those counts of the indictment.

Lamphear and defendant had what all acknowledged to be an acrimonious relationship laced with racial overtones. Much of this animosity stemmed from the fact that defendant lived with Holly Walker, a woman with whom Lamphear had a prior relationship and the mother of one of Lamphear's children. According to Walker, Lamphear repeatedly expressed his dislike for defendant and had grown increasingly resentful of the fact that Walker lived with defendant and that her children had developed a positive relationship with him.

On the night in question, defendant agreed to drive Walker and her children to Lamphear's residence so that the children could be with him pursuant to a visitation schedule. According to Walker, while they were en route, Lamphear called her on a cell phone to complain that they were late and uttered threats directed at defendant if the children were not delivered as scheduled. Walker testified that Lamphear stated during the call that he had friends who were "waiting" and would "jump" defendant upon his arrival. When defendant and Walker did arrive, Lamphear approached them with a pipe in hand and demanded that defendant get out of the vehicle. According to Walker's testimony, Lamphear put the pipe down and, after defendant exited the vehicle, Lamphear suddenly and without provocation, "punched [defendant] in the face." Walker intervened and in the struggle that followed, Lamphear fell to the ground. At that point, according to Walker, Lamphear uttered a racial epithet, struck Walker in the face with his fist and picked up a wooden board that he used to hit defendant in the back of the head. Walker then fled to the house and defendant backed away from Lamphear towards his vehicle. Lamphear followed and, according to defendant, continued to brandish the board stating, "I'm going to kill you, n****r." Again, Lamphear attacked defendant with the board and this time struck a blow that fractured defendant's arm. As defendant reached the driver's side of the vehicle, Lamphear continued to advance toward him, brandishing the board, stating, "I'm going to get you now, n****r." As Lamphear tried to hit defendant with the board for a third time, defendant took out a pocket knife, swung it at Lamphear and struck him once, causing a two centimeter wound in the abdomen. Defendant then got into his vehicle and waited for Walker to join him. As Walker got into the vehicle, Lamphear took the board and smashed it through the driver's side window. Defendant then drove from the scene and, using 911, reported the incident to the police.

A weight of the evidence review requires us to independently review the evidence and, if a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, to "`weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony'" (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987], quoting People ex rel. MacCracken v Miller, 291 NY 55, 62 [1943]; see People v Richardson, 55 AD3d 934, 938 [2008]). Upon doing so here, we conclude that viewing the evidence as an integrated whole, the People have failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not justified in his use of deadly physical force against Lamphear (see People v McManus, 67 NY2d 541, 546-547 [1986]; Matter of Ismael S., 213 AD2d 169, 172 [1995] [adjudication that child was a juvenile delinquent was reversed where the People "failed to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the respondent was justified in using deadly physical force"]; People v Reeder, 209 AD2d 551, 551-552 [1994], lv denied 85 NY2d 913 [1995]).

Without question, defendant used deadly physical force or "physical force which, under the circumstances in...