People v. Lardie, Docket No. 171293

• Decision Date: 22 November 1994
• Docket Number: Docket No. 171293
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Mothers Against Drunk Driving ("MADD"), American Alliance for Rights & Responsibilities, Secretary of State and Automobile Club of Michigan, Amici Curiae, v. Jash Eli LARDIE, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 504

525 N.W.2d 504

207 Mich.App. 615

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant,

and

Mothers Against Drunk Driving ("MADD"), American Alliance

for Rights & Responsibilities, Secretary of State and Automobile Club of Michigan, Amici Curiae, v. Jash Eli LARDIE, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 171293.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Aug. 1, 1994, at Grand Rapids.

Decided Nov. 22, 1994, at 9:25 a.m.

Released for Publication Jan. 24, 1995.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., and Dennis LaBelle, Pros. Atty., for the People.

Michael J. Haley, Traverse City, for defendant.

Gregory Smith, Midland, for Mothers Against Drunk Driving, amici curiae.

Roger L. Conner and Robert Teir, Washington, DC, for American Alliance for Rights & Responsibilities, amicus curiae.

Carole F. Barnett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, for Secretary of State.

Gina Smith-Gallant, Detroit, for Auto Club of Michigan.

Before HOOD, P.J., and MARILYN J. KELLY and MARTLEW, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was charged with three counts of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor (OUIL) and thereby causing death, M.C.L. § 257.625(4); M.S.A. § 9.2325(4). In a written opinion and order the circuit court dismissed the complaint against defendant. The court concluded that the "OUIL causing death" statute is unconstitutional because it fails to allow the jury to evaluate a defendant's mental intent or moral culpability. The prosecutor appeals the ruling as of right. Four additional parties join this appeal as amici curiae. We reverse.

Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and courts have a duty to construe them as constitutional, absent a clear showing of unconstitutionality. People v. Thomas, 201 Mich.App. 111, 116-117, 505 N.W.2d 873 (1993). Where the Legislature, in enacting a statute, has omitted language indicating that fault is a necessary ingredient, the proper focus is not on the constitutionality of the enactment, but rather on whether the Legislature actually intended to require some fault as a predicate to finding guilt, irrespective of the failure to expressly so state. People v. Quinn, 440 Mich. 178, 185, 487 N.W.2d 194 (1992). Where a criminal statute is a codification of the common law, and where mens rea was a necessary element of the crime at common law, the Court will not interpret the statute as dispensing with knowledge as a necessary element. Id. at 185-186, 487 N.W.2d 194.

The statute at issue, M.C.L. § 257.625(4); M.S.A. § 9.2325(4), adopted by the Legislature as part of 1991 P.A. 98, provides:

A person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within this state, under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, or with a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol, and by the operation of that motor vehicle causes the death of another person is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years, or a fine of not less than $2,500.00 or more than $10,000.00, or both.

Defendant contends, and the trial court agreed, that the statute as written amounts to an unconstitutional strict liability, public welfare offense. We disagree that the statute is unconstitutional.

The Legislature, in drafting the statute at issue, made no reference to the actor's intent. Therefore, we must first ascertain whether the Legislature intended to require some fault as a predicate to finding guilt, irrespective of the failure to expressly so state. Quinn, supra at 185-186, 487 N.W.2d 194. In People v. Crawford, 187 Mich.App. 344, 349, 467 N.W.2d 818 (1991), this Court stated that the offense of OUIL, M.C.L. § 257.625; M.S.A. § 9.2325, is proved without regard to the defendant's motive or intent. The crime of OUIL causing death contains the same elements as OUIL with the only additional element being the aggravated circumstance of death resulting from the prohibited conduct. Therefore, by extension, we conclude that intent is likewise irrelevant to prove the crime of OUIL causing death.

Additionally, we note that the OUIL statute is not a codification of a common-law offense. See People v. Townsend, 214 Mich. 267, 273, 183 N.W. 177 (1921) (it is unlawful by statute to operate an automobile upon a public highway while in a state of inebriation). Thus, this Court is not inclined to read a mens rea requirement into the statute. Quinn, supra. This is especially true because, if the Legislature wanted to add specific or general intent as an element, knowing that the predecessor statute had been construed as a strict liability crime, it would have specifically done so. See People v. Langworthy, 416 Mich. 630, 644, 331 N.W.2d 171 (1982). Therefore, the statute at issue may appropriately be characterized as imposing strict liability.

A state may decide under its police powers that public policy requires that certain acts or omissions to act be punished regardless of the actor's intent. Quinn, supra, 440 Mich. at 188, 487 N.W.2d 194; People v. Cash, 419 Mich. 230, 242, 351 N.W.2d 822 (1984). In People v. Snowberger, 113 Mich. 86, 91, 71 N.W. 497 (1897), our Supreme Court stated:

The police power of the State extends to the protection of the health, as well as of the lives and property, of the citizens. Generally, it is for the legislature to determine what laws and regulations are needed to protect the public health and secure the public comfort and safety. If it passes an act ostensibly for the public health, and thereby destroys or takes away the property of the citizen or interferes with his liberty, it is for the courts to determine whether it relates to and is appropriate to promote such public health.

The following statement from this Court's opinion in People v. Tucker, 177 Mich.App. 174, 182, 441 N.W.2d 59 (1989), is illustrative:

The Vehicle Code does not have a stated purpose. The OUIL statute itself evidences an intent to keep people who operate vehicles while intoxicated off the highways by imposing prison terms, fines and the suspension or revocation of the operator's license. By...