People v. Justice
| Decision Date | 16 May 1997 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 105352,No. 11,11 |
| Citation | 454 Mich. 334,562 N.W.2d 652 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas Raymond JUSTICE, Defendant-Appellant. (After Remand) Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Diane M. Smith, Prosecuting Attorney, and Robert J. Engel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Petoskey, for the People.
Steven C. Bullock, Inkster, for Defendant-Appellant.
Stuart G. Friedman, Livonia, for amicus curiae Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan, Inc.
In the matter before us, this Court is asked to decide whether the district court abused its discretion in binding defendant over on two counts of conspiring to possess with an intent to deliver cocaine, where one count involved more than 650 grams and the other was for over 225 grams but less than 650 grams of cocaine. The only evidence presented regarding each count was the coconspirators' testimony, which established that defendant delivered various amounts of cocaine over defined periods of time.
This Court holds that in order to bind defendant over on the two counts of conspiracy there must be probable cause to believe that defendant and the coconspirators shared the specific intent to accomplish the substantive offenses charged. We conclude, with respect to count I, that the district court's finding that probable cause existed to believe defendant was guilty of conspiracy to possess with an intent to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine did not constitute an abuse of discretion because the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable trier of fact to infer that defendant and the coconspirator had a specific intent to deliver the statutory amount as charged. Also, we conclude, with respect to count II, that it was reasonable to find probable cause existed to believe that defendant conspired with the coconspirator to possess with an intent to deliver over 225 grams but less than 650 grams of cocaine because there was testimony at the preliminary examination that enabled the district court to infer that defendant and his coconspirator specifically intended to combine to deliver over 225 but less than 650 grams of cocaine.
Therefore, we affirm both the Court of Appeals decision concluding that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's bindover on count I and its decision reversing the circuit court's quashing of the indictment on count II.
On June 26, 1991, pursuant to M.C.L. § 767.7b(1), (2); M.S.A. § 28.947(1), (2), defendant was indicted by a multicounty grand jury on two counts of conspiracy to possess with an intent to deliver cocaine. Count I alleges that defendant conspired with Cathy Boyer to possess with an intent to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine between the fall of 1989 and the summer of 1990 in violation of M.C.L. § 333.7401(2)(a)(i); M.S.A. § 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i). Count II alleges that defendant conspired with Suzanne Kausler to possess with an intent to deliver over 225 grams but less than 650 grams of cocaine between March 1990 and December 1990 in A preliminary examination was held on May 13, 1992. At the hearing, it was established that defendant, who lived in Ann Arbor, Michigan, supplied cocaine to Cathy Boyer, who resided in Charlevoix, Michigan. 2 Boyer obtained the cocaine for herself and for her husband. Boyer and her husband were introduced to Suzanne Kausler 3 in February 1990 by a mutual friend, Anna Nawrocki. 4 Boyer eventually began purchasing cocaine on Kausler's behalf. 5 Boyer would give two-thirds of the cocaine she purchased to Kausler, and keep one-third for herself as payment.
violation of M.C.L. § 333.7401(2)(a)(ii); M.S.A. § 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(ii). 1
When Boyer wanted to purchase cocaine, she would telephone defendant. Sometimes she would drive to Ann Arbor to make the purchases, while at other times she and defendant would meet either in West Branch or Bay City, which was approximately halfway between their homes. Boyer's husband, and other individuals, occasionally accompanied her on her trips to Ann Arbor. 6 When Boyer would arrive at defendant's residence, her passengers would usually wait for her while she met with defendant to obtain the cocaine. These individuals were aware of the purpose of the drive and sometimes used some of the cocaine on the drive back. Boyer testified that she drove to Ann Arbor on an irregular basis, but there was testimony that she drove there approximately twice a week, from March through the beginning of May 1990. She drove to Ann Arbor six or seven times before making her first purchase for Kausler and traveled to Ann Arbor an additional six or seven times with Kausler. 7 Boyer also testified that she would receive between three and seven ounces on these trips (approximately between 84 and 196 grams of cocaine).
