People v. Lawrence

• Citation: 246 Mich. App. 260,632 N.W.2d 156
• Decision Date: 23 August 2001
• Docket Number: Docket No. 220598.
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Lee LAWRENCE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

632 N.W.2d 156

246 Mich. App. 260

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Lee LAWRENCE, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 220598.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted May 10, 2001, at Detroit.

Decided June 5, 2001, 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication August 23, 2001.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, and Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, David Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, and Thomas Richards, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

State Appellate Defender (by Douglas W. Baker), for the defendant on appeal.

Before McDONALD, P.J., and MURPHY and METER, JJ.

MURPHY, Judge.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine, M.C.L. § 333.7401(1), (2)(a)(iv), and of escape from lawful custody, M.C.L. § 750.197a. The trial court sentenced defendant as an habitual offender, third offense, M.C.L. § 769.11, to thirty-four months to forty years' imprisonment on the possession with intent to deliver conviction. On the escape conviction, the court imposed a consecutive sentence of 165 days in jail and gave defendant credit for that time served. Defendant now appeals as of right, challenging only his conviction of escape from lawful custody. Because we conclude that defendant was not "under any criminal process" when he attempted to flee from police transportation upon his arrest, we vacate the misdemeanor conviction of escape from lawful custody.¹

Police officers, conducting surveillance of a housing project because of complaints regarding narcotics trafficking, approached defendant and a second individual after the two were observed making a suspicious exchange. Both men ran, but the officers gave chase, caught them, and returned to the location of the initial approach. On the ground where defendant had been standing, the officers found two individually wrapped rocks of suspected crack cocaine. The rocks field-tested positive for cocaine, and the officers arrested defendant, handcuffed him, and placed him in a police car for transport to the police station. Just as the car began to move, defendant opened the car door and "took off running." The officers again gave chase, caught defendant approximately two hundred yards from the car, and returned him to the car, this time locking the door.

The sole issue we must decide is whether these uncontested facts support conviction of escape from lawful custody. Defendant argues that his action of fleeing the police car is not punishable under M.C.L. § 750.197a because no court had yet issued an order affecting his custody and, thus, he did not escape from lawful custody "under any criminal process." The prosecution, meanwhile, contends that this case is controlled by People v. Taylor, 238 Mich.App. 259, 604 N.W.2d 783 (1999), wherein a similar claim was considered and rejected when the Court construed a companion statute, M.C.L.§ 750.197(2).

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, this Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Wolfe, 440 Mich. 508, 515, 489 N.W.2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich. 1201 (1992); People v. Vronko, 228 Mich.App. 649, 654, 579 N.W.2d 138 (1998). Statutory interpretation, however, presents a question of law that we review de novo. People v. Webb, 458 Mich. 265, 274, 580 N.W.2d 884 (1998).

MCL 750.197a provides:

Any person who shall break or escape from lawful custody under any criminal process, including periods while at large on bail, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 1 year, or by a fine of not more than $500.00. [Emphasis added.] In part because this case turns on construction of the phrase "under any criminal process," we initially find, contrary to the prosecution's argument, that this case is not controlled by Taylor, supra.²

In Taylor, supra at 260, 604 N.W.2d 783, the defendant was arrested, taken to the jail, and placed in a holding cell. Before he was booked, he asked to use the bathroom. When the guard opened his cell door, the defendant escaped. Id. The trial court ruled that individuals who have been arrested on a felony warrant and placed in a holding cell in a jail are immune from prosecution under subsection 197(2) until they are formally processed. However, this Court reversed, finding that the defendant was "lawfully imprisoned in a jail" when he escaped. Id. at 262, 604 N.W.2d 783. This Court additionally ruled that the fact that the defendant had not yet been processed was irrelevant because he was not jailed for the purpose of being booked. "Rather, he was being held in jail pending the commencement of the criminal process," which "logically includes examination, arraignment, and possibly trial." Id. at 266, 604 N.W.2d 783. The circumstances presented in Taylor are factually distinguishable from the instant case, and this Court's interpretation of strikingly different statutory language does not assist our analysis of § 197a.

