People v. Kubic

• Citation: 62 Cal.Rptr. 287,254 Cal.App.2d 470
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 19 September 1967
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Respondent, v. Leon KUBIC, Anne Kubic, S. Roger Janis, Estelle C. Janis, Defendants, Cross-Complainants and Appellants, Los Angeles County Flood Control District, Defendant. Civ. 30778.

Page 287

62 Cal.Rptr. 287

254 Cal.App.2d 470

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Respondent, v. Leon KUBIC, Anne Kubic, S. Roger Janis, Estelle C. Janis, Defendants, Cross-Complainants and Appellants, Los Angeles County Flood Control District, Defendant.

Civ. 30778.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Sept. 19, 1967.

Hearing Denied Nov. 15, 1967.

Allen, Fasman & Wolf, Leonard S. Wolf and Albert H. Allen, Beverly Hills, for defendants, cross-complainants and appellants.

Harry S. Fenton, Chief Counsel, Sacramento, R. B. Pegram, Deputy Chief Counsel, Richard L. Franck, Philip F. Lanzafame and Robert W. Vidor, Attys., Dept of Public Works, State of California, Los Angeles, for plaintiff, cross-defendant and respondent.

KINGSLEY, Associate Justice.

This action was begun by the state to condemn real property owned by the Los Angeles County Flood Control District. A certain portion of the property sought to be condemned by the state, hereinafter called parcel A, is improved with paved ramps, which ramps provide the only means of ingress and agress to four parcels of land, hereinafter called B, C, D, and E. Defendants own parcels B, D and E and have a nonexclusive easement over a 30 foot strip owned by Standard Oil, hereinafter called parcel C. The location and relation of these parcels is shown on the map appended to this opinion.

In 1953, the state acquired certain real property from Standard Oil in the vicinity of Rosecrans and Summerdale for the purpose of constructing the Long Beach freeway. It was agreed that the state would provide a means of access to Standard Oil's remaining property, parcels B and C. Since the property lying between parcel B and Rosecrans Avenue was owned by the district, the state applied to the district for a permit to construct ramps over the district's real property. The usual permit issued by the district was revocable for flood control purposes, but at the insistence of Standard Oil, the provisions concerning revocability were deleted. The district issued a flood control encroachment permit in favor of the state. The state agreed to pay Standard Oil $3,419 for certain real property, and in 1955 the state promised access to parcels B and C as follows:

'Access to grantor's remaining property located easterly of the proposed freeway and westerly of the Los Angeles River will be by means of an access ramp from the north side of Resecrans Avenue as shown on plans and profiles previously submitted to grantor. The right of grantor to use said ramp over the property of the Los Angeles County Flood Control District is by means of Flood Control District Permit No. 54024--B dated March 15, 1954, a copy of which is attached hereto marked Exhibit 'A' and by this reference made a part hereof.'

The ramps were constructed by the state, one ramp leading to Standard Oil's property, and the other to the levee of the flood control district. Since the ramps were to be used as a means of furnishing access by the district to the levee of the Los Angeles River, a gate was put up to prevent unauthorized personnel from using the ramp which leads to the top of the levee. There was also a gate leading to the Standard Oil property. After the ramps were completed they were principally used by Standard Oil to inspect and maintain its pipelines which were located on parcel C.

Parcel D, which became landlocked as a result of the construction of the freeway, was owned by the state at this time, and was not sold to Leon Kubic until 1960. The deed to Kubic said the grantee understood that the property was landlocked. This parcel is immediately adjacent to parcel C. After the acquisition of parcel D in 1960 by Kubic, Kubic bought parcel B from Standard Oil in 1961, and a nonexclusive easement from Standard Oil over parcel C. Kubic's purpose in these 1961 negotiations with Standard Oil was to provide access for the parcel of land, parcel D, acquired by him the year before. At some time during these negotiations Kubic bought parcel E from Mr. Willhoit. The deeds to the various parcels were vested in the Janises as to a one-half undivided interest, and the Kubics as to the other one-half undivided interest.

Parcels B and D are in view of the freeway. Defendants, in 1963, made a lease with Pacific Outdoor Advertising Company who put three signs on parcel D, and an electric power plant on parcel B to service lighting of the signs.

In 1963 the state began condemnation proceedings against the district to acquire property on which the ramps have been located and to terminate use of the ramps by defendants but not by the flood control district or Standard Oil.

Defendants filed an answer setting forth their interest in the property and they also cross-complained seeking a declaration of their rights of access. The state's demurrer to the answer and motion to strike the cross-complaint were denied but the demurrer to the cross-complaint was sustained.

Based on a stipulated set of facts the court found that defendants' right of access was a real property interest, entitling defendants to damages, and that defendants' interests in parcels A, B, C, and D were one 'larger parcel' entitling defendants to severance damages.

Appraisers' reports were exchanged; the matter was set for a valuation trial; prior to impaneling a jury the court took evidence on restrictions on defendants' right of access over the ramps. The court ruled that defendants would not be permitted to present evidence on the loss in value to parcel D, or on a loss of income from the lease with Pacific Outdoor Advertising Company.

Defendants seem to be raising the following issues: That there is insufficient evidence to support the findings that the use of the ramps did not extend to parcels D and E; that defendants had the right to have a jury determine damages as to parcels D and E; that defendants were entitled to prove that an extension of their access rights was reasonably probable in the near future; that evidence of statements made by the district's representatives as to their intent was erroneously excluded; that their cross-complaint based on estoppel against the state should have been sustained; that the court's failure to state grounds for sustaining the demurrer to the cross-complaint was prejudicial; and finally, that defendants should have been permitted to introduce evidence of damages in conjunction with parcel E.

I

Defendants assert that the court's finding that the easement over the ramps did not extend to parcel D, and other related findings, are not supported by the evidence. This is without merit. The appellate court will accept a trial court's interpretation of extrinsic evidence received to aid in the interpretation of an easement where the evidence is conflicting and conflicting inferences may be drawn; but where there is no conflict in the evidence, the interpretation of the instrument becomes a question of law. (McManus v. Sequoyah Land Assoc. (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 348, 49 Cal.Rptr. 592.) Defendants' contention may be summarized as follows: Standard Oil had sought an easement which would afford it access rights to parcels B and C equal to those which it originally had by reason of the fact that those parcels then abutted on a public street; one of those rights, then held, was to use parcels B and C to gain access to real property (such as parcels D and E) adjacent to parcels B and C but separated from the then street by those parcels; had the original condemnation not taken place, if Standard Oil had thereafter purchased parcels D and E, they could have gained access to the newly acquired property by going from the street across parcels B and C; defendants have all the rights that Standard Oil had under the easement granted to it.

The difficulty with this contention, ingenious as it is, is that the record does not support it. It is not enough to say that there is evidence that Standard Oil desired the exact legal equivalent of the access rights condemned; to sustain defendants' position, there must also be uncontradicted evidence that, in the final settlement, Standard Oil achieved its fullest desire. No such evidence appears in the record. Secondly, we do not think that the evidence impels the desired finding that Standard Oil wanted, or even bargained for, such a total equivalent. All of the evidence concerning Standard's alleged desire to secure access rights 'equal' to those then held is in connection with the discussions over the desired removal from the district's contemplated permit of the revocation clause usually included in such permits. The record clearly supports a finding that the equivalent for which Standard was bargaining was an equivalency in time, not an equivalency in use. At the time the permit was granted, Standard owned only parcels B and C; there is nothing to...