People v. King

• Decision Date: 26 March 2014
• Citation: 115 A.D.3d 986,982 N.Y.S.2d 178,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 02080
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Darnell KING, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

115 A.D.3d 986

982 N.Y.S.2d 178

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 02080

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Darnell KING, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

March 26, 2014.

Del Atwell, East Hampton, N.Y., for appellant.

Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Hae Jin Liu, Laurie G. Sapakoff, and Steven A. Bender of counsel), for respondent.

RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., SANDRA L. SGROI, JEFFREY A. COHEN, and HECTOR D. LASALLE, JJ.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Zambelli, J.), rendered July 5, 2011, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant's contentions that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered because it was precipitated by the trial court's improper denial of his motion to suppress evidence, and by his attorney's failure to properly address this issue, are unpreserved for appellate review since he did not move to withdraw his plea on these grounds prior to sentencing ( see People v. Vasquez, 40 A.D.3d 1134, 837 N.Y.S.2d 693). In any event, a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court ( see People v. Nixon, 21 N.Y.2d 338, 353–354, 287 N.Y.S.2d 659, 234 N.E.2d 687,cert. denied393 U.S. 1067, 89 S.Ct. 721, 21 L.Ed.2d 709), whose determination generally will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion ( see People v. DeLeon, 40 A.D.3d 1008, 1009, 837 N.Y.S.2d 189). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's pro se application to withdraw his plea of guilty. The defendant entered his plea of guilty knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, having reached a favorable plea bargain with the assistance of competent counsel with whose representation the defendant was satisfied ( see People v. Wiedmer, 71 A.D.3d 1067, 896 N.Y.S.2d 686). The defendant's unsubstantiated claim that his plea was involuntary was refuted by his statements during the plea allocution ( see id.;People v. Torres, 68 A.D.3d 1142, 892 N.Y.S.2d 156).

The defendant's contention that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel is based, in part, on matter appearing on record and, in part, on matter outside the record and, thus, constitutes a “mixed claim[ ]” of ineffective assistance ( see People v. Maxwell, 89 A.D.3d 1108, 1109, 933 N.Y.S.2d 386, quoting People v. Evans, 16 N.Y.3d 571, 575 n. 2, 925 N.Y.S.2d 366, 949 N.E.2d 457,cert. denied––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 325, 181 L.Ed.2d 201). In this case, it is not evident from the matter appearing on the record that the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel ( cf. People v. Crump, 53 N.Y.2d 824, 440 N.Y.S.2d 170, 422 N.E.2d 815;People v. Brown, 45 N.Y.2d 852, 410 N.Y.S.2d 287, 382 N.E.2d 1149). Since the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be resolved without reference to matter outside the record, a CPL 440.10 proceeding is the appropriate forum for reviewing the claim in its entirety ( see People v. Freeman, 93 A.D.3d 805, 806, 940 N.Y.S.2d 314;People v. Maxwell, 89...