People v. Joseph
Decision Date | 10 November 1983 |
Docket Number | Cr. 21548 |
Citation | 196 Cal.Rptr. 339,34 Cal.3d 936,671 P.2d 843 |
Parties | , 671 P.2d 843 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mariney JOSEPH, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Quin Denvir, under appointment by the Supreme Court, State Public Defender, Edward H. Schulman and J. Courtney Shevelson, Deputy State Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant.
John K. Van de Kamp and George Deukmejian, Attys. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Norman H. Sokolow and Howard J. Schwab, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
This is an automatic appeal from a judgment imposing a penalty of death. (See Pen.Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 1
Appellant Mariney Joseph was convicted by a jury of the first degree murder of Oscar Dent. (§§ 187, 189.) The jury found that he used a firearm in the commission of the murder (§§ 12022.5, 1203.06, subd. (a)(1)), and that the murder was committed during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery. (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(17)(i) and (b).) Appellant was also convicted of the robbery of Lou Reynolds; allegations of firearm use (§ 12022.5) and great bodily injury (§ 12022.7) were found to be true. The Dent-Reynolds offenses arose out of a single incident in which appellant and one or possibly two other men went to a house to rob its residents of money. The jury also convicted appellant of six additional counts of robbery, each with firearm use. These offenses arose out of a separate incident which occurred at a shoeshine parlor approximately one month before the Dent-Reynolds offenses.
Neither party presented any evidence at the penalty phase. (§§ 190.3, 190.4.) The jury fixed the penalty at death.
The only claim of error this court need address is appellant's contention that the trial court erred in denying his timely motion to represent himself. (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562.) The record indicates that an unequivocal assertion of appellant's desire to proceed pro se was made well in advance of trial. As a result, the denial of that motion constituted error. Since the erroneous denial of a timely proffered Faretta motion is reversible per se, the judgment of conviction must be set aside.
Some five months prior to the commencement of trial and before any pretrial motions had been heard, appellant and his appointed counsel, Mr. Armstrong, appeared for a pretrial conference. Counsel informed the court that he and appellant had "such a basic difference" on how the case should be handled that it was impossible for Armstrong to continue representing him. Armstrong also informed the court that appellant was requesting to represent himself. The following colloquy ensued:
The trial court then appointed John Torribio as defense counsel, who continued in that capacity throughout the trial.
Almost a decade ago, the United States Supreme Court held that under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a criminal defendant who is competent may waive the right to counsel and represent himself. (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 807, 819-821, 95 S.Ct. at pp. 2527, 2533-34.) That holding was premised on the "nearly universal conviction, on the part of our people as well as our courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so." (Id., at p. 817, 95 S.Ct. at p. 2532.)
Once a defendant proffers a timely motion to represent himself, the trial court must proceed to determine whether (Ferrel v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 888, 891, 144 Cal.Rptr. 610, 576 P.2d 93; see People v. Teron (1979) 23 Cal.3d 103, 113, 151 Cal.Rptr. 633, 588 P.2d 773, disapproved on another point in People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 750, fn. 7, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837.)
The only determination a trial court must make when presented with a timely Faretta motion is (People v. Teron, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 113, 151 Cal.Rptr. 633, 588 P.2d 773.) One need not pass a "mini-bar examination" in order to exhibit the requisite capacity to make a...
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