People v. Jones

• Decision Date: 24 December 1984
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Appellant, v. Michael JONES, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 345

483 N.Y.S.2d 345

105 A.D.2d 179

The PEOPLE, etc., Appellant, v. Michael JONES, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Dec. 24, 1984.

Elizabeth Holtzman, Dist. Atty., Brooklyn (Barbara D. Underwood and Roseann B. MacKechnie, Brooklyn, of counsel), for appellant.

William E. Hellerstein, New York City (Daniel E. Rosen, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MOLLEN, P.J., and MANGANO, O'CONNOR and LAWRENCE, JJ.

MANGANO, Justice.

On the instant appeal, the People of the State of New York contend that Criminal Term erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss his indictment based on the People's failure to provide him with a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.30. A resolution of this appeal necessarily involves an interpretation of the holding of the Court of

                Appeals in People v. Giordano, 56 N.Y.2d 524, 449 N.Y.S.2d 955, 434 N.E.2d 1333.   Although we reject the very broad interpretation of Giordano advanced by the People in support of their argument, we nevertheless are of the view that the order appealed from should be reversed, defendant's motion denied, and the indictment reinstated
                

BACKGROUND

The defendant was arrested on August 22, 1981 and was arraigned on August 23, 1981 upon a criminal complaint charging him with a series of rapes which had occurred earlier that month. On March 16, 1982, the People announced on the record, their readiness for trial. By notice of motion dated May 24, 1983, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the People were not ready for trial within the six-month period provided by CPL 30.30.

In defendant's papers submitted in support of the motion, defense counsel alleged that 407 days of unreasonable delay were chargeable to the People. Included in the total delay alleged by defense counsel was (1) delay resulting from the People's failure to provide defendant with police laboratory reports and a supplemental bill of particulars within a reasonable time and (2) delay resulting from the People's failure to use due diligence in having defendant produced by the Department of Correction for various court appearances.

In opposition to the defendant's motion, the People argued, inter alia, that (1) excluding certain delay chargeable to the defendant, they announced their readiness for trial, on the record, within the required time period, i.e., within six months of the commencement of the criminal action (CPL 30.30, subd. 1, par. ), (2) as a matter of law, once the People timely announced their readiness for trial on the record, any subsequent delay, no matter what the reason or cause, could not be charged to them, pursuant to the holding of the Court of Appeals in People v. Giordano, 56 N.Y.2d 524, 449 N.Y.S.2d 955, 434 N.E.2d 1333, supra, and (3) in any event, the delays which occurred in the instant case after the People timely announced their readiness for trial on the record, i.e., the delay resulting from the People's failure to comply within a reasonable time with defendant's requests for discovery, and a delay resulting from the People's failure to have defendant produced by the Department of Correction for various court appearances, could not be charged to them since they either (a) were unnecessarily caused by defense counsel, (b) occurred at a time when defense counsel admitted that his material witnesses and records were not available and he was therefore not ready for trial, or (c) occurred despite the exercise of due diligence by the People.

THE DECISION OF CRIMINAL TERM

After a hearing, Criminal Term found that the People were chargeable with 259 days of unreasonable delay including, inter alia, 55 days of delay prior to March 16, 1982 when the People announced on the record that they were ready for trial (the People do not challenge this figure on appeal) and 204 days of delay which occurred after the People's announcement of readiness for trial, made on March 16, 1982. The latter period (which is challenged by the People on appeal) included, inter alia, (1) 22 days of delay from May 25, 1982 to June 16, 1982, resulting from the People's failure to comply within a reasonable time with a direction of the court, dated March 30, 1982, that the People provide defendant with a supplemental bill of particulars, (2) 57 days of delay during the 69-day period between June 16, 1982 and August 24, 1982, resulting from the People's failure to provide defendant with requested police laboratory reports within a reasonable time after their completion, and (3) 103 days of delay during the 127-day period between January 3, 1983 and May 10, 1983, resulting from the People's failure to have the Department of Correction produce defendant for various court appearances. Criminal Term rejected the People's broad interpretation of People v. Giordano, 56 N.Y.2d 524, 449 N.Y.S.2d 955, 434 N.E.2d 1333, supra, and instead ruled that the Court of Appeals in Giordano clearly intended, by

