People v. Jones
| Citation | 346 N.Y.S.2d 92,74 Misc.2d 767 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Benjamin JONES, Defendant. |
| Decision Date | 10 July 1973 |
| Court | New York City Court |
On March 29, 1973, the defendant Jones was arrested and arraigned on charges of coercion in the first degree, menacing and sexual abuse in the first degree (Sections 130.65, 120.15, and 135.65 of the Penal Law). The case was set down for a hearing on April 2nd.
In the hearing part this court ordered that the defendant be examined pursuant to Section 730.10 et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Law to determine whether or not he was fit to assist counsel.
On May 1, 1973, the defendant was examined by staff psychiatrists in the Bronx Criminal Court and refused to cooperate. The psychiatrists recommended that the defendant be transferred to the Bellevue Psychiatric Prison Ward for further examination. While at Bellevue, the defendant was examined by two other psychiatrists who, despite the defendant's continued refusal to cooperate, found him competent to stand trial and not an incapacitated person within the meaning of Section 730.10 et seq. of the CPL.
The findings of the psychiatric examination, dated May 29, 1973, described the defendant as a 'paranoid personality', indicating further that the defendant is apparently capable of behaving in normal fashion. The defendant was found to be alert, coherent and logical, despite some moodiness and depression. His intelligence was rated as average.
The behavior and actions of the defendant in court appeared to belie the findings of the psychiatric reports. The defendant's outbursts and erratic behavior exhibited in the courtroom gave the Court reason to believe that the defendant was in need of psychiatric care and supervision.
The defendant has refused to cooperate with Legal Aid and subsequently refused to discuss his case with assigned counsel. On June 1, 1973, the defendant refused to leave the pens and the preliminary hearing was held in abstentia with his assigned counsel present. Subsequently, the assigned counsel requested that he be relieved and the defendant stated that he wished to defend in person, without assistance of counsel. The case was adjourned to June 29, 1973 for trial.
On June 29, 1973, the defendant Jones again refused to leave the detention pens at the court building. At my direction, a staff member of the Legal Aid Society, an Assistant District Attorney and the Court's Law Assistant, together with a court reporter, visited the detention facilities to interview the defendant.
The defendant was advised of his rights and that his responses were not privileged or confidential. The Legal Aid attorney questioned the defendant to ascertain why he refused to appear in court. The defendant made reference to a note, in the form of a motion, which he had sent to the courtroom earlier that day. In substance, it stated that he felt he was being deprived of his rights under the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
When questioned further, the defendant indicated that by asserting his 1st Amendment right, he was asking that he be permitted to conduct his own defense, save for the opening and closing statements to the jury. He stated that he was willing to accept assigned counsel for those latter purposes, and 'to prevent the District Attorney from pulling a fast one' on him.
Until that point, the defendant answered the questions in a rational manner. However, he soon became unresponsive. He lapsed into a monologue in which he stated that he was suing all parties involved for the sum of $50,000.00. Thereafter, his response to every question was '$50,000.00'.
When all the parties, except the defendant who still refused to leave the pens, reassembled in the courtroom, the Court noticed that a young woman and a child were still seated in the spectator section after the calendar had been called. The Court asked the young woman which case she was waiting for and she responded: 'Benjamin Jones'. She was asked to approach the bench and she identified herself as the defendant's sister-in-law. She informed the Court that the defendant had made threats to members of the family and that they were afraid that he might harm them if he were released.
The sister-in-law stated that the defendant had previously represented himself at arraignment on two other criminal matters and had those charges dismissed. Additionally, she showed the Court a 1,000 page transcript from a civil case in which the defendant, acting as his own counsel, sued the City of New York.
In view of the defendant's continued erratic behavior, his re-examination under Section 730.10 et seq. of the CPL was ordered to be conducted by psychiatrists other than those who previously examined the defendant. A third psychiatrist examined the defendant on July 2nd, 1973 and his examination confirmed that the defendant was competent, under the provisions of Section 730.10 et seq. of the CPL, to assist counsel.
The Court is caught in a dilemma of insuring the rights of the defendant while at the same time maintaining decorum in the proceedings. The following issues must be resolved:
1. Does a defendant have an unqualified right to defend himself in a criminal proceeding?
2. Is the standard in determining fitness to act as one's own counsel different than the standard for determining fitness to stand trial and assist counsel?
Article I, section 6 of the New York State Constitution provides that a person accused of a crime will have to appear and defend, in person, as well as with counsel. It has also been held that every defendant in a criminal case has a statutory right to the assistance of counsel and the correlative right to waive counsel and defend himself. People v. Cunningham, 2 Misc.2d 162, 134 N.Y.S.2d 212, appeal dismissed 283 App.Div. 1057, 132 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1954); Hedgecock v. Oneida County Court, 19 Misc.2d 459, 190 N.Y.S.2d 786, appeal denied 10 A.D.2d 604, 200 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1959). However, such a waiver of the right of counsel could only be accepted where the accused acts understandingly, competently and intelligently. People v. Witensky, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.2d 358, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1965); People v. Betillo, 53 Misc.2d 540, 279 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1967). See also, in re S., 29 N.Y.2d 206, 325 N.Y.S.2d 921, 275 N.E.2d 577 (1971).
The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right of counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461; People v. Lynch, 2 Misc.2d 217, 155 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Westchester County Court 1955), reversed on other grounds 2 A.D.2d 854, 155 N.Y.S.2d 849.
Where a defendant states that he desires to defend pro se and at the same time, evinces disruptive or potentially disruptive behavior, the court is presented with a problem for which no guidelines have as yet been established.
In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 LEd.2d 353 (1970), the Supreme Court of the United States considered the question of the disorderly and disruptive defendant. The Court concluded that although the Trial Court should make every effect to permit the defendant to remain in the courtroom despite his disruptive and disrespectful conduct, the removal of the defendant where necessary to maintain proper decorum is within the judge's discretion and not constitutionally infirm.
The Court stated, p. 343, 90 S.Ct. p. 1061, that,
The Court, in Allen, suggested that the defendant could be
(1) bound and gagged, but permitted to remain present;
(2) cited for contempt;
(3) taken out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.
However, the circumstances in Allen are distinguishable from our case in that defendant Allen was represented by counsel.
The court is aware of the well established principle that a person has the right to refuse counsel and represent himself at trial or at any stage of the proceedings, if it is established that he has an awareness of the situation confronting him. Likewise, the Court is cognizant of the fact that counsel cannot be foisted upon a defendant. People v. Jackson, 46 Misc.2d 742, 262 N.Y.S.2d 907 (S.C. Kings County 1965). Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the need may arise where the defendant, acting as his own counsel, may prevent the orderly conduct of his trial. If such a situation arises, it is apparent that the recommendation in Illinois v. Allen, supra, will be of no avail.
At the state level, the statutory scheme contained in sections 260.20 and 340.50(3) of the CPL deals with the problem of the unruly or disruptive defendant. These sections state, in material part, that where a defendant conducts himself in so disorderly and disruptive a manner that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom, he may be removed from the courtroom if, after he has been warned by the court that he will be removed if he continues such conduct, he continues to engage in such...
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