People v. Kelan W. (In re Kelan W.)
| Decision Date | 01 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | 5-21-0029 |
| Citation | 2021 IL App (5th) 210029,191 N.E.3d 1252,455 Ill.Dec. 544 |
| Parties | IN RE KELAN W., a Minor The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Kelan W., Respondent-Appellee |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James A. Gomric, State's Attorney, of Belleville (Patrick Delfino and Patrick D. Daly, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
James E. Chadd, Ellen J. Curry, and Eun Sun Nam, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee.
¶ 2 Respondent, Kelan W., a minor, was charged with aggravated vehicular hijacking, unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, aggravated unlawful use of weapon, and misdemeanor theft in an amended petition for adjudication of wardship (petition) filed on September 28, 2020. The petition alleged that the respondent committed aggravated vehicular hijacking in the State of Missouri and committed the other offenses in Illinois. The charge of aggravated vehicular hijacking referenced section 570.023.1 of the Missouri Revised Criminal Code ( Mo. Ann. Stat. § 570.023.1 (West Supp. 2017)), first degree robbery, while charging the respondent under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) ( 705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)) with a violation of section 18-4(a)(5) of the Criminal Code of 2012 ( 720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(5) (West 2020)).1 The vehicular hijacking charge alleged that "[o]n or about 08-27-2020, the said minor, while in the State of Missouri, knowingly took a motor vehicle, a 2019 Volkswagen Jetta from the person of Joshua Luterman, by force or the threat of use of force, while the minor was armed with a firearm."
¶ 3 The statute the respondent allegedly violated was section 570.023 of the Missouri Revised Criminal Code, which reads as follows: Mo. Ann. Stat. § 570.023.1(2) (West Supp. 2017).2 The corresponding Illinois law would be aggravated vehicular hijacking pursuant to section 18-4(a)(4)3 of the Criminal Code of 2012, which reads, "A person commits aggravated vehicular hijacking when he or she violates Section 18-3; and *** (4) he or she carries on or about his or her person or is otherwise armed with a firearm ***." 720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4) (West 2020). On September 30, 2020, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the aggravated vehicular hijacking charge on the grounds that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear a prosecution of the respondent for acts committed entirely in Missouri.
¶ 4 The State filed a response on October 6, 2020. It asserted that juvenile and criminal prosecutions are discrete, that juvenile court procedure is defined by statute, and that the Juvenile Court Act by statutory definition permits the prosecution of the respondent in Illinois for an offense committed in Missouri. It noted that respondent forcibly stole a vehicle at gunpoint in Missouri and then fled in the vehicle to Illinois, where he was arrested. After hearing oral arguments on the motion to dismiss, the circuit court entered an order on January 6, 2021, which stated that "in the Court's opinion, based on the evidence presented, the Court does not have the authority or required jurisdiction to rule over violations of Missouri law." The State filed a timely notice of appeal on February 2, 2021. For the following reasons, we reverse.
¶ 6 Before we turn to the merits of this appeal, we first address Illinois Supreme Court Rule 660A (eff. July 1, 2018), which requires accelerated disposition in appeals involving delinquent minors. Under Rule 660A, we are directed to issue our decision within 150 days after the filing of the notice of appeal, except for good cause shown. Ill. S. Ct. R. 660A(f) (eff. July 1, 2018). In order to give this case the attention it deserves, this court finds it necessary to file this disposition past the due date, and we find good cause to issue our decision after the 150-day deadline.
¶ 7 This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) and Rule 660A. This case involves a question of statutory interpretation, a purely legal question, and as such the standard of review is de novo. People v. Begay , 2018 IL App (1st) 150446, ¶ 40, 426 Ill.Dec. 847, 117 N.E.3d 264.
