People v. Keagle
| Decision Date | 29 March 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 40058,40058 |
| Citation | 37 Ill.2d 96,224 N.E.2d 834 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Robert KEAGLE, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Gerald W. Getty, Public Defender, Chicago, appointed by the court (James J. Doherty, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane, Morton Friedman, and James B. Klein, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for appellee.
Robert Keagle, hereafter defendant, is presently serving a sentence of 25 years to life for armed robbery. His petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 38, par. 122--1 et seq.) was denied by the circuit court of Cook County, and he has appealed. He contends that his conviction must be reversed because it was obtained by twice putting him in jeopardy for the same offense, in violation of his rights under the constitutions of this State and of the United States.
To determine this issue a lengthy course of litigation must be reviewed. In 1952 the defendant, William Seppi, and Andrew Mikka were jointly indicted. The first count of the indictment charged robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon, the second count made the same charge and also charged the defendant as an habitual criminal, and the third count charged plain robbery. At the close of this trial the judge instructed the jury:
'If the jury find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants were so armed with a dangerous weapon, to-wit: PISTOLS, they should say so in their verdict.'
Three verdict forms were submitted to the jury. The first was for an acquittal. The second was as follows:
'We, the jury, find the defendant, (naming him), guilty of robbery, in manner and form as charged in the indictment.
'And we further find from the evidence that at the time of the commission of said robbery, the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a pistol.
'And we further find from the evidence that the said defendant, (naming him), is now about the age of _ _ years.'
The third form, which was returned by the jury, was as follows:
The jury returned the first two forms unused, and signed and returned the third form. Judgment was entered on that verdict and the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment.
The defendant sued out a writ of error from this court. The Attorney General confessed error, and on his motion this court reversed, and remanded the cause for a new trial 'with directions to strike the portion of the indictment, (the second count) referring to the previous offense of robbery, to require a plea to the indictment to the extent of the charge of armed robbery, and for a new trial.' (People v. Keagle, No. 32913, September Term, 1953 (not reported).) The reversal was based upon the fact that, although the evidence showed that the defendant had previously been convicted of robbery and imprisoned in the penitentiary, the habitual criminal portion of the indictment omitted the allegation that the defendant had actually been imprisoned in the penitentiary upon the previous offense. Cf. People v. Mikka, 7 Ill.2d 454, 463, 131 N.E.2d 79.
Upon remand the attorney for the defendant interposed a plea in bar of Autrefois acquit to the charge of armed robbery, on the ground that the original verdict convicted the defendant of plain robbery, and amounted to an acquittal of the greater offense of armed robbery. The trial court, following the mandate of this court, overruled the plea in bar. The defendant was tried and convicted of armed robbery, and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 25 years nor more than life, the sentence he is presently serving.
The defendant again sued out a writ of error, Pro se, from this court. He made ten separate allegations of error in his fifty-page brief, and one of them was that the 'Court erred by twice putting the defendant in jeopardy for the same offense.' The court rejected all of his contentions. (People v. Keagle, 7 Ill.2d 408, 131 N.E.2d 74.) Thereafter the defendant filed a post-conviction petition in which he charged that the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony at his trial. On January 24, 1958, in an unreported Memorandum Order (No. 2404) this court stated its reasons for affirming the trial court's dismissal of this post-conviction petition.
The defendant then sought leave to file an original Habeas corpus action in this court; leave was denied without opinion, on September 28, 1965. He then filed a petition for a writ of Habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. In that court the Attorney General of Illinois argued that the defendant had not exhausted his State remedies because he failed to proceed under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. This argument was apparently the result of oversight, for the record in this court makes it clear that the defendant had previously filed a post-conviction petition with the result that has been described. Chief Judge William J. Campbell first held, relying on United States ex rel. Crump v. Sain, (7th cir.) 264 F.2d 424, that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies was satisfied, without a post-conviction proceeding, if the highest court of the State had decided the issue sought to be raised in the Federal Habeas corpus petition. In his Memorandum and Order he then stated: Chief Judge Campbell then denied the defendant's petition for a writ of Habeas corpus 'without consideration of the issues raised therein' and dismissed the cause 'without prejudice to the institution of a proper proceeding in the State Courts.'
The defendant then brought the present action in the circuit court of Cook County. That court considered the matter on the merits, and held that the verdict in the original trial could only have applied to the second count of the indictment, which charged armed robbery, because no other count charged the defendant with being an habitual criminal. The court therefore concluded that the defendant had not been subjected to double jeopardy, and denied his petition for post-conviction relief. The case is before us on the defendant's appeal.
The State contends that the defendant's claim of...
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People v. Lewis, 58910
...in the process of adjudication, there has been any infringement of the constitutional rights of the defendant. (People v. Keagle (1967), 37 Ill.2d 96, 101, 224 N.E.2d 834; People v. Reeves (1952), 412 Ill. 555, Page 913 [85 Ill.Dec. 314] 559, 107 N.E.2d 861; People v. Evans (1952), 412 Ill.......
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People v. Kauffman, 1-97-1849.
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Ortiz v. District Court In and For Las Animas County, 80SA165
...... After the district attorney confessed the motion for a new trial, 5 the People, on December 11, 1979, filed new informations charging each petitioner with second-degree assault, third-degree assault, menacing, and crime of ... 1 People v. Keagle, 37 Ill.2d 96, 224 N.E.2d 834 (1967). A jury verdict of guilt on one charge does not automatically convert a jury's silence on other charges into ......