No reported cases in this state in fact construe the phrase "under any criminal process," as it is used in M.C.L. § 750.197a. Moreover, the few cases that have considered § 197a have been concerned, generally, with issues related to bail jumping. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 243 Mich.App. 333, 334-335, 620 N.W.2d 906 (2000); People v. Pfeiffer, 177 Mich.App. 170, 172, 441 N.W.2d 65 (1989) (two cases in which this Court found the statute applicable to situations where convicted defendants failed to appear for sentencing after being released on bond). Accordingly, our analysis of the phrase "under any criminal process" must be governed by the rules of statutory construction.

The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. People v. Morris, 450 Mich. 316, 326, 537 N.W.2d 842 (1995); People v. Stephan, 241 Mich.App. 482, 496, 616 N.W.2d 188 (2000). The first criterion in determining intent is the specific language of the statute. People v. Stone, 234 Mich.App. 117, 121, 593 N.W.2d 680 (1999). If statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court must enforce it as plainly written. Morris, supra at 326, 537 N.W.2d 842. Statutory language is clear and unambiguous when reasonable minds could not differ with regard to its meaning. People v. Armstrong, 212 Mich.App. 121, 123, 536 N.W.2d 789 (1995). However, if a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the court must engage in judicial construction and interpret the statute. Morris, supra at 326, 537 N.W.2d 842. The court must access the object of the statute and the harm it was designed to remedy and apply a reasonable construction that best accomplishes the purpose of the statute. People v. Adair, 452 Mich. 473, 479-480, 550 N.W.2d 505 (1996). Provisions of the Penal Code are construed according to the fair import of their terms to effect the purpose of the statute. MCL 750.2; Morris, supra at 327, 537 N.W.2d 842; Armstrong, supra at 127, 536 N.W.2d 789.

The phrase "under any criminal process" is not defined in the statute. Where the Legislature has not expressly defined the terms used in a statute, a court may turn to dictionary definitions for aid in construing the terms in accordance with their ordinary and generally accepted meanings. People v. Morey, 461 Mich. 325, 330, 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999). The term "process" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed), p 1222, as "[t]he proceedings in any action or prosecution," or as "[a] summons or writ, esp. to appear or respond in court."³ The meaning of "criminal process" is more specifically set forth as "[a] process (such as an arrest warrant) that issues to compel a person to answer for a crime."

Consistent with these definitions, many cases use the term "criminal process" when referring to criminal court proceedings, i.e., the prosecution of a defendant, see, e.g., Taylor, supra; People v. Solomon (Amended Opinion), 220 Mich.App. 527, 536, 560 N.W.2d 651 (1996); People v. Bryant, 80 Mich.App. 428, 437, 264 N.W.2d 13 (1978), while many statutes use the term "criminal process" when referencing a summons, see, e.g., M.C.L. § 767.92(3)(c); MCL 324.1606(1); MCL 3.258(1). Construing the phrase "under any criminal process" in accord with these conceptualizations, we hold that defendant was not under criminal process when he made his attempt to flee the police car after his arrest without a warrant.⁴

At the time of defendant's action, no court had acquired or exercised jurisdiction over him, nor had any court compelled his appearance through the issuance of a summons. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that this was a lawful arrest without a warrant, criminal proceedings stamped with a court's approval had not yet been initiated against defendant. Our conclusion that the statute refers to individuals who are, in one form or another, already under court order is supported by the additional language of § 197a, which indicates that "under any criminal process" includes "periods while at large on bail."⁵ Accordingly, defendant's conviction of, and sentence for, possession with intent to deliver is affirmed; defendant's conviction of escape from lawful custody under any criminal process, pursuant to M.C.L. § 750.197a, is vacated.

Affirmed in part, and vacated in part.

McDONALD, P.J., concurred.

METER, J. (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent, because I believe that construing the phrase "any criminal process" in M.C.L. § 750.197a as including a lawful arrest accords with the ordinary meaning of the phrase and best effectuates the purpose of the statute.

As stated by the majority, the term "process" has two general meanings in a legal context, the first being the proceedings in any action or prosecution and the second being the summons by which a person is made to...