People v. Lanfair

Docket NumberCR No. 00668-22
Decision Date12 January 2023
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Shannon LANFAIR, Defendant.
CourtNew York City Court

P. DAVID SOARES, Albany County District Attorney (Robert Max Beyer, Esq., of Counsel), Attorney for the People.

STEPHEN W. HERRICK, Albany County Public Defender, Kelly Vidur, of counsel, Attorney for the Defendant.

Eric M. Galarneau, J. CPL § 245.50 is a pivotal statute in the state's discovery laws. It requires the People to certify that they have complied with the discovery requirements of CPL § 245.20 before announcing ready for trial under the speedy trial statute. For their part, the defense may challenge the People's position upon written motion establishing that there is some defect in the certification that would, in turn, nullify the People's trial readiness. There was a problem with the scheme for raising the challenges, however. Nowhere did it impart direction as to when the certification challenges should be made. That created an incentive for defendants to stay their challenges in the hopes of running out the speedy trial clock. To discourage such tactics, the Legislature enacted amendments in 2022 setting forth how and when challenges to the certifications should be made. This case requires the Court to determine how these amendments should operate in practice.

The defendant was charged in City Court with perjury and related offenses. On August 18, 2022, the People filed their statement of readiness (SOR) and Certificate of Compliance (CofC) and, following an inquiry pursuant to CPL § 30.30(5), were deemed ready for trial, subject to the defendant's right to file a motion challenging the CofC ( CPL § 245.50[4] ). The defense exercised that right by first alerting the People to deficiencies with the CofC on October 26, 2022 and thereafter filing a motion to challenge the original CofC and SOR. In the meantime, the People remedied the errors and, on November 17, 2022, filed a Supplemental CofC and SOR.

The defense challenge focuses on two videos that were not disclosed--one from a street camera, the other from the Cohoes Police Station.1 In response, the People claim that the defense is not entitled to the recordings from the street cameras because the footage did not relate to the subject matter of the case — a position which the Court, based on the insufficiency of the papers before it, does not reach, but, for purposes of this motion, will assume is relevant and, therefore, disclosable (See CPL § 245.20[1] ). Less debatable is whether the People should have disclosed the police station recordings capturing the alleged perjured statements—they should have (see CPL § 245.20[1][g] ). However, both parties concede that, when alerted to the lapse, the People promptly made the appropriate disclosure and filed a Supplemental CofC.

On its face, the People's late disclosure of the videos invalidated their original CofC and SOR. CPL § 245.50 requires that the People file a CofC affirming that, "after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery", the prosecutor has complied with their discovery obligations under CPL § 245.20. ( CPL § 245.50[1] ). There is no dispute that the People failed to disclose the videos ( CPL § 245.20[1][g] ). Further, the People have not raised any objection to the information being beyond their possession or control or that of any "public servant engaged in law enforcement activity" ( § 245.20[1][j] ; see People v. Preston , 70 Misc. 3d 355, 135 N.Y.S.3d 587 [City Court 2020] ). Finally, given this Court's precedent (see People v. Kaba , 75 Misc. 3d 1218(A), 2022 WL 2312430 [City Court 2022] ), it cannot be said that the People acted with due diligence in trying to obtain the video; in fact, the street camera video was clearly referenced in a one-page report appended to the People's CPL § 710.30 notices that were disclosed at arraignment. (See People v. Vasquez , 75 Misc. 3d 49, 168 N.Y.S.3d 644 [App. Term., 2nd Dep't. 2022] ; People v. Vargas , 76 Misc. 3d 646, 171 N.Y.S.3d 877 [Bronx Co. Crim. Ct. 2022] ; People v. Audino , 75 Misc. 3d 969, 172 N.Y.S.3d 569 [N.Y. Co. Crim. Ct. 2022] ; People v. Diaz , 75 Misc. 3d 314, 165 N.Y.S.3d 261 [Bronx Co. Crim. Ct. 2022] ). As a result, the Court concludes that the CofC is invalid because the People failed to turn over the video and did not act with due diligence.

