People v. Jones

Decision Date09 December 2010
Citation912 N.Y.S.2d 746,79 A.D.3d 1244
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Octavious JONES, Appellant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Carl J. Silverstein, Monticello, for appellant.

Holley Carnright, District Attorney, Kingston (Joan Gudesblatt Lamb of counsel), for respondent.

Before: ROSE, J.P., LAHTINEN, STEIN, McCARTHY and GARRY, JJ.

GARRY, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Ulster County (Czajka, J.), rendered November 17, 2006, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of burglary in the second degree, aggravated criminal contempt and criminal contempt in the first degree (two counts).

In January 2006, defendant entered a second-floor apartment in the City of Kingston, Ulster County, where the victim lived with her mother and several other people. At that time, defendant was prohibited from having contact with the victim by a three-year order of protection previously entered by Kingston City Court upon his conviction of criminal contempt in thesecond degree. After a brief verbal altercation with the victim, defendant left. The victim's roommate sought to lock the door but, before she could do so, defendant re-entered and struck the victim in the face. The victim called for her mother and told her that defendant had entered the apartment through the window and had hit her. The mother saw defendant descend the stairs, exit the building, and run toward a house where police found him soon thereafter.

Defendant was charged with burglary in the second degree (two counts), criminal contempt in the first degree (two counts), and aggravated criminal contempt. Following a jury trial, he was acquitted of one of the burglary counts and convicted of the four other charges. County Court sentenced defendant as a second felony offender to an aggregate prison term of 15 years plus five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals.

Initially, defendant contends that his burglary and aggravated criminal contempt convictions were not based on legally sufficient evidence and were against the weight of the evidence. As to aggravated criminal contempt, defendant asserts that the People did not demonstrate that he caused physical injury to the victim ( see Penal Law § 215.52[1] ).1 As pertinenthere, physical injury consists of "substantial pain" ( Penal Law § 10.00[9] ), meaning pain that is "more than slight or trivial ... [but] need not ... be severe or intense" ( People v. Chiddick, 8 N.Y.3d 445, 447, 834 N.Y.S.2d 710, 866 N.E.2d 1039 [2007]; see People v. Rivera, 42 A.D.3d 587, 588, 838 N.Y.S.2d 727 [2007], lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 880, 842 N.Y.S.2d 792, 874 N.E.2d 759 [2007] ). "A variety of factors are relevant in determining whether physical injury has been established, including the injury viewed objectively, the victim's subjective description of the injury and [his or] her pain, and whether the victim sought medical treatment" ( People v. Dixon, 62 A.D.3d 1036, 1039, 878 N.Y.S.2d 495 [2009], lvs. denied 12 N.Y.3d 912, 914, 884 N.Y.S.2d 693, 695, 912 N.E.2d 1074.1076 [2009] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord People v. Stearns, 72 A.D.3d 1214, 1217, 898 N.Y.S.2d 348 [2010], lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 778, 907 N.Y.S.2d 467, 933 N.E.2d 1060 [2010] ). The victim did not testify, but the roommate testified that she saw defendant strike the victim in the mouth, the mother and the roommate testified that the victim bled significantly, and the roommate described "rush [ing] her to the hospital." The treatingphysician testified that the victim's mouth suffered several lacerations, one of which required five sutures, and that he prescribed two different medications to control her pain. Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, this evidence was legally sufficient to support the conclusion that the victim suffered a physical injury ( see People v. Foster, 52 A.D.3d 957, 959-960, 860 N.Y.S.2d 273 [2008], lv. denied 11 N.Y.3d 788, 866 N.Y.S.2d 614, 896 N.E.2d 100 [2008]; People v. Porter, 305 A.D.2d 933, 933-934, 761 N.Y.S.2d 691 [2003], lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 586, 764 N.Y.S.2d 396, 796 N.E.2d 488 [2003] ). Further, considering the evidence in a neutral light and according deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 644, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 [2006] ), the conviction was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Perser, 67 A.D.3d 1048, 1049-1050, 889 N.Y.S.2d 107 [2009], lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 941, 895 N.Y.S.2d 332, 922 N.E.2d 921 [2010]; People v. Foster, 52 A.D.3d at 960, 860 N.Y.S.2d 273).

Defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the burglary conviction was not fully preserved, as the contentions he now raises were, in part, presented for the first time in his presentencing motion after trial ( see People v. Hines, 97 N.Y.2d 56, 61, 736 N.Y.S.2d 643, 762 N.E.2d 329 [2001]; People v. Gonzalez, 64 A.D.3d 1038, 1039, 882 N.Y.S.2d 598 [2009], lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 796, 887 N.Y.S.2d 545, 916 N.E.2d 440 [2009] ). " 'However, we necessarily review the evidence adduced as to each of the elements of the crimes in the context of our review of defendant's challenge regarding the weight of the evidence' " ( People v. Gonzalez, 64 A.D.3d at 1040, 882 N.Y.S.2d 598, quoting People v. Caston, 60 A.D.3d 1147, 1148-1149, 874 N.Y.S.2d 623 [2009] [citation omitted] ). Defendant's contention that the People failed to demonstrate that he entered the apartment unlawfully ( see Penal Law § 140.25) iswithout merit, as the order of protection explicitly required him to stay away from the victim's home ( see Penal Law §§ 215.50, 215.51). Further, his violation of the protective order did not, as he contends, serve both as the basis for the illegality of his entry and as the crime that he intended to commit when he entered the apartment ( see Penal Law § 140.25). Neither the indictment nor the jury charge required the People to limit their case to proving that defendant intended to commit a particular crime ( see People v. Lewis, 5 N.Y.3d 546, 552 n. 7, 807 N.Y.S.2d 1, 840 N.E.2d 1014 [2005] ), and the jury was not precluded from considering defendant's intent to commit a further violation of the order of protection once he had entered the apartment "in a manner that went beyond trespass" ( id. at 552, 807 N.Y.S.2d 1, 840 N.E.2d 1014; see People v. Dombrowski, 55 A.D.3d 1358, 1359, 864 N.Y.S.2d 612 [2008], lv. denied 11 N.Y.3d 924, 874 N.Y.S.2d 9, 902 N.E.2d 443 [2009] ). Insofar as defendant's challenges were preserved, the evidence-including, among other things, the roommate's testimony that defendant struck the victim after calling her a "liar"-was legally sufficient to support the conviction ( see People v. Lewis, 5 N.Y.3d at 552-553, 807 N.Y.S.2d 1, 840 N.E.2d 1014). In addition, the conviction was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Dombrowski, 55 A.D.3d at 1359, 864 N.Y.S.2d 612; compare People v. VanDeWalle, 46 A.D.3d 1351, 1352, 847 N.Y.S.2d 816 [2007], lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 845, 859 N.Y.S.2d 404, 889 N.E.2d 91 [2008] ).

Defendant was not, as he contends, deprived of a fair trial by County Court's evidentiary rulings. The court correctly permitted the mother to testify about the victim's statements immediately after the incident, as these statements were classic examples of the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule ( see People v. Fratello, 92 N.Y.2d 565, 570, 684 N.Y.S.2d 149, 706 N.E.2d 1173 [1998], cert. denied 526 U.S. 1068, 119 S.Ct. 1462, 143 L.Ed.2d 548 [1999] ). Moreover, the statements were not, as defendant claims, precluded as testimonial ( see generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 [2004]; see People v. Nieves-Andino, 9 N.Y.3d 12, 14-15, 840 N.Y.S.2d 882, 872 N.E.2d 1188 [2007] ), since they were not made to police or their agents, but to the victim's mother in the immediate aftermath of a violent confrontation ( see People v. Bradley, 8 N.Y.3d 124, 126-127, 830 N.Y.S.2d 1, 862 N.E.2d 79 [2006] ). The court did not deprive defendant of the right to present a defense by cautioning his counsel that asking the victim's roommate about prior occasions when defendant had been allowed to enter the apartment might open the door to inquiry into previous bad acts. Whether or not defendant was welcome in the apartment, his presence there was prohibited by the restraining order. Since the line of inquiry would not have given rise to a defense, the court did not err in warning against it, and defendant's counsel was not ineffective for terminating it ( compare People v. Fleegle, 295 A.D.2d 760, 762-763, 745 N.Y.S.2d 224 [2002]; People v. Hollins, 221 A.D.2d 863, 864, 634 N.Y.S.2d 561 [1995] ).

County Court properly interrupted defense counsel's summation to instruct the jury that it was not to consider defendant's potential punishment in its deliberations, after defense counsel asked the jury whether the evidence justified sending defendant to prison. A curative instruction was proper, as the issue of punishment was an external factor not grounded in the evidence adduced at trial and, in any event, the brief interruption was too minor to deprive defendant of a fair trial ( see People v. Facey, 22 A.D.3d 765, 766, 804 N.Y.S.2d 371 [2005]; see alsoPeople v. Burdash, 92 A.D.2d 627, 627, 459 N.Y.S.2d 919 [1983] ). Defendant failed to preserve his claim that a missing witness charge should have been issued as to the victim by requesting the charge at trial ( see People v. Williams, 132 A.D.2d 892, 894, 518 N.Y.S.2d 451 [1987]; see also People v. Burdick, 266 A.D.2d 711, 713, 699 N.Y.S.2d 173 [1999] ). In any event, defendant was not entitled to the charge. Given the victim's unwillingness to cooperate with the prosecution and defendant's apparent expectation that she would testify in his favor, she was not in the People's control ( see People v. Turner, 73 A.D.3d 1282, 1284, 903...

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