People v. Lane
| Decision Date | 26 June 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 27957,27957 |
| Citation | 196 Colo. 42,581 P.2d 719 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee, v. James Frederick LANE, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
James V. Phelps, County Atty., Paul J. Willumstad, Asst. Pueblo County Atty., Pueblo, for petitioner-appellee.
James R. Hurst, Pueblo, for respondent-appellant.
Robin S. Freedman, Denver, for amicus curiae Colorado Bar Ass'n Office for the Mentally Disabled.
The appellant challenges the district court's order, entered pursuant to section 27-10-101, et seq., C.R.S.1973 (1976 Supp.), which determined that he is mentally ill, a danger to others, and in need of long-term care and treatment. We affirm the district court's order.
In 1955, when he was fourteen years old, the appellant was committed to the Colorado State Hospital. Except for isolated, brief periods, he has remained there since. On June 2, 1976, the hospital filed a petition pursuant to the Colorado Care and Treatment of the Mentally Ill Act, 1 for evaluation and screening of the appellant in order to obtain a new order for commitment. The court entered an order authorizing evaluation.
On June 4, 1976, the evaluating psychiatrist certified the appellant as mentally ill and a danger to himself or others. After an August 19, 1976, hearing on the certification, the district court accepted the psychiatrist's analysis and authorized short-term treatment pursuant to section 27-10-107, C.R.S.1973 (1976 Supp.). The court determined, however, that the appellant's assignment to the hospital's Forensic Ward failed to accord him the required "least restrictive alternative" 2 mode of treatment, and thus ordered him transferred to the General Adult Psychiatric Services unit. Finally, the court ordered hospital personnel to develop a treatment program and deliver to it a copy so that it could monitor the appellant's status. His progress was scheduled for court review on November 5, 1976.
On September 2, 1976, Dr. Michael Guthrie extended the appellant's certification for short-term treatment for an additional ninety days, 3 to December 4, 1976. Prior to expiration of that ninety-day period, the doctor filed a petition for long-term care and treatment, 4 on which a hearing was held December 3, 1976.
At the latter hearing, the court found that the appellant still was mentally ill, a danger to others, and in need of long-term care and treatment. Although the petition had requested a six-month treatment period, the court limited the period to three months and ordered the hospital treatment team to report twice monthly on the appellant's progress. From this order the appellant has appealed.
Section 27-10-109, C.R.S.1973 (1976 Supp.), sets out in detail the prerequisites for commitment for long-term care and treatment. Those portions pertinent to our decision on this appeal are as follows:
In addition, section 27-10-111(1), C.R.S.1973 (1976 Supp.), establishes hearing procedures and the burden of proof necessary to support long-term commitment, as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, the statutes require that, before authorizing long-term commitment, the trial court find, not only that the respondent is "mentally ill," but also as a result of his illness that he is either: (1) a danger to others, (2) a danger to himself, or (3) gravely disabled. The person or institution seeking the commitment order has the burden of proving these facts by "clear and convincing evidence."
The questions here raised concern the quality of evidence required to meet the "clear and convincing evidence" standard for proof of danger to others. The appellant argues that judicial findings of dangerousness may not constitutionally be based solely on what he characterizes as "unsupported" psychiatric opinion that is, psychiatric opinion not in turn based, at least in part, on "recent overt acts, attempts or threats" constituting dangerous behavior. This argument is premised on the contention that psychiatric predictions of dangerousness, when not based on recent overt behavior, have generally proven inaccurate, 5 and therefore are insufficiently reliable to meet the statutory standard of proof.
Civil commitment of the mentally ill has generally been justified on one of two premises: (1) that the state is acting as parens patriae, and thus is depriving the individual of liberty, not for punishment, but for treatment; or (2) that one whose mental illness renders him potentially dangerous may be deprived of liberty under the police power to protect society against him. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.Supp. 1078 (E.D.Wis.1972).
However, the state's power to confine persons on either basis must be carefully restrained by procedural safeguards, and can be invoked only by conditions "great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty." Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 1052, 31 L.Ed.2d 394, 402 (1972).
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 2493, 45 L.Ed.2d 396, 406-07 (1975).
Because of the constitutional rights at stake, it is essential that the courts carefully scrutinize, in each case, the petitioning party's proof of mental illness and dangerousness or grave disability. In this case, however, the appellant not only seeks review of whether the proof presented met the statutory burden, but also asks that we hold, as a matter of law, that psychiatric opinion, not corroborated by evidence of recent dangerous conduct, can never constitute "clear and convincing evidence" of dangerousness, and therefore can never be sufficient to sustain a commitment based on dangerousness.
We need not, however, reach that issue here, for the record is replete with evidence...
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