People v. Kelly

• Decision Date: 31 December 2015
• Citation: 23 N.Y.S.3d 512,134 A.D.3d 1571
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Louis KELLY, Jr., Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

134 A.D.3d 1571

23 N.Y.S.3d 512

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Louis KELLY, Jr., Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Dec. 31, 2015.

Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Bridget L. Field of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.

Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Daniel Gross of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, WHALEN, and DeJOSEPH, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

On appeal from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03[3] ), defendant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction because the People failed to present evidence that he constructively possessed the handgun while he was a passenger in the minivan in which the handgun was found. We reject that contention. Defendant admitted to a police investigator that he possessed the handgun for at least two months prior to the time that it was found, he was the only backseat passenger in the minivan, and the handgun was found in plain view protruding from a pocket on the back of the front passenger seat. We conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, is legally sufficient to support defendant's conviction on a theory of either actual or constructive possession (see generally People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ).

Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree as charged to the jury (see id. ), we reject defendant's further contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence with respect to that crime (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Even assuming, arguendo, that an acquittal would not have been unreasonable, we note that, where, as here, "witness credibility is of paramount importance to the determination of guilt or innocence, [we] must give [g]reat deference ... [to the jury's] opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony and observe demeanor" (People v. Harris, 15 A.D.3d 966, 967, 788 N.Y.S.2d 745, lv. denied 4 N.Y.3d 831, 796 N.Y.S.2d 586, 829 N.E.2d 679 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). We decline to disturb the jury's resolution of the conflict between the testimony of the police investigator and the testimony of defendant. The jury's resolution of that conflict was reasonable, particularly in view of the fact that defendant's testimony contradicted the statements he had previously made to the police investigator at the time of his arrest.

We agree with defendant that County Court failed to make the proper two-part inquiry pursuant to People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 438 N.Y.S.2d 261, 420 N.E.2d 59 with respect to testimony that defendant told the police that he did not wish to reduce his statement to writing because, "based on his experience, nothing good would come of that," which was an apparent reference to prior contact with the criminal justice system. The court should have precluded that testimony, which "did not relate to a relevant and material issue in the case" (People v. Judd, 96 A.D.3d 784, 784, 945 N.Y.S.2d 569, lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 998, 951 N.Y.S.2d 474, 975 N.E.2d 920 ). Nonetheless, we conclude that the error in...