including therein a reference toPeople v. Brothers, 50 N.Y.2d 413, 429 N.Y.S.2d 558, 407 N.E.2d 405, to limit its holding in Giordano to those delays, occurring subsequent to the People's announcement of readiness, over which the People had "no control", i.e., calendar congestion, or which were "irrelevant to the People's readiness for trial". Based on this interpretation of Giordano, supra, Criminal Term opined that the defendant's presence in court was within the prosecutor's control and was relevant to the People's continued readiness for trial. Criminal Term, without making an express finding, implicitly found that the People had failed to demonstrate that they exercised due diligence in attempting to have defendant produced by the Department of Correction during this 103-day period. Criminal Term further held that once the People were not ready for trial at any point after announcing their readiness for trial on the record, their announcement of readiness was "vitiated" and under those circumstances, any delays which occurred after the announcement of readiness by the People and which would otherwise not be considered relevant to the People's continued readiness for trial, i.e., unreasonable delay in responding to requests for discovery (see People v. Cole, 90 A.D.2d 27, 457 N.Y.S.2d 589), would nevertheless be chargeable to the People. Accordingly, Criminal Term charged the People with 79 days of unreasonable delay in complying with defendant's requests for discovery. Since the total delay chargeable to the People was 259 days, i.e., far more than the six-month period provided for in CPL 30.30, Criminal Term granted defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.

THE LAW

In People v. Brothers, 50 N.Y.2d 413, 429 N.Y.S.2d 558, 407 N.E.2d 405, supra, the Court of Appeals held that court congestion did not excuse the People's failure to be ready for trial so as to defeat defendant's entitlement to a dismissal of the indictment under CPL 30.30.

In People v. Giordano, 56 N.Y.2d 524, 449 N.Y.S.2d 955, 434 N.E.2d 1333, supra, the People did announce, on the record, their readiness for trial within the required six-month period and the case was subsequently delayed because of court congestion. In Giordano, the defendant argued that the holding of People v. Brothers, supra, was applicable, i.e., that the delay caused by court congestion was to be charged to the People, even if that delay occurred after the People announced, on the record, their readiness for trial. In rejecting that argument, and affirming the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30, the Court of Appeals held:

"when the District Attorney * * * announced his readiness on the record he * * * satisfied his obligation under CPL 30.30. Whatever may in fact have been the reason why the case was not reached for trial thereafter, there is no basis for dismissal pursuant to that statute (cf. People v. Brothers, 50 NY2d 413, 417 )" (People v. Giordano, supra, p. 525, 449 N.Y.S.2d 955, 434 N.E.2d 1333).

The People argue on appeal, as they did unsuccessfully before Criminal Term, that although the facts in Giordano involved delay resulting from court congestion, they could not, under the language of Giordano, as a matter of law, be charged with any delays, under any circumstances, which occurred after they timely announced their readiness for trial on the record.

We disagree with the People's interpretation of Giordano, supra.

Initially, we note that in interpreting the holding of the Court of Appeals in Giordano, we must be guided by the general principle that the language used therein "must be read in context and in the light of the issues presented" (People v. Olah, 300 N.Y. 96, 101, 89 N.E.2d 329; see, also, Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599, 157 N.E.2d 597).

This court has, on several occasions, taken pains to stress that the People cannot, by timely announcing on the record that they are ready for trial, totally insulate themselves from being charged with unreasonable delays which occur thereafter and affect their continued readiness for trial. Thus, inPeople v. Papa, 96 A.D.2d 601, 465 N.Y.S.2d 295, decided after Giordano, 56 N.Y.2d 524, 449 N.Y.S.2d 955, 434 N.E.2d 1333, supra, the People announced their readiness for trial on the record within six months of commencement of the action against defendant. The court in People v. Papa, supra, 96 A.D.2d p. 603, 465 N.Y.S.2d 295, reversed a judgment of conviction and remitted the matter for a hearing as to whether defendant's statutory speedy trial rights had been violated, stating:

"Counts 5 through 8 did not surface until the indictment was returned on October 15, 1980. This date marks the commencement of the criminal action against defendant on counts 5 through 8 (see CPL 1.20, subd 17). The People's 'ready date' on March 9, 1981 would render the prosecution of these charges timely. After March 9, many more delays and adjournments intervened, some at...