People v. Jones
| Decision Date | 02 February 1971 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 11288 |
| Citation | 266 N.E.2d 411,130 Ill.App.2d 769 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Earl C. JONES, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Richard A. Hollis, State's Atty., Springfield, Arthur J. Inman, Asst. State's Atty., for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
The Circuit Court of Sangamon County dismissed an indictment on motion of the defendant, concluding that the People did not afford the defendant a speedy trial subsequent to his written demand. This appeal by the People is from that order of dismissal.
A determination of the issue presented for review necessitates a chronological recitation of the proceedings as they transpired in the circuit court.
On March 17, 1969, a two-count criminal complaint was filed in the circuit court charging the defendant with armed robbery and unlawful use of a weapon. Bail was fixed and a preliminary hearing was requested. Thereafter, on March 20, on motion of the defendant, the preliminary hearing was continued to March 31, 1969. The defendant was released on bail.
On March 25, a series of motions was filed, labeled 'Pre-Trial Motions', including a motion for list of witnesses, for discovery of physical evidence, for production of confession, for a bill of particulars, and finally a written demand for a speedy trial by jury. On March 28, all of these pretrial motions, other than the motion to dismiss, were allowed. The State was ordered to furnish the information by April 21, 1969. On April 1, 1969, the preliminary hearing was again continued, on the motion of defendant's attorney, to April 8, 1969, and thereafter the same was cancelled by agreement of counsel.
On June 11, 1969, the defendant was indicted for armed robbery, robbery, battery, two counts of burglary, and two counts of theft over $150. Bond was set and the defendant was released on bond. So far as appears, the matters set forth in the indictment relate to the same transaction set forth in the March 17 two-count complaint.
On July 18, 1969, a motion was filed to dismiss the indictment, and on the same date a motion for statements of witnesses was filed, together with a repeat of the motions filed March 25, 1969, and allowed on March 28, 1969. Also, on July 18, 1969, another demand for speedy trial was filed. On September 10, 1969, there was a ruling on the pretrial motions. So far as here relevant, the motions were allowed except as to the motion to dismiss, and that motion was taken under advisement and then denied on September 12, 1969.
On September 30, 1969, the defendant filed a motion to suppress certain identification evidence. The motion to suppress was continued generally on motion of the State's Attorney.
On November 20, 1969, another motion for statements of witnesses and for copies of police reports was filed. It appears that the motion for statements of witnesses was allowed, and on the same date the court allowed a motion of the State's Attorney for disclosure of alibi witnesses. Arguments were heard on the motion to suppress, the matter was taken under advisement, and on December 2, 1969, that motion was denied.
On December 19, 1969, a motion to dismiss was filed asserting that the written demand for a speedy trial had been filed on March 25, 1969, and renewed on July 18, 1969, and asserting that the defendant had done nothing to occasion any delay. Thereafter, on December 30, 1969, the motion to dismiss was allowed and a written order was filed on January 13, 1970, reciting the basics of the chronology herein enumerated. The court, among other findings, found 'the defendant has not contributed in anyway (Sic) to the delay in this case.' The court also found that the State's Attorney had not requested any extension of time within which to have this case set for trial.
Section 103--5(b) of ch. 38, Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, provides, in substance, that every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date the defendant demands trial unless the delay is occasioned by the defendant or by other causes enumerated therein and not here relevant. The 120-day provision was changed to 160 days by an amendment to the section effective August 28, 1969. The sole issue presented here is whether the various and sundry motions filed by the defendant occasioned delay attributable to the defendant so as to toll this statute.
In People v. Gray, 83 Ill.App.2d 262, 227 N.E.2d 159 (4th Dist.1967), we had occasion to review the cited statutory provision. In the context of the right to a speedy trial for one incarcerated, the observations there made with reference to the object and purpose of the statute as being an implementation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial are appropriate here. The People are under a duty to prosecute within the time specified absent a delay occasioned by the defendant. The fasctual determination of the existence of such a delay occasioned by the defendant necessarily involves a consideration of the facts and circumstances in each case. Thus, in People v. Hamby, 27 Ill.2d 493, 190 N.E.2d 289, cert. denied, Hamby v. Pate, 372 U.S. 980, 83 S.Ct. 1116, 10 L.Ed.2d 146, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 857, 84 S.Ct. 120, 11 L.Ed.2d 84 (1963), under the facts there existent, the...
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People v. Boyd
...or some act to which he consented, necessitated a "slowdown" in the judicial process so as to delay his trial. People v. Jones (1971), 130 Ill.App.2d 769, 266 N.E.2d 411. Defendant was arrested on July 9, 1976 and remained in custody until the trial began on August 9, 1977. The trial was co......
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People v. Williams
...case is whether some act of defendants, or some act to which they consented, necessitated a delay in their trial. People v. Jones (1971), 130 Ill.App.2d 769, 266 N.E.2d 411. The record discloses that the defendants were taken into custody on April 13, 1978. On April 28, 1978, they were arra......
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People v. Green
...is clearly in point, as are the cases cited by the State, People v. Ross, 132 Ill.App.2d 1095, 271 N.E.2d 100, and People v. Jones, 130 Ill.App.2d 769, 266 N.E.2d 411. For these reasons we judge that the trial court properly denied the motion for Over the defendant's objection, the court ga......
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People v. McKinney
...defendant which causes actual delay tolls the statutory period (People v. Richards, 28 Ill.App.3d 505, 328 N.E.2d 692; People v. Jones, 130 Ill.App.2d 769, 266 N.E.2d 411; People v. Donalson ) and causes a new period to commence to run from the date to which the case has been delayed (Peopl......