People v. Lanahan

• Decision Date: 24 November 1981
• Citation: 55 N.Y.2d 711,431 N.E.2d 624,447 N.Y.S.2d 139
• Parties: , 431 N.E.2d 624 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John LANAHAN, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 139

447 N.Y.S.2d 139

55 N.Y.2d 711, 431 N.E.2d 624

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John LANAHAN, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 24, 1981.

E. Stewart Jones, Jr., Troy, for appellant.

Sol Greenberg, Dist. Atty. (Ilene R. Bergman, Albany, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division, 75 A.D.2d 185, 429 N.Y.S.2d 78, should be reversed, defendant's plea vacated, his statement suppressed, and the case remitted to Albany County Court for further proceedings on the indictment.

In the face of the finding by both courts below that defendant's statement was spontaneous, we conclude as a matter of law that it was not spontaneous as that concept is recognized for purposes of delineating an exception to the rule that a defendant is entitled to suppression of inculpatory statements made by him in the absence of his attorney. The police arrested defendant at his home pursuant to an arrest warrant and gave him his constitutional preinterrogation warnings. ^* At the time of his arrest, according to the police testimony, defendant stated that he wanted to know what robbery he was charged with and was told that he would be given an explanation when they reached the police barracks. After arriving at the barracks, defendant was again given his preinterrogation warnings, and Investigator Connelly stated to him:

"I am going to tell you what you are charged with. You are charged with the robbery of the Gasland gas station on Route 7 in the Town of Colonie. You did the job with a kid by the name of Lawless. You used Lawless's car. You parked the car behind the bank, which is about a block behind the Gasland gas station, walked through the fields, stood behind the wooden fence. When the girl came out with the two moneybags, both of you stepped out from behind the fence. You told her to throw the money over and she threw you the money.

"Then you asked--one of you asked her for the car keys, told her not to do anything stupid, got in behind the fence again, ran back to the car and drove to your house and split the money up.

"I said, that is the robbery that you are charged with." Whereupon, defendant responded, "I did it."

In the circumstances in which it was made, this inculpatory statement was not "made without apparent external cause, i.e., self-generating" (People v. Stoesser, 53 N.Y.2d 648, 650, 438 N.Y.S.2d 990, 421 N.E.2d 110). As we wrote in that case: "It is not sufficient that the statements were found to have been voluntary and not in response to express questioning by the police. To entitle these statements to receipt in evidence it must at least be shown that they were in no way the product of an 'interrogation environment', the result of 'express questioning or its functional equivalent' (cf. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d 297). defendant spoke with genuine spontaneity 'and not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed' (People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 302-303, 413 N.Y.S.2d 316, 385 N.E.2d 1245). (Cf. People v. Lucas, 53 N.Y.2d 678, 439 N.Y.S.2d 99, 421 N.E.2d 494.)"

Our holding in People v. Lynes 49 N.Y.2d 286, 425 N.Y.S.2d 295, 401 N.E.2d 405, illustrates the delineating contrast. In Lynes the officer to whom the defendant made the statement (there also found by both lower courts to have been spontaneous, a finding which we did not disturb) had no knowledge of or connection with the charge concerning which a warrant had been issued against the defendant. To the defendant's question as to what the warrant was all about, the officer responded, "You should know, they are looking for you", whereupon the defendant made the incriminating statement sought to be suppressed. The listening officer had not given the defendant his constitutional preinterrogation warnings. He had not conveyed any suggestion that he had foreknowledge of the details of the charge. Nor had he otherwise said or done anything from which the defendant might reasonably have inferred that the officer had any interest in eliciting a statement from him.

