People v. Joyce
| Decision Date | 10 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 1495/12.,1495/12. |
| Citation | 57 N.Y.S.3d 676 (Table) |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Joell JOYCE, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Barry Krinsky, Esq., Brooklyn, Appearing on behalf of the defendant.
Courtney Groves & Amanda Levy, Assistant District Attorneys, New York, Appearing on behalf of the People.
By Indictment Number 1495/12, the defendant is charged with Attempted Murder in the Second Degree pursuant to Penal Law Section 110/125.25(1), a class B violent felony offense, and related charges. On June 5, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law Section 30.30(1)(a). The defendant's argument is twofold; that the People should be charged with every adjournment for which they failed to produce him from federal custody, and that the People's subsequent lack of readiness rendered a Certificate of Readiness filed on January 15, 2015, illusory. After careful review of the Supreme Court file, the Court's own notes, the relevant transcripts, and the myriad papers filed by the parties, the Court ordered an evidentiary hearing. The hearing was held before this Court on October 20, 2016. Based on the particular facts and circumstances present in this case, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.1
On March 18, 2012, an accusatory instrument charging the defendant with a felony was filed against him. Pursuant to C.P.L. § 30.30(1)(a), the People are required to be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of the criminal action. As the six month period in which the People are required to be ready for trial is measured by the number of days in the intervening calendar months, the People are required to be ready for trial in this matter within 184 days following the commencement of the action. See People v. Cortes, 80 N.Y.2d 201 (1992). Whether the People have satisfied this obligation is determined by computing the time elapsed between the commencement of the action and the People's declaration of readiness, subtracting any periods of delay that are excludable under the terms of the statute and then adding to the result any post-readiness periods of delay that are attributable to the People and are ineligible for an exclusion. Id. at 208. This Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the speedy trial time incurred in this case.
On March 18, 2012, a felony complaint was filed against the defendant and he was arraigned in Criminal Court. The case was adjourned, pursuant to C.P.L. § 180.80, for grand jury action to March 23, 2012. This time period, as the People concede, is charged to them.
4 days2
On March 23, 2012, as there had been no grand jury action, the case was adjourned to July 12, 2012 for grand jury action. On April 10, 2012, however, the instant indictment was filed against the defendant. The case, therefore, was advanced to May 10, 2012 for the defendant's Supreme Court Arraignment. This time period, as the People concede, is charged to them.
48 days
On May 10, 2012, the defendant was not present in court as, although he had been released on bail in this matter, he had been taken into federal custody in Virginia due to his violation of a federal probationary sentence. The case, therefore, was adjourned to June 14, 2012 for the People to produce the defendant from federal custody and for his Supreme Court arraignment.
The defendant now contends that as the People are responsible for having him produced and failed to do so, they must be charged with this time period, as well as each and every subsequent time period during which he remained in federal custody. The People counter that they acted diligently in attempting to produce the defendant and, therefore, are entitled to a statutory exclusion pursuant to C.P.L. § 30.30(4)(e) for this and other subsequent non-production from federal custody. Indeed, pursuant to C.P.L. § 30.30(4)(e), the People are not charged with "the period of delay from detention of the defendant in another jurisdiction provided the district attorney ... has been diligent and has made reasonable efforts to obtain the presence of the defendant for trial." The People's efforts to secure the defendant's presence from various federal authorities often spanned multiple adjournments as he faced federal charges in different states, was frequently transferred in and between federal correctional facilities in those several states, and in certain circumstances federal authorities were unwilling to release him to state custody. The People's efforts, as a whole, plainly demonstrate their diligence.
Specifically, with respect to the May 10, 2012 adjournment, the People had been made aware that the defendant had been taken into federal custody on or about March 26, 2012, for violating the terms of his supervised release. The People were in contact with the defendant's federal supervised release officer during this time period, who informed them that the defendant had not yet been sentenced on that violation and would not be released to local authorities until that time. Judge Stone was so informed in court on May 10, 2012, and he adjourned the case to June 14, 2012 for the People to secure the defendant's appearance. The People learned from their contact with federal authorities that on May 25, 2012, the defendant was sentenced to four months incarceration for violating the terms of his federal supervised release. The People subsequently learned from federal authorities that the defendant was to be transported to a federal correctional facility to serve that sentence, and that the District Attorney's office would be unable to file a writ pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (hereinafter "IAD"), to secure his appearance until his location had been finalized. The People's research revealed that the defendant would be serving his sentence in a federal correctional facility in Virginia but, as the defendant had been in custody since March 2012, the People were informed by federal authorities that he would be released shortly. As the defendant was to be released imminently, federal authorities informed the People that there was insufficient time for them to file the appropriate paperwork to secure his appearance. Indeed, federal authorities would not consent to the defendant's release to state custody, as it was likely that he would still be in state custody when scheduled to be released from federal custody. The People so informed Judge Stone and defense counsel in court on June 14, 2012, and requested a bench warrant, so that immediately upon his release from federal custody, state authorities could take custody of the defendant. Judge Stone declined to issue a bench warrant, instead directing the People to produce the defendant on the next court date—July 26, 2012—if, rather than being released as scheduled in July, he remained in federal custody. The defendant was released as planned, and, on July 26, 2016, appeared in court. Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the People exercised due diligence throughout this time period. Indeed, the People maintained frequent contact with federal authorities, despite their refusal to release the defendant to state custody, closely monitored the status of the defendant's federal matter, and kept Judge Stone and defense counsel apprised of their efforts to secure the defendant's appearance. Accordingly, this time period, during which the defendant was in federal custody and entirely unavailable to the People, is excluded.
0 days
On July 26, 2012, the defendant appeared in court and was arraigned on the instant indictment. At the defendant's request, Judge Stone set a motion schedule, with a decision on the defendant's omnibus motion to be rendered on September 27, 2012. This time period, related to motion practice, is excluded. See People v. Fagan, 260 A.D.2d 219 (1st Dept.1999).
0 days
On September 27, 2012, Judge Stone issued a written decision with respect to the defendant's omnibus motion. The People filed, off-calendar on September 10, 2012, a motion for a buccal swab with respect to both the defendant and the co-defendant. The co-defendant requested an opportunity to respond to the People's motion in writing and the case was adjourned to October 25, 2012 for that purpose. This time period, related to motion practice, is excluded. See C.P.L. § 30.30(4)(d) ; People v. Delvalle, 265 A.D.2d 174 (1st Dept.1999).
0 days
On October 25, 2012, Judge Stone granted the People's motion for a buccal swab. The case was adjourned to February 14, 2013 for the results of the DNA testing. This time period, during which DNA testing was being conducted, is excluded. See C.P.L. § 30.30(4)(g)(i).
0 days
On February 14, 2013, the People informed the Court that the DNA testing had not yet been completed, explaining that the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (hereinafter "OCME") had notified them that as a result of a backlog caused by Hurricane Sandy in October of 2012, OCME needed an additional sixty days to provide the DNA results.4
Defense counsel then informed the court and the People that federal marshals were present in the courtroom and intended to take the defendant into custody for a second violation of his federal supervised release. Counsel stated he understood that the defendant was going to be transported to a federal correctional facility in Virginia. The Court instructed the People to make efforts to secure the defendant's appearance for the next court date, should he remain in federal custody.
The case was adjourned to April 9, 2014 for the DNA results. This time period, during which DNA testing was being conducted, is...
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