Boyer purchased approximately fifty-four ounces (1,530.90 grams) of cocaine from defendant between the fall of 1989 until she At the conclusion of the preliminary examination, defendant objected to being bound over, arguing that the people failed to present evidence that would permit a finding that probable cause existed to believe that defendant intended to deliver the statutory amounts as charged, i.e., he intended to combine with Boyer and Kausler, respectively, to deliver the statutory amounts as charged, and Boyer and Kausler intended to combine with defendant to deliver the statutory amounts as charged to a third party. The people argued that case law precedent permitted the aggregating of the various amounts exchanged when conspiracy is at issue. They contended that it was legally permissible to infer defendant's specific intentions to deliver the statutory amounts charged with respect to each count and that a reasonable inference could be made to believe that the cocaine was redistributed to third parties on the basis of volume alone. 11
moved to Florida in May of 1990, because she feared the possibility of a grand jury indictment. Thereafter, Kausler began purchasing directly from defendant. Besides meeting defendant at various locations in Ann Arbor, she met him 8 between [454 Mich. 341] two and five times in West Branch, purchasing anywhere from 56.70 grams to 113.40 grams of cocaine. At some point, defendant knew Kausler was distributing to others some of the cocaine she received. 9 Additionally, on at least one occasion, defendant drove to Kausler's residence to visit and bring her cocaine. At that same time, defendant and Kausler reached an agreement "for a very large purchase" of 226.80 grams of cocaine. She paid him approximately $8,800. Kausler purchased approximately twenty ounces (567 grams) of cocaine from the time Boyer moved to Florida until December 1990. 10
Finding persuasive the people's contention, the district court concluded that probable cause existed to believe defendant committed the charged offenses.
On November 3, 1992, the circuit court concluded that the district court abused its discretion, finding that there was insufficient evidence at the preliminary examination "to establish probable cause that the defendant conspired to deliver the volume charged."
The Court of Appeals peremptorily reversed the circuit court's order and reinstated the charges. On February 28, 1994, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, this Court vacated the Court of Appeals peremptory order and remanded the matter for plenary consideration. 12 On December 28, 1995, the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's
order and reinstated the charges. We subsequently granted defendant's motion for immediate consideration. 13
In a preliminary examination, a district court's function is to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to cause an individual marked by discreetness and caution to have a reasonable belief that the defendant is guilty as charged. People v. King, 412 Mich. 145, 152-153, 312 N.W.2d 629 (1981); People v. Asta, 337 Mich. 590, 60 N.W.2d 472 (1953). 14 A bindover is not a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, " '[a] preliminary hearing,' " the Supreme Court has said, " 'is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial.' " Coleman v. Burnett, 155 U.S. App DC 302, 316, 477 F.2d 1187 (1973), quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1322, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968). 15 InColeman, the court stated:
It is the contrast of probable cause and proof beyond a reasonable doubt that inevitably makes for examinatorial differences between the preliminary hearing and the trial. Probable cause signifies evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused's guilt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, on the other hand, connotes evidence strong enough to create an abiding conviction of guilt to a moral certainty. The gap between these two concepts is broad. A magistrate may become satisfied about probable cause on much less than he would need to be convinced. Since he does not sit to pass on guilt or innocence, he could legitimately find probable cause while personally entertaining some reservations. By the same token, a showing of probable cause may stop considerably short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and evidence that leaves some doubt may yet demonstrate probable cause. [Id. at 316-317, 477 F.2d 1187 (emphasis added).]
The decision to bind a defendant over is reviewed for abuse of discretion. King, supra; People v. Talley, 410 Mich. 378, 301 N.W.2d 809 (1981). Thus, in this case, we review for abuse of discretion the district court's determination that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a bindover on each count of conspiracy, i.e., we decide whether the...
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