The People argue here that Inspector Connelly's explanation should be viewed as only a somewhat delayed answer to defendant's question. Such an analysis cannot be accepted. Connelly's statement was significantly removed from defendant's question in both time and space. Coming on the heels of the classic prelude to police interrogation, Connelly's recital went far beyond mere identification of the robbery with which defendant was charged to describe the criminal transaction with complete particularity as to both the participants and the manner of its achievement. Such a narrative in the circumstances can only be perceived as intended, more effectively perhaps than any forthright interrogation, to convey the message to defendant that, inasmuch as the police were aware in such detail of exactly how the robbery was accomplished, anything but an open admission would be futile and thereby to elicit a confession from him; the question asked by defendant was fully answered in the first two sentences. Defendant's unvarnished response precisely matched what must have been the hoped-for reaction to this psychological pressure.

Inasmuch as the police had previously been aware that defendant was represented by counsel, his confession, not having been blurted out in genuine spontaneity, should have been suppressed.

Wachtler, J. (dissenting). I cannot agree with the majority that the defendant's admission of guilt should be suppressed.

A defendant in custody who immediately admits his guilt when informed of the charge against him cannot be said to have been interrogated. When the police have also provided details of the underlying criminal act, an affirmed finding that the defendant's admission was spontaneous should be upheld, particularly when the defendant himself requested the additional information. To hold as a matter of law, as the majority now does, that such a statement is not spontaneous, because not literally "self-generating", unrealistically narrows to the point of extinction, the exception for spontaneous confessions which in the past has been one of the few consistently approved concepts in this otherwise volatile area of the law. It also ignores well-settled principles holding this type of question to be essentially a factual one beyond our review. Indeed it effectively overrules last year's decision in People v. Lynes, 49 N.Y.2d 286, 295, 425 N.Y.S.2d 295, 401 N.E.2d 405, in which we expressly rejected the notion that "any police remark, no matter how innocuous, would constitute an interrogation, as long as it was followed by an inculpatory statement."

The incident at issue occurred on February 9, 1978 when the defendant was arrested for robbery by Inspector Connelly of the State Bureau of Criminal Investigation. At the police barracks the defendant, unassisted by counsel, allegedly admitted his guilt to the charge. Prior to trial he moved to suppress this admission on the ground, among others, that it was obtained in violation of his right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the State Constitution.

At a hearing on the motion Inspector Connelly testified that on February 9, 1978 he applied to the Town Justice for a warrant authorizing defendant's arrest on a first degree robbery charge. After obtaining the warrant Connelly went to the defendant's house where he arrested the defendant at approximately 7:30 that evening. The officer testified that he then advised the defendant of his rights in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, after which the defendant stated "He wanted to know * * * what robbery he was charged with and I told him I would explain that to him when he got to the barracks." In the police car the defendant asked the officer "numerous times" what he was "being charged with" and accused the police of making a mistake. However, the officer told him to "sit back. When I get to the barracks I will tell you what robbery."

When they arrived at the barracks the officer removed the defendant's handcuffs, again advised him of his rights and said "now, I am going to tell you what you are charged with."

"You are charged with the robbery of the Gasland gas station on Route 7 in the Town of Colonie. You did the job with a kid by the name of Lawless. You used Lawless's car. You parked the car behind the bank, which is about a block behind the Gasland gas station, walked through the fields, stood behind the wooden fence. When the girl came out with the two moneybags, both of you stepped out from behind the fence. You told her to throw the money over and she threw you the money.

"Then you asked--one of you asked her for the car keys, told her not to do anything stupid, got in behind the fence again, ran back to the car and drove to your house and split the money up.

"I said, that is the robbery that you are charged with." At that point the defendant responded, "I did it." He also agreed to make a written statement. That, however, was not done because another officer informed Connelly that an attorney representing the defendant had just called the barracks and directed that no statement be taken. Connelly confirmed this in a brief discussion with the attorney.

At the hearing the defendant also sought to show that he had retained the attorney prior to his arrest and that the police knew or should have been aware of this. The trial court found it unnecessary to reach that question because it found the defendant's admission of guilt was spontaneous. Accordingly, the motion to suppress was denied.

The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to robbery in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed holding that "the record amply supports the conclusion of the trial court that the admission was made 'spontaneously' ".

Initially I note...