People v. Lawrence

• Decision Date: 02 January 2008
• Docket Number: No. B193831.,B193831.
• Citation: 158 Cal.App.4th 685,70 Cal.Rptr.3d 420
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ringo LAWRENCE, Defendant and Appellant.

70 Cal.Rptr.3d 420

158 Cal.App.4th 685

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ringo LAWRENCE, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B193831.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7.

January 2, 2008.

Heather J. Manolakas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and Lauren E. Dana, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

PERLUSS, P.J.

Rather than agree to a two-week trial continuance requested by his defense counsel due to a scheduling conflict, Ringo Lawrence, charged with two serious drug offenses, asserted his Sixth Amendment right under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (Faretta) to represent himself. After a half-day of jury selection, Lawrence thought better of his decision and asked that counsel be appointed to represent him at trial. The trial court denied the request and also denied a second request made by Lawrence at the conclusion of jury selection. Did the trial court err in refusing to permit Lawrence to withdraw his Faretta waiver? If so, is the erroneous denial of a request to withdraw a Faretta waiver state law error only or is it federal constitutional error? If federal constitutional error, is that error structural or subject to harmless error analysis, under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 1,7 L.Ed.2d 705 (Chapman)? Under the circumstances of this case the trial court abused its discretion in denying Lawrence's request for counsel at the end of the first day of trial. Because deprivation of counsel at a critical stage of a criminal trial is federal constitutional error that affects the framework within which the trial proceeds, "with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate," the error is structural and reversal is required without analysis of prejudicial effect. (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 282, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182; see United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. ___, ___, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409.)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Charges

Lawrence, apprehended in connection with an undercover drug investigation, was charged by information with one count of selling, transporting or offering to sell a controlled substance (Health & Saf.Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) and one count of possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11351.5). The information specially alleged Lawrence had been released from custody on bail or his own recognizance at the time of the offenses (Pen.Code, § 12022.1) and had previously been convicted of two felonies within the meaning of Health & Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a).¹ Lawrence pleaded not guilty and denied the special allegations.

2. The Grant of Lawrence's Request for Self-representation

On September 6, 2005, at the request of Lawrence's counsel, but over Lawrence's objection, the trial court (Hon. Marsha N. Revel) continued trial of Lawrence's case to September 20, 2005, On September 20, 2005 the case was trailed to September 28, 2005 and sent to Department 100 for trial. On the morning of September 28, 2005 Lawrence's counsel informed the court (Hon. David S. Wesley) he had filed a motion to continue trial for two weeks because he was currently engaged in another trial but, notwithstanding the court's willingness to grant the continuance, as a result of the proposed delay Lawrence wanted to represent himself. The court required Lawrence to complete an advisement and waiver of right to counsel form (commonly referred to as a Faretta. waiver) to ensure Lawrence understood the dangers and consequences of representing himself. The court also told Lawrence, "I will advise you against representing yourself You are not a trained lawyer. You will be up against a very fine lawyer, but if that your choice, you have a right to represent yourself. I will give you no special privileges. I want you to understand that."²

Lawrence initialed the Faretta waiver in most of the required locations, including the box acknowledging he understood his constitutional right to an attorney and the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Although Lawrence also initialed the box corresponding to the statement, "I understand that I am charged with the following crime(s)," he did not list the crimes on the blank spaces provided nor t lid he initial the boxes corresponding to questions 5, 6 and 7 indicating he understood certain aspects of the crimes charged.³ The trial court asked Lawrence if he knew the crimes with which he was charged. Lawrence failed to respond; and the court informed him of the charges and asked, "Now, do you understand what you are charged with?" Lawrence replied he did, and the court filled in the section specifying the charges and returned the Faretta waiver form to Lawrence to initial boxes 5, 6 and 7 if he understood the questions. The court advised Lawrence if he had any questions he could ask his counsel before the court relieved him. After Lawrence initialed the boxes and the court again ascertained he wanted to represent himself⁴ and was ready to proceed (as were his two codefendants),⁵ the case was transferred to a new department for trial.⁶

3. Lawrence's Efforts To Withdraw His Faretta Waiver and Obtain Counsel

Jury selection commenced that afternoon. After the conclusion of the trial day, Joseph Walsh, counsel for Broomfield, informed the court, "Once the trial started, Mr. Lawrence was unfamiliar with the proceedings, so out of courtesy I was answering his questions essentially." "And just informal conversations with Mr. Lawrence he has a request now that he wishes the court—I think he wants to withdraw his pro per status." Lawrence explained, "The only reason is cross-examination. People are saying something and I am not for sure able to, you know." The court (Hon. Mark V. Mooney) denied Lawrence's request, stating: "Mr. Lawrence, I think you were advised of all of these problems. I see here that you filled out a pro per waiver form setting forth all of these things about your understanding and what you would be up against and you made a decision." The court then admonished Lawrence, "You can't be bothering Mr. Walsh during the trial" and denied Walsh's request Lawrence be provided with advisory counsel.

The following day, Thursday, September 29, 2005, voir dire concluded; the jury was sworn; and the proceedings were adjourned until Monday, October 3, 2005, at 10:30 a.m.

At the outset of the proceedings on October 3, 2005, before the jurors were brought into the courtroom, Lawrence again attempted to withdraw his Faretta waiver and requested the appointment of counsel, stating, "I talked to my wife and I need a state appointed lawyer or public defender. I am going to have to request a public defender and I am retiring my pro per on the record."⁷ The court declined to address Lawrence's request until the next break in the proceedings. Before that occurred, opening statements were made; and the prosecution's first witness began testifying. After excusing the jury for lunch, the court denied Lawrence's request, stating, "The court has considered your request and I am going to deny your request at this time. This was something you were warned about when you got yourself into this, about you would be at a disadvantage choosing to represent yourself in this matter. I also consider the fact that, you know, the jury has been selected in this matter, that you also have a codefendant. And it would be disruptive to her case as well to have someone come in. Your previous attorney, Mr. Cohen [sic], as I understand, is still engaged in trial and not available, so for all of those reasons I am going to deny your request. And I also note when you filled out this form you were specifically advised and you initialed here on paragraph H if you ask to give up your pro per status the court may deny the request and have you proceed to trial without an attorney and that is where we are now, sir."

4. The Jury's Verdict and Sentencing

The jury found Lawrence guilty on both counts.⁸ The trial court found true the special allegations Lawrence had suffered two prior convictions within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a), but struck one conviction due to its age and the significant sentence Lawrence would serve without regard to the enhancement for the older conviction. Lawrence was sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of seven years: the middle term of four years for selling, transporting or offering to sell a controlled substance, plus a consecutive three-year enhancement for the prior drug conviction. A concurrent middle-term sentence of four years was imposed for possession of cocaine base for sale.

CONTENTIONS

Lawrence contends he did not knowing and voluntarily waive his constitutional right to counsel and invoke his right to self-representation and the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit him to withdraw his waiver of that right.⁹

DISCUSSION

1. Lawrence's Waiver of His Right to Counsel and Invocation of His Right to Self-representation Was Knowing and Voluntary

It is now a fundamental precept of our criminal justice systems that every defendant, rich or poor, has the right to assistance of counsel and that no accused may be convicted and imprisoned unless he or she has been accorded that right. (See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158; Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 [Sixth Amendment "embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by...