¶ 8 Turning to the merits, the State argues on appeal that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the charge of aggravated vehicular hijacking contained in the State's petition on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction over a juvenile who committed an offense in another state. The State further argued that the circuit court erred in finding that it lacked authority to preside over a proceeding enforcing a law of another state. According to the State's argument, the circuit court accepted the respondent's argument that only violations of Illinois law may be pursued under the Juvenile Court Act. Because that ruling is directly contrary to the plain language of the Juvenile Court Act ( 705 ILCS 405/5-715 (West 2020) ), we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 9 The respondent argues that this court should affirm the circuit court's ruling that it did not have jurisdiction to preside over a juvenile who committed an offense in any other state nor authority to preside over a violation of Missouri law. In support of that argument, respondent offers arguments targeted at practicality, policy, and fairness. For example, the respondent argues that prosecution in Illinois for an offense occurring in another state may be impractical where counsel would be required to interview witnesses in another state, issue subpoenas through another state, and familiarize themselves with the laws of another state.
¶ 10 We recognize that attorneys in this state regularly must interview witnesses in other states and our courts must expend resources to coordinate those witnesses’ testimony before our tribunals. Further, attorneys in the State of Illinois must often familiarize themselves with statutes of other jurisdictions. The legislature is the body vested with the responsibility of codifying public policy into law. People ex rel. Madigan v. Bertrand , 2012 IL App (1st) 111419, ¶ 35, 365 Ill.Dec. 426, 978 N.E.2d 681. The narrow issue in this appeal is whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent for an offense that was not committed in Illinois. The question requires only an interpretation of the relevant juvenile jurisdiction statute and not consideration of any potential inconvenience to counsels or courts.
¶ 11 The juvenile court system is a creature of legislative design. People v. M.A. , 124 Ill. 2d 135, 141, 124 Ill.Dec. 511, 529 N.E.2d 492 (1988). The legislature has the prerogative of establishing procedural rules for access to the juvenile courts in Illinois. People v. Patterson , 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 104, 388 Ill.Dec. 834, 25 N.E.3d 526. As such, the legislature has specifically described the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as follows:
705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2020).
¶ 12 Our primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc. , 238 Ill. 2d 455, 461, 345 Ill.Dec. 644, 939 N.E.2d 487 (2010). The plain language of a statute is the most reliable indication of legislative intent. DeLuna v. Burciaga , 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59, 306 Ill.Dec. 136, 857 N.E.2d 229 (2006). When the language of the statute is clear, it must be applied as written without resort to aids or tools of interpretation. Id. This court cannot read into the plain statutory language exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. People v. Youngblood , 365 Ill. App. 3d 210, 211, 302 Ill.Dec. 631, 849 N.E.2d 423 (2006). Moreover, this court should give independent meaning to all words in the statute. People v. Glisson , 202 Ill. 2d 499, 505, 270 Ill.Dec. 57, 782 N.E.2d 251 (2002). Where, as here, the circuit court's power to act is controlled by statute, the circuit court must proceed within the strictures of the statute and may not take any action that exceeds its statutory authority. People ex rel. Devine v. Stralka , 226 Ill. 2d 445, 453-54, 315 Ill.Dec. 664, 877 N.E.2d 416 (2007). Further, a court exercising jurisdiction over a juvenile pursuant to the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act is not at liberty to reject or embellish its statutory authority, even if there is a perceived need or desirability for such action. Id. at 454, 315 Ill.Dec. 664, 877 N.E.2d 416.
¶ 13 We are not authorized to construe a statute other than by its plain language where its plain language is clear and unambiguous. Bertrand , 2012 IL App (1st) 111419, ¶ 35, 365 Ill.Dec. 426, 978 N.E.2d 681. The jurisdictional statute allowing for proceedings to be initiated under the Juvenile Court Act is not ambiguous. The statute permits proceedings to be instituted in the juvenile court for any violation or attempted violation, "regardless of where the act occurred, [of] any federal, State, county or municipal law or ordinance." 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2020). Unlike a criminal...
To continue reading
Request your trial