People v. Keegan

• Decision Date: 20 November 2015
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Kelly J. KEEGAN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

133 A.D.3d 1313

20 N.Y.S.3d 796

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Kelly J. KEEGAN, Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Nov. 20, 2015.

D.J. & J.A. Cirando, Esqs., Syracuse (John A. Cirando of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.

Cindy F. Intschert, District Attorney, Watertown (Wendy Lehmann, New York Prosecutors Training Institute, Inc., Albany, of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND VALENTINO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of one count each of assault in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.10[3] ), assault in the third degree (§ 120.00[2] ), and reckless assault of a child (§ 120.02[1] ), and two counts each of assault in the second degree (§ 120.05[8], [9] ) and endangering the welfare of a child (§ 260.10[1] ). The convictions arose out of two separate incidents, one in February 2011, in which the infant victim's ears were injured, and a second in March 2011, in which the child, then not yet a year old, suffered a traumatic brain injury and other debilitating permanent injuries.

Contrary to defendant's contention, County Court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to sever those counts of the indictment relating to the February 2011 incident from those counts relating to the March 2011 incident. The counts are joinable because they "are defined by the same or similar statutory provisions and consequently are the same or similar in law" (CPL 200.20[2][c] ), and defendant failed to show good cause for a discretionary severance under CPL 200.20(3) (see People v. Gaston, 100 A.D.3d 1463, 1464–1465, 953 N.Y.S.2d 780 ; see generally People v. Mahboubian, 74 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 544 N.Y.S.2d 769, 543 N.E.2d 34 ).

Defendant further contends that his statements to the police were involuntary because his "emotional state caused his will to be overborne," and that the court therefore erred in refusing to suppress those statements. Inasmuch as defendant failed to seek suppression of the statements on that ground, he failed to preserve that contention for our review (see generally People v. Ricks, 49 A.D.3d 1265, 1266, 856 N.Y.S.2d 346, lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 869, 860 N.Y.S.2d 495, 890 N.E.2d 258, reconsideration denied 11 N.Y.3d 740, 864 N.Y.S.2d 399, 894 N.E.2d 663 ). In any event, we conclude that "[t]he evidence at the suppression hearing does not establish that defendant's will was overborne or that defendant's capacity for self-determination was critically impaired" (People v. Worth, 233 A.D.2d 939, 940–941, 649 N.Y.S.2d 573 ), and thus defendant's contention lacks merit. By failing to object to the testimony of a police officer concerning his prior dealings with defendant, defendant likewise failed to preserve for our review his contention that the officer's testimony was improper (see CPL 470.05[2] ). In any event, the court sua sponte issued a curative instruction, and the court's instruction was "sufficient to alleviate any prejudice to defendant" (People v. Hogan, 292 A.D.2d 834, 834, 739 N.Y.S.2d 311, lv. denied 98 N.Y.2d 676, 746 N.Y.S.2d 465, 774 N.E.2d 230 ).

We reject defendant's contention that certain photographs of the infant victim were improperly admitted in evidence. In order to prove that defendant committed the offense of assault in the first degree, the People were required to establish that defendant acted recklessly and with a depraved indifference to human life, and thereby caused serious physical injury to the infant victim (see Penal Law § 120.10[3] ). Because "the extent of the injuries was a major element in the prosecution's proof that defendant acted with a depraved indifference to human life, the introduction of the photographs cannot be considered to have been solely motivated by a desire to inflame the jury" (People v. Arca, 72 A.D.2d 205, 207, 424 N.Y.S.2d 569 ; see generally People v. Pobliner, 32 N.Y.2d 356, 369, 345 N.Y.S.2d 482, 298 N.E.2d 637, rearg. denied 33 N.Y.2d 657, 348 N.Y.S.2d 1030, 303 N.E.2d 710, cert. denied 416 U.S. 905, 94 S.Ct. 1609, 40 L.Ed.2d 110 ).

Defendant also contends that he was denied his constitutional right to present a defense because a police officer testified inaccurately at trial about a statement made by defendant, and the People failed to notify defendant, pursuant to CPL 710.30, of their intent to offer that inaccurate testimony at trial. We reject that contention. At the hearing on defendant's posttrial motion, the police officer testified that he had inaccurately testified at trial about defendant's statement based on an unfounded assumption about that statement. Inasmuch as the officer's inaccurate testimony was inconsistent with defendant's statement to the police, which was thereafter admitted in evidence at trial, the court properly struck that testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it. In addition, the prosecutor stipulated before the jury that the testimony in question was inaccurate. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the police officer's inaccurate testimony did not deny defendant his constitutional right to present a defense, and the court therefore properly denied defendant's mistrial motion and posttrial motion to set aside the verdict on that ground.

Defendant failed to object to the jury charge as given, and therefore failed to preserve for our review his contention that the jury charge was improper (see generally People v. Robinson, 88 N.Y.2d 1001, 1001–1002, 648 N.Y.S.2d 869, 671 N.E.2d 1266 ). In any event, contrary to defendant's contention, the court properly charged the jury that defendant could intend to cause physical injury for purposes of the assault in the second degree count while at the same time "recklessly creat[ing] ‘a grave risk that a different, more serious result ... would ensue from his actions' " for purposes of the assault in the first degree count (People v. Belcher, 289 A.D.2d 1039, 1039, 735 N.Y.S.2d 299, lv. denied 97 N.Y.2d 751, 742 N.Y.S.2d 611, 769 N.E.2d 357, quoting People v. Trappier, 87 N.Y.2d 55, 59, 637 N.Y.S.2d 352, 660 N.E.2d 1131 ). The court also properly denied defendant's request for an "entire case" circumstantial evidence charge because the evidence adduced at trial was not wholly circumstantial (see e.g. People v. Bryce, 174 A.D.2d 945, 946, 571 N.Y.S.2d 638, lv. denied 79 N.Y.2d 854, 580 N.Y.S.2d 725, 588 N.E.2d 760 ).

Defendant further contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction of assault in the first degree because the People failed to establish that he acted with depraved indifference.

We reject that contention. Despite the infliction of serious injuries upon the infant victim, including a traumatic brain injury, defendant failed to seek medical treatment until the infant victim became fully unresponsive. Under these circumstances, the jury "could have rationally found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant consciously disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk that death or serious injury would result" from his actions (People v. Barboni, 21 N.Y.3d 393, 405, 971 N.Y.S.2d 729, 994 N.E.2d 820 ). While defendant also contends that the People failed to prove with respect to the March 2011 incident that he alone could have caused the injuries suffered by the infant victim, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to establish that the child was in defendant's sole custody at the time the injuries were inflicted (see People v. Walter, 128 A.D.3d 1512, 1512–1513, 8...