People v. Jones
| Decision Date | 06 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 14SA284 |
| Citation | 346 P.3d 44,2015 CO 20 |
| Parties | In re The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff, v. Zachariah M. JONES, a/k/a Zackariah M. Jones, Defendant. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Attorneys for Plaintiff: Mitchell R. Morrissey, District Attorney, Second Judicial District, Robert J. Whitley, Chief Appellate Deputy District Attorney, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Defendant: Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender, Jud Lohnes, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado
En Banc
¶ 1 Jones petitioned for relief pursuant to C.A.R. 21 from an order of the district court granting the prosecution's motion to revoke his bail bond in its entirety and order that he be held without bond pending resolution of charges in a different district. The district court reasoned that it was granted the power to do so by section 16–4–105(3), C.R.S. (2014), upon concluding that another court had found probable cause to believe Jones committed a felony while released on bond. Jones appealed to the court of appeals according to the expedited procedure of section 16–4–204, C.R.S. (2014), but that court found itself to be without jurisdiction to entertain an expedited appeal from an order entered pursuant to section 105(3).
¶ 2 Because Colorado's statutory scheme governing release on bail entitled Jones to an expedited review of the district court's order revoking his existing bond and declining to set another pending trial, the court of appeals erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain his appeal. Because section 105(3) merely empowered the district court to have Jones brought before it for purposes of modifying the conditions of his pretrial release, the district court erred in revoking his existing bond and denying him a right to pretrial release altogether. The rule is therefore made absolute, and the matter is remanded to the district court with directions to reinstate Jones's bail bond or change any condition thereof, as authorized by statute.
¶ 3 In October 2013, Zachariah M. Jones was arrested, charged, and released on bond, in connection with several felony drug offenses in Denver County. Some four months later, the Denver District Attorney moved to revoke his bond, alleging that while Jones was released on bond in the present case, a court in Adams County issued a warrant for his arrest, based on conduct resulting in a charge of second degree assault. Relying on a provision of section 16–4–105(3), C.R.S. (2014), the motion asserted that the district court was empowered to revoke the defendant's bond because, during the time he was released on that bond, a competent court had found probable cause to believe he committed a felony. After hearing the motion, the Denver District Court granted it; revoked the defendant's bond in this case; and declined to reassess bond until the Adams County case had been resolved.
¶ 4 The defendant appealed the district court's order to the court of appeals pursuant to the expedited procedures set forth in section 16–4–204, C.R.S. (2014). In a published opinion, the court of appeals concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under section 204 and dismissed the defendant's appeal. The appellate court reasoned that its power of review pursuant to this statutory provision included only review of those orders entered pursuant to three specifically enumerated statutory sections, none of which was section 16–4–105.
¶ 5 The defendant petitioned this court pursuant to C.A.R. 21 for relief from the district court's “no-bond hold.” In issuing our rule to show cause, we expressly ordered the district attorney to also address the defendant's entitlement to review according to the expedited review provisions of section 16–4–204.
¶ 6 Exercise of this court's original jurisdiction is entirely within its discretion. People v. Nichelson, 219 P.3d 1064, 1066 (Colo.2009). We have often deemed relief pursuant to C.A.R. 21 appropriate to correct an abuse of discretion or an excess of jurisdiction where no other adequate remedy exists. See, e.g., id. ; Pearson v. Dist. Court, 924 P.2d 512, 514 (Colo.1996). As recognized by both statute and rule, a review of rulings affecting a criminal defendant's release pending trial, by the very nature of such rulings, can generally serve a useful purpose only if it is permitted immediately, without awaiting a final judgment in the case. See § 16–4–204(1), C.R.S (2014) (); C.A.R. 9(a) (). The published opinion of the court of appeals narrowly construing its jurisdiction over bond orders has not only left the defendant without any other meaningful remedy in this case; because the statute it construes purports to provide the exclusive method of appellate review for both pretrial and post-conviction bond orders, that judgment effectively eliminates any meaningful right of review for a large class of unreleased defendants.
¶ 7 At least since the enactment of Colorado's Criminal Procedure Code in 1972, matters concerning the types and conditions of both pretrial and post-conviction bail bonds, the requirements for setting and modifying those bonds, and the review of such settings or modifications, as well as matters concerning the forfeiture, termination, and enforcement of bail bonds and exoneration from bond liability have, within constitutional limitations, see Colo. Const. art. II, § 19, been governed by statute in this jurisdiction. See ch. 44, 1972 Colo. Sess. Laws 190–268 (). More specifically, parts 1 and 2 of title 16, article 4, of the revised statutes prescribe the mechanics of release from custody pending final adjudication of criminal charges. As relevant here, sections 101 and 102 of that article affirm that all persons, with certain narrowly defined exceptions, are bailable by sufficient sureties pending disposition of the charges against them, and dictate that upon request by any person in custody for whom the court has not already set bond, that person shall be brought before the court and, as long as the offense for which he was arrested is bailable, shall have bond and conditions of release set by the court. §§ 16–4–101 to –102, C.R.S. (2014).
¶ 8 In addition to providing for an early determination of the type of bond and conditions of release for all bailable defendants, the statutory scheme details the purposes to be served by, and the criteria to be considered in making, those determinations, see § 16–4–103, C.R.S. (2014) (); the various types of pretrial bond available for setting by the court, see § 16–4–104, C.R.S. (2014) (); specific conditions of release to be made applicable to bonds, see § 16–4–105, C.R.S. (2014) (); and authorization for the court to modify the conditions of bond, including the procedural prerequisites for doing so, see § 16–4–109, C.R.S. (2014) (). Of particular relevance to the district court's action in this case, section 16–4–105(3) mandates that every bond include the condition that the released person not commit any felony while free on bail bond. In addition to requiring the imposition of this condition, section 105(3) also authorizes the court to take particular action concerning the defendant's bond “if it is shown that a competent court has found probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a felony while released, pending the resolution of a prior felony charge.”
¶ 9 Further, the statutory scheme not only provides its own form of appellate review, but in fact mandates that the expedited procedure prescribed by it be the exclusive method of appellate review of orders entered pursuant to section 16–4–104 (), section 16–4–107 (), or section 16–4–201 (Bail after conviction). See § 16–4–204. Because amendments to the statutory scheme in 2013 re-designated the content of section 16–4–107, with only minor changes, as section 16–4–109, without similarly amending the reference to section 107 in the scheme's provisions for appellate review, see ch. 202, sec. 2, § 16–4–109, 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 830–31; and because the statutory section currently designated section 107 provides for a motion for reconsideration of monetary conditions of bond rather than a court order of any kind, see § 16–4–107, C.R.S. (2014); the question whether the district court's order in this case falls within the scope of the statutorily prescribed expedited appellate review procedure necessarily entails two separate inquiries:
first, whether the orders appealable by section 204 include orders currently authorized at section 109, and second, even if so, whether the district court's order at issue in this case constitutes such an order.
¶ 10 A statute has meaning according to the legislative intent expressed in the language of the statute itself. Pham v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 2013 CO 17, ¶ 13, 296 P.3d 1038, 1043. When the language of a statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable understanding and is therefore considered ambiguous, or when there is conflicting language, a substantial body of interpretive aids, either provided by the legislature to explain its own drafting conventions and preferences for resolving conflicts, see tit. 2, art. 4, C.R.S. (2014), or developed by the courts over centuries, see generally Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes & Statutory Construction (7th ed.2007), determines which of these reasonable understandings embodies the legislative intent. Frank M. Hall & Co., Inc. v. Newsom, 125 P.3d 444,...
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