People v. Lafferty
| Citation | 9 P.3d 1132 |
| Decision Date | 05 August 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98CA0915.,98CA0915. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jimmy F. LAFFERTY a/k/a Lafferty, Jimmy Ford, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Colorado |
Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Barbara McDonnell, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Michael E. McLachlan, Solicitor General, John Daniel Dailey, Assistant Solicitor General, John J. Krause, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Law Office of Wesley A. Miller, Wesley A. Miller, Vigil Law Offices, P.C., Frank G. Vigil, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Opinion by Judge TAUBMAN.
Defendant, Jimmy Lafferty, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of second degree assault. We affirm.
Defendant was charged after a neighbor called 911 upon hearing an argument between defendant and the victim, his girlfriend. When the neighbor heard the victim calling for help, he went out to the hallway, found her on the floor, and noticed a "massive bruise on her face."
After the neighbor brought the victim into his apartment, she told the 911 dispatcher that she had been beaten by defendant and that she was going to press charges. Later, the victim told an officer and a paramedic on the scene that defendant had punched her several times in the face.
At trial, the victim recanted, testifying that her injuries were the result of a fall she had suffered earlier that evening.
The jury also heard the testimony of an expert qualified to testify in the area of domestic violence. The expert specifically testified concerning patterns of behavior associated with domestic violence, including the "cycle of violence." The expert described the cycle of violence as consisting of three phases: tension-building, acute battering, and loving contrition. The expert explained why a victim may remain in a violent relationship or recant accusations of abuse.
First, defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the expert to testify. More specifically, he contends that the trial court improperly allowed the expert to testify regarding the "cycle of violence" associated with domestic violence, and its relation to recantations by victims of domestic violence. We perceive no error.
Here, upon completing voir dire of the expert, defense counsel stated that he had no objection to the expert's qualifications in the field of domestic violence.
Later, after the court had accepted the expert in the field of domestic violence, and after he had begun testifying, the court clarified the scope of the expert's testimony outside the presence of the jury. The court indicated that the expert's testimony would be useful to the jury in explaining "why [a recantation by the victim] would be occurring." The trial court gave defendant an opportunity to make a further record on the issue, but defense counsel declined the opportunity.
The expert later testified that he had not met the victim, and further stated that he had not formed an opinion about the credibility of any of the witnesses in the case. However, when the prosecutor asked: "Now, Doctor, how does time weigh into a victim's level of cooperation without discussing her credibility at all," the expert responded that, over time, a victim may recant. Defense counsel objected, contending that recantation implies untruthfulness.
The trial court overruled the objection and instructed the jury that the expert's testimony concerned not whether there was an untruthful statement by any witness in the case, but rather why the victim's version of the incident had changed over time.
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." CRE 702.
CRE 702 calls for a two-tiered analysis. A court must first consider whether the substance of the proffered testimony will be helpful to the fact finder. The court must then decide whether the witness providing such information is competent to render an expert opinion on the subject in question. See Brooks v. People, 975 P.2d 1105 (Colo. 1999)
.
In cases involving domestic violence, expert testimony concerning the reasons for victims' recantations is admissible. See Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir.1991)
; State v. Borrelli, 227 Conn. 153, 629 A.2d 1105 (1993); State v. Cababag, 9 Haw.App. 496, 850 P.2d 716 (1993). See also People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758 (Colo.App. 1991) ().
The decision to admit expert testimony lies within the discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. See People v. Fasy, 829 P.2d 1314 (Colo.1992)
.
The issue here is distinguishable from the issue presented in People v. Yaklich, supra,
i.e., that evidence concerning battered woman's syndrome is admissible in certain circumstances to establish a defense of self-defense. However, we agree with other courts that the admissibility of such evidence should not be limited to establishing self-defense. See Arcoren v. United States, supra ().
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert's testimony concerning the cycle of violence and how it relates to recantation. See People v. Fasy, supra.
Our conclusion is consistent with other decisions of the supreme court that have afforded trial courts broad discretion in admitting expert testimony. See People v. Fasy, supra
(); People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947 (Colo.1987) ().
To the extent defendant contends the expert improperly implied that the victim and defendant were in a battering relationship, we also disagree.
The expert testified that recantations and inconsistencies in victims' statements are common and consistent with victims' conduct in battering relationships. However, the expert stated that he had not met the victim. He further testified that the cycle of violence can be manifested in the space of one incident. Therefore, we conclude that the expert did not incorrectly imply that the victim and defendant were in a battering relationship.
Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the expert to testify concerning the victim's credibility by suggesting that, as a victim of domestic violence, the victim was lying when she recanted. We disagree with defendant, and conclude that the expert did not vouch for the victim's credibility.
Neither a lay witness nor an expert witness may give opinion testimony with respect to whether a witness is telling the truth on a specific occasion. Expert testimony is to be excluded on the issue of whether a witness is fabricating the particular facts at issue. People v. Koon, 713 P.2d 410 (Colo. App.1985).
As noted, the trial court gave the jurors a limiting instruction indicating that the expert's testimony concerned, not credibility, but rather, why the victim's version of the event had changed over time.
Accordingly, we conclude that the expert did not vouch for the credibility of any of the witnesses in the case, and that the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony.
Next, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial when the prosecution failed to disclose a statement of the victim found in an investigator's report. Again, we are not persuaded.
Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(1)(I) provides that the prosecutor shall provide the defendant with police, arrest, and crime reports, including statements of all witnesses.
Such disclosures are automatically required and need not be requested by defense counsel. People v. District Court, 790 P.2d 332 (Colo.1990).
Sanctions imposed for discovery violations rest within the broad discretion of the trial court. Such sanctions should be no more restrictive than necessary to protect the defendant's right to due process. People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 656 P.2d 1287 (Colo.1983).
A mistrial is a drastic remedy and is warranted only if the prejudice to the defendant cannot...
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People v. Fortson
...2011). Similarly, "we review the trial court’s not granting a mistrial sua sponte under a plain error standard." People v. Lafferty , 9 P.3d 1132, 1136 (Colo. App. 1999). In other words, while the first inquiry is what the prosecutor did, the second and more important inquiry is what the tr......
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...an intimate relationship justifies the admission of this type of expert testimony. The Attorney General's reliance on People v. Lafferty , 9 P.3d 1132 (Colo. App. 1999), is misplaced. There, the court upheld "cycle of violence syndrome" testimony to explain the victim's recantation. Id. at ......
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