Ordinarily, that would end the matter. However, in 2022, the Legislature amended CPL § 245.50(4) to add two components to the CofC challenges. (See L.2022, c. 56, p. UU, subpt. D. 1). The first requires the challenging party, to "the extent that [it] is aware" of a discovery issue, to "notify or alert" its adversary "as soon as practicable" ( CPL § 245.50[4][b] ). This "duty to notify" requires the challenging party to alert its opponent to the discovery issue before bringing it to the Court. The second component requires that a motion challenging a CofC be made "as soon as practicable". Notably, each requirement is expressed in mandatory language, meaning that a challenging party must comply with both if it wants to succeed in its challenge. Assuming, as the Court should, that the Legislature did not insert the new provisions gratuitously, it is clear that the failure to comply with the new requirements forfeits the right to challenge the CofC and SOR. ( People v. Dethloff , 283 N.Y. 309, 28 N.E.2d 850 [1900] ; Orange & Rockland County Utilities Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp. , 59 A.D.2d 110, 397 N.Y.S.2d 814 [2nd Dep't. 1977] ; Held v. Hall , 191 Misc. 2d 427, 741 N.Y.S.2d 648 [West. Co. Ct. 2002] ).

Not defined in the 2022 legislation, however, are two concepts integral to the amendment. First, the Legislature did not specify what "as soon as practicable" meant. To be sure, the reference to motion practice, for which there is a statutory deadline of 45 days (see CPL § 255.20[1] ), suggests that there may be an outside parameter for what is considered "practicable". (See People ex.rel Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Saxe. 179 A.D. 721, 725, 166 N.Y.S. 887 [3rd Dep't 1917] (in construing a statute, a court must consider its meaning in light of the larger statutory scheme of which it is a part, and that statutes relating to a "common subject must be read as a whole and construed together"). But, aside from the allusion to the deadline for omnibus motions, the statute does not contain an explicit timeframe for filing a CofC motion or notifying the People of a defect. This legislative silence is significant because it leaves it to judges to define "practicable" according to the circumstances of the case—a decision that is understandable given the myriad of fact-specific reasons for a discovery dispute that the legislature could not possibly have anticipated. (Statutes 74; see also People v. Garson , 6 N.Y.3d 604, 612, 815 N.Y.S.2d 887, 848 N.E.2d 1264 [2006] (legislative decision not to define a particular term suggests that meaning is left for factual resolution)).

Of course, what is "practicable" will change from case to case. A two-month delay in a major case may be less severe than a two-week delay in a petty one. Nevertheless, some factors will apply no matter the controversy. These include the length of the delay; the underlying charges; the nature of the discovery violation; whether the violation is obvious, and susceptible to easy detection, or obscure, and more likely to escape notice; whether there is evidence that the defense knew or should have known of the error; the volume of discovery in the case; and the applicability of any statutory deadlines (see, e.g., CPL § 245.10 and § 255.20 ). Another factor worth considering is the resources available to the defense attorney; for example, a larger law firm, with superior technologies and more support staff, may be better equipped to unearth a discovery error than an overburdened solo practitioner or legal aid attorney. That certainly is something that this Court would consider in assessing whether the defense acted "as soon as practicable" in raising a CofC challenge.

The Court believes that these factors reflect a just appraisal of the purpose of the amendments to CPL § 245.50(4). Prior to the amendments, CofC's were vulnerable to manipulation. A party aware of a discovery lapse could jealously guard their secret while the speedy trial clock ran out. Many courts deplored that possibility. (See People v. Barralaga , 73 Misc. 3d 510, 520, 153 N.Y.S.3d 808 [N.Y. Co. Crim. Ct. 2021] ; People v. Florez , 74 Misc. 3d 1222(A), 2022 WL 792140 [Nassau Co. Sup. Ct. 2022] ). The 2022 amendments, however, ensure against the use of such tactics by imposing on the challenging party a quasi "due diligence" requirement so that they do not exploit delay to their advantage. After all, discovery reforms were intended to "level the playing field"—not encourage gamesmanship. (See Barralga , supra.)

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2 cases
  • People v. Valdez
    • United States
    • New York Criminal Court
    • July 28, 2023
    ...escape notice; whether there is evidence that the defense knew or should have known of the error; the volume of discovery in the case,.." Id at 375. factor to consider, which was not listed in the Lanfair Court, is whether a party was prejudiced in failing to notify the opposing party of th......
  • People v. Hutchinson
    • United States
    • New York Criminal Court
    • June 20, 2023
    ...the defense knew or should have known the error; the volume of discovery in the case; and the applicability of any statutory deadlines." Id. at 375. defects or deficiencies are not resolved after defendant notifies the people as a soon as practicable, any challenges to the CoC must be raise......

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