People v. Kloster
| Decision Date | 21 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | A164557 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEPHEN KLOSTER, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
City & County of San Francisco Super. Ct. No. 232289
Defendant Stephen Kloster appeals a judgment convicting him of misdemeanor battery. Defendant contends his conviction must be reversed because he was denied his federal Sixth Amendment and California constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial. We find no prejudicial error and affirm the judgment.
On December 6, 2019, defendant was charged by information with among other things, one count each of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen Code,[1] § 245, subd. (a)(4)), elder abuse likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 368, subd (b)(1)) and false imprisonment of an elder (§ 368, subd (f)).[2] At his arraignment on December 16, defendant declined to waive his speedy trial rights. The trial court determined that under section 1382, the trial was required to commence by February 14, 2020.[3] On February 10, 2020, the trial court found good cause to continue the trial to February 21 on the prosecutor's motion, based on the unavailability of a witness.[4] Four days later, defendant entered a general waiver of his speedy trial rights.
On August 4, defendant withdrew his general time waiver, and the court set the latest trial date of October 5, 2020. Defendant, who had been in custody since his arrest in November 2019, was released on his own recognizance at this time.
On September 9, the trial court granted defendant's request for mental health diversion. Trial was continued during the pendency of defendant's diversion until it terminated unsuccessfully on February 3, 2021.
On February 5, defendant was remanded into custody and again declined to enter a general time waiver. The court identified the last date for trial under section 1382 as April 6, 2021.
On April 6, the court found good cause to continue the trial "due to exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, under Federal, State and Local emergency proclamations and in consideration of public health due to the Covid-19 pandemic." Trial was set for June 18, 2021. Continuing to rely on the Covid-19 pandemic as good cause, the trial was continued twice more over defendant's objection, first to August 20, 2021, and then to December 15, 2021.
After the second continuance, defendant again filed a motion to dismiss based on speedy trial grounds. Defendant argued that the pandemic no longer constituted good cause for the continuance because the San Francisco Superior Court was no longer under pandemic-related restrictions and because the court was failing to move through its backlog of cases as expeditiously as other local courts. The trial court denied the motion. The court explained, The court also noted that part of the delay stemmed from the fact that defendant asserted his speedy trial rights in February 2021, when the court was still in the "throes of the pandemic."
Trial commenced December 28, 2021.[5] On December 30, 2021, the court granted defendant's motion for acquittal on the false imprisonment charge. On January 5, 2022, the jury announced that it could not reach a verdict on the aggravated assault charge, acquitted defendant of elder abuse, and convicted him of the lesser included offense of simple battery (§ 242). The trial court granted a mistrial on the aggravated assault charge and granted the prosecutor's subsequent motion to dismiss that charge.
Defendant was sentenced to six months in jail against which the court applied 440 days of custody credits. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
Both the state and federal Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial "and both guarantees operate in state criminal prosecutions." (People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 754 citing U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15, cl. 1.) Additionally," '[t]o implement an accused's constitutional right to a speedy trial, the Legislature enacted section 1382.'" (Burgos v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 817, 825; see also People v. Martinez, supra, at p. 766 [].)
To determine whether a speedy trial violation has occurred under the Sixth Amendment, we apply the balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530 (Barker) which consists of" 'four separate enquiries: whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result.'" (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 233 (Williams).) The burden of demonstrating a speedy trial violation lies with the defendant. (Ibid.)
Defendant incorrectly contends that it is the People's burden to establish that the violation of his speedy trial right under the federal Constitution was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. Prejudice resulting from a delay in bringing a case to trial is an element of the speedy trial violation on which defendant bears the burden of proof. Although an uncommonly long delay in bringing a case to trial may give rise to a "presumption of prejudice" sufficient "to trigger the Barker enquiry," in balancing the Barker factors, the trial court must nonetheless consider whether defendant suffered unjustified prejudice as a result of the delay. (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 234, 235-236.)[6] Defendant's claim under the federal Constitution may be rejected rather summarily. Defendant was brought to trial just over two years after the filing of the information in this case. The record establishes that a significant portion of the delay was at defendant's request or caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Within three months of the filing of the information, defendant waived time so that his suitability for mental health diversion could be evaluated. The evaluation took approximately six months. Then, for five months, the matter was continued so that defendant, who was then released from custody, could participate in mental health diversion. When defendant's diversion was terminated in February 2021, the courts were operating at reduced volume due to the pandemic. After the courts were fully opened in late June 2021, defendant's case was tried within six months. Thus, aside from the portion of the delay caused by defendant's participation in mental health diversion and the approximately five months during which the courts were operating under pandemic restrictions, the delay in bringing the case to trial is at most six months. And some portion of that period was justified as the court worked through the backlog of cases that had accumulated during the pandemic. Defendant has not established that he suffered any significant prejudice as a result of that minimal delay.
"Whether defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the delay must be assessed in light of the interests the speedy trial right was designed to protect: '(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.'" (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 235, quoting Barker, supra, 407 U.S at p. 532.) Defendant argues the delay was prejudicial because his pretrial incarceration was oppressive and anxiety inducing as a result of the risk of illness and pandemic restrictions, and because the total time he served in custody before trial was more than the maximum sentence for the offense of which he was convicted. Defendant's pretrial incarceration during the pandemic was likely anxiety inducing, but six months of pretrial incarceration is far less than...
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