People v. Laffman

• Decision Date: 01 May 1990
• Citation: 554 N.Y.S.2d 840,161 A.D.2d 111
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John LAFFMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 840

554 N.Y.S.2d 840

161 A.D.2d 111

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John LAFFMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division First Department.

May 1, 1990.

M. Schwartz, for respondent.

J. Gutman, for defendant-appellant.

Before MURPHY, P.J., and ROSENBERGER, KASSAL and SMITH, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Edwin Torres, J.), entered on or about May 17, 1989, which denied the defendant's motion pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 440 to vacate the judgment rendered against him by the same court on February 14, 1984, convicting him, after a jury trial, of Robbery in the First Degree (Penal Law § 160.15), Kidnapping in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 135.20), Robbery in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 160.10) and Assault in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 120.05), and sentencing him to concurrent prison terms of from 7 to 21 years for first degree robbery and second degree kidnapping, 5 to 15 years for second degree robbery, and 2 1/3 to 7 years for second degree assault, unanimously reversed, on the law, and the motion granted to the extent of vacating the judgment of conviction and remanding for a hearing as to the existence of an independent source for the complainant's identification testimony, and for a new trial.

Defendant-appellant Laffman and co-defendant Rodriguez were identified by the complainant at a stationhouse showup as the men who had robbed him at knifepoint. Just prior to viewing Laffman and Rodriguez, the complainant was told by the police that two suspects had been apprehended. Laffman and Rodriguez were then displayed to him through an open door, handcuffed and flanked by state troopers. These circumstances, claimed the defendants, were highly suggestive and rendered the complainant's identification testimony unreliable. Their motion to suppress the testimony was, however, denied, the motion court finding, after a Wade hearing, that the stationhouse identification procedures had not been improper. Having so found, the court had no occasion to continue the bifurcated hearing to determine whether there existed an independent basis for the complainant's identification testimony. The defendants were subsequently convicted of various offenses in connection with the knifepoint robbery of the complainant and their judgments of conviction affirmed by this court.

Both defendants thereafter sought leave to appeal from the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the application of Rodriguez but denied that of Laffman. Rodriguez's case was eventually decided along with a companion case, People v. Riley, 70 N.Y.2d 523, 522 N.Y.S.2d 842, 517 N.E.2d 520. In reversing Rodriguez's conviction, the Court observed that the stationhouse identification procedures employed had been "patently exploitive and suggestive," (id. at 530, 522 N.Y.S.2d 842, 517 N.E.2d 520) and concluded that "precinct showup procedures should have almost no place in acceptable identification procedures, unless exigency warrants them" (id. at 531, 522 N.Y.S.2d 842, 517 N.E.2d 520). As this Court has already had occasion to note, Riley propounded a new standard for evaluating the propriety of precinct showups (see People v. Hale, 142 A.D.2d 172, 174, 535 N.Y.S.2d 699). Whereas previously, stationhouse showup procedures were evaluated according to a "totality of the circumstances" standard (see People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 241, 440 N.Y.S.2d 902, 423 N.E.2d 379), after Riley their exclusion was mandated in all but those cases in which the People were able to demonstrate that showup procedures were compelled by exigent circumstances.

There can be no question that, had defendant-appellant Laffman been permitted to appeal the affirmance of his conviction to the Court of Appeals, his conviction...