People v. Jones

• Decision Date: 10 April 1995
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Vernon JONES, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 809

626 N.Y.S.2d 809

214 A.D.2d 623

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Vernon JONES, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

April 10, 1995.

Susan Bloch Marhoffer, White Plains, for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, Dist. Atty., Kew Gardens (Steven J. Chananie, John M. Castellano, and Nicole Beder, of counsel), for respondent.

Before SULLIVAN, J.P., and COPERTINO, PIZZUTO and KRAUSMAN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Demakos, J.), both rendered August 25, 1993, convicting him of attempted rape in the first degree under Indictment No. 4152/90, and escape in the first degree under Indictment No. 1619/92, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences.

ORDERED that the judgments are affirmed.

The defendant's claim of a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial (see, CPL 30.30) has been forfeited by the entry of his guilty pleas (see, People v. O'Brien, 56 N.Y.2d 1009, 453 N.Y.S.2d 638, 439 N.E.2d 354; People v. Suarez, 55 N.Y.2d 940, 449 N.Y.S.2d 176, 434 N.E.2d 245; People v. Gerber, 182 A.D.2d 252, 589 N.Y.S.2d 171) as well as expressly waived by him as part of his waiver of the right to appeal (see, People v. Callahan, 80 N.Y.2d 273, 590 N.Y.S.2d 46, 604 N.E.2d 108; People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 541 N.E.2d 1022). Moreover, upon our consideration of the appropriate factors (see, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101; People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 335 N.E.2d 303), we find that the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not compromised under the circumstances of this case (see, e.g., People v. Allen, 203 A.D.2d 97, 610 N.Y.S.2d 40; People v. McCummings, 203 A.D.2d 656, 610 N.Y.S.2d 634; People v. Allah, 202 A.D.2d 599, 609 N.Y.S.2d 628).

Additionally, contrary to the defendant's contention, the fact that his first trial ended in a mistrial did not implicate the prohibition against double jeopardy. The mistrial was granted upon the motion of the defendant's counsel, and there is no suggestion that the motion was provoked by any conduct on the part of the prosecution (see, e.g., Matter of Roman v. Brown, 175 A.D.2d 899, 573 N.Y.S.2d 627; Matter of Cavaliere v. Judges of Supreme Ct. of State of N.Y., 157 A.D.2d 722, 549 N.Y.S.2d 817; see generally, People v. Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d 383, 388, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972, 494 N.E.2d 77).

Similarly unavailing is the defendant's contention that the court erred in denying his application to withdraw his guilty pleas. A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the sound discretion of the court (see, People v. Evans, 204 A.D.2d 346, 614 N.Y.S.2d 151; People v. Pettway, 140 A.D.2d 721, 529 N.Y.S.2d 32), and a guilty plea will be upheld if it was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently (see, People v. Fiumefreddo, 82 N.Y.2d 536, 605 N.Y.S.2d 671, 626 N.E.2d 646; People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 471 N.Y.S.2d 61, 459 N.E.2d 170). The court provided the defendant with a complete opportunity to set forth the basis of his motion and conducted an extensive hearing on the matter. In light of the...