People v. Jordan
| Decision Date | 20 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 99895.,99895. |
| Citation | 843 N.E.2d 870,218 Ill.2d 255 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Christopher JORDAN, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, Renee G. Goldfarb, Annette Collins, Margaret J. Campos, James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, and John E. Nowak, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Kathleen M. Flynn, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellee.
Defendant, Christopher Jordan, was charged in the circuit court of Cook County with endangering the life and health of a child in violation of section 12-21.6 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-21.6 (West 2002)). Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty and was placed on three months' court supervision. He appealed, arguing that (1) the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the child's life or health was endangered by his actions and (2) the child endangerment statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutional. The appellate court held that the statute contained an unconstitutional presumption, which was severable, and the State's evidence was otherwise insufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court. 354 Ill.App.3d 294, 290 Ill.Dec. 16, 820 N.E.2d 1083. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 134 Ill.2d R. 317.
Section 12-21.6 of the Code provides as follows:
"(a) It is unlawful for any person to willfully cause or permit the life or health of a child under the age of 18 to be endangered or to willfully cause or permit a child to be placed in circumstances that endanger the child's life or health, except that it is not unlawful for a person to relinquish a child in accordance with the Abandoned Newborn Infant Protection Act.
(b) There is a rebuttable presumption that a person committed the offense if he or she left a child 6 years of age or younger unattended in a motor vehicle for more than 10 minutes." 720 ILCS 5/12-21.6(a), (b) (West 2002).
The complaint, as originally filed in this case, charged that the defendant committed the offense of endangering the life or health of a child in that he "knowingly and without legal justification left his child * * * unattended in a motor vehicle with an outside temperature of 22° and a windchill of 12° for approximately one hour." On the day of defendant's bench trial, the State was granted leave to amend the complaint, striking that portion of the charge relating to weather conditions, and rephrasing the pertinent portion of the charge to state that defendant "willfully caused or permitted the life or health" of his child "to be endangered by leaving the child unattended in a vehicle for over ten minutes." Defendant did not object to the amendment. The complaint, in its original and amended form, alleged that defendant, violated subsection (a) of section 12-21.6 of the Code.
Defendant was tried before the court on June 27, 2003. At trial, Reuben Tate testified that he was the supervisor of security at Truman College on February 5, 2003. On that date, in response to a report he received, Tate proceeded to a parking lot on the campus where, after approximately 10 minutes of searching, he located an infant left alone in a vehicle. The infant was crying. Tate estimated that the infant was less than four months old. The outside air temperature was "around the twenties."
Tate could not get into the car because the doors were locked and the windows were shut, so he directed his staff to call the fire department. Fire department personnel arrived approximately 10 minutes after he first located the child, and two police cars arrived approximately 10 minutes after the arrival of the fire truck. After the firefighters opened the car door, they removed the infant, and took her to an ambulance, where her vital signs were checked. Tate stated that it was approximately 30 minutes or more between the time he arrived at the vehicle and the time fire department personnel removed the infant. Defendant did not appear on the scene until after the child had been removed to the ambulance.
Under cross-examination, Tate admitted he had estimated response times. Because the baby was crying, his attention was focused on the baby. He said the infant was located in a vehicle in the back of the main student parking lot, between 200 and 400 feet from the entrance to the school. The child was dressed in a winter coat, gloves, and a hat, and was covered with a blanket. Tate conceded he had no information regarding the air temperature inside the vehicle. Though the baby was crying, to his knowledge, the baby was unharmed.
On redirect, the following colloquy occurred between the prosecutor and Tate:
"Q. You know the child was left alone for 35 to 40 minutes because that's what you told the media news * * *?
A. Right.
Q. You don't know how long the child was left alone before you got there?
A. That's correct.
Q. You were there at least ten minutes?
A. Yes.
Q. You know the child was left for over ten minutes because you were there for over ten minutes?
A. That's correct."
Officer Robert Hightower testified that he was on duty on February 5, 2003, and on that date, he responded to a call at Truman College. The call concerned a child left alone in a motor vehicle. Hightower estimated his response time at 10 minutes. When he arrived, fire department personnel were already on the scene, and the four-month-old infant was still in the vehicle. It was "very cold" that day. Hightower testified that it took the fire department six to eight minutes to get the baby out of the car after his arrival. Shortly after the infant was moved to an ambulance, defendant approached and identified himself as her father. Defendant said he had only been away from the car for five minutes. Hightower stated that he had been on the scene at least 12 minutes prior to defendant's arrival.
Under cross-examination, Hightower described the parking lot where the vehicle was located as "huge," and he noted that the car was parked "very far away" from the school. Defense counsel asked Hightower, "You don't know what the temperature inside of the vehicle was, do you?" Hightower responded, Defense counsel then moved on to another line of inquiry.
Defendant testified that he was a student at Truman College on February 5, 2003, and he went there after 2 p.m. that day to get a textbook at the college bookstore. According to defendant, he had just come from his house, and his infant daughter was sleeping, so he decided to leave her in his vehicle while he went into the school. Defendant said his daughter was dressed in a "full body jumpsuit[,] a hood, gloves," and she was covered with "a very thick wool blanket," with a small sheet under the blanket. Defendant described the weather as windy, but "not cold." Defendant said he parked approximately one-half block from the door of the school. He described the area where he parked as "the front of the main parking lot." Defendant admitted it was a "pretty big lot." According to defendant, it took him about three minutes to get from his vehicle to the bookstore, which was closed, and another three minutes to get back to his car. When he returned, his daughter had just been taken out of his vehicle.
Under cross-examination the prosecutor asked defendant to indicate the distance he walked to the entrance of the school and repeatedly requested that he estimate the time it would have taken him to walk that distance. From the record, it appears that defendant estimated the distance involved as a little longer than the length of the courtroom.
In closing argument, the prosecutor argued, primarily, the rebuttable presumption of subsection (b) of section 12-21.6, focusing on the time period during which the child was left alone in the defendant's vehicle. However, the prosecutor also touched briefly on the weather conditions on the day of the incident. Defense counsel offered his own time calculation—based upon a report which Hightower testified was erroneous—that the child had been alone in the car at most 20 minutes. Although defense counsel also focused on the time element in his argument, he noted that the infant was dressed warmly and there was no testimony that the child had suffered harm from defendant's conduct. Counsel concluded: "This is a stupid act, yes, not a criminal act."
Prior to announcing its decision, the trial court summarized the testimony of each witness, focusing primarily upon the timing of events, but also mentioning the weather conditions on the day of the offense alleged, the distance between defendant's parked vehicle and the school entrance, and the location of the vehicle in the parking lot. The trial court concluded, simply:
As previously noted, the trial court placed defendant on three months' court supervision. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on July 25, 2003. A computer printout in the common law record suggests that the circuit court discharged defendant's supervision on April 12, 2004.
The appellate court filed its decision in this matter on December 8, 2004. 354 Ill.App.3d 294, 290 Ill.Dec. 16, 820 N.E.2d 1083. Relying principally upon our decision in People v. Pomykala, 203 Ill.2d 198, 271 Ill.Dec. 230, 784 N.E.2d 784 (2003), the appellate court held that the rebuttable presumption set forth in subsection (b) of section 12-21.6 is a mandatory presumption...
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