People v. Lewis
| Docket Number | S272627 |
| Decision Date | 22 June 2023 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Rodney Taurean LEWIS, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
Swanson & McNamara, Edward W. Swanson and August Gugelmann, San Francisco, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Alice B. Lustre, Seth K. Schalit and Arthur P. Beever, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted defendant Rodney Taurean Lewis of raping S.D. while she was intoxicated ( Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(3) )1 and kidnapping S.D. to commit rape (§ 209, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Lewis to a determinate term of eight years in prison for the rape conviction and a consecutive indeterminate term of life imprisonment, with the possibility of parole after seven years, for the kidnapping conviction.
Lewis appealed. As relevant here, he contended the trial court erred by instructing the jury that he could be convicted of kidnapping to commit rape based on the theory that he accomplished the kidnapping by deception rather than by force or fear. Lewis further contended the evidence at trial did not support the required element of force or fear, thus barring retrial on the kidnapping offense.
A divided Court of Appeal agreed with Lewis. ( People v. Lewis (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1, 5, 287 Cal.Rptr.3d 180 ( Lewis ).) The majority concluded that kidnapping by deception was an invalid legal theory, the trial court erred by including that theory in its instructions, the ordinary force or fear element of kidnapping applied even to intoxicated victims like S.D., and the evidence at trial was insufficient to support that element. ( Id . at pp. 13–19, 287 Cal.Rptr.3d 180.) One justice disagreed and would have affirmed the judgment on the ground that the ordinary force or fear element did not apply where the victim is intoxicated and unable to legally consent to movement. ( Id . at pp. 31–32, 287 Cal.Rptr.3d 180 (conc. & dis. opn. of Bedsworth, J.).)
We granted review to examine the force or fear element of kidnapping in the context of an intoxicated adult victim. We have previously interpreted the kidnapping statute to incorporate a relaxed standard of force where the victim is an infant or small child. ( In re Michele D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 610, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 59 P.3d 164 ( Michele D. ).) We reasoned that infants and children are too young to give their consent to being moved and are therefore "in a different position vis-à-vis the force requirement for kidnapping than those who can apprehend the force being used against them and resist it." ( Ibid . ) Thus, "the amount of force required to kidnap an unresisting infant or child is simply the amount of physical force required to take and carry the child away a substantial distance for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent." ( Ibid . ) We conclude that an unresisting intoxicated person who is unable to legally consent is similarly vulnerable to victimization, and the Legislature must have intended the relaxed standard of force to apply to such individuals as well.
In his petition for review, the Attorney General did not raise the underlying instructional error found by the Court of Appeal, and the parties have not briefed the issue. Thus, although the Attorney General agrees with the Court of Appeal that deception is an invalid theory of kidnapping even for an intoxicated adult victim, we do not need to consider that question here. Even assuming this instructional error, we conclude it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. By its verdict, the jury found that Lewis moved or made S.D. move a substantial distance, beyond that merely incidental to the commission of rape, and it was undisputed at trial that Lewis used some quantum of physical force — he admitted driving S.D. in his car — to accomplish that movement. The jury also found the remaining elements of the offense, including that Lewis had the requisite illegal intent. Any rational juror who made these findings would, based on the evidence at trial, have likewise found Lewis guilty of kidnapping under the relaxed force standard beyond a reasonable doubt. ( In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 589, 306 Cal.Rptr.3d 348, 526 P.3d 88 ( Lopez ).) In other words, "it would be impossible, based on the evidence, for a jury to make the findings reflected in its verdict without also making the findings that would support a valid theory of liability." ( Id . at p. 568, 306 Cal.Rptr.3d 348, 526 P.3d 88.)
Because the Court of Appeal found prejudicial instructional error, it was unnecessary for it to consider Lewis's other appellate contentions. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal but remand with directions to conduct further proceedings, including addressing any contentions that remain unresolved by this opinion.
During one early morning, a family attending a youth sports game in Palo Alto discovered a young woman lying in some landscaping adjacent to a parking lot. The woman, later identified as S.D., was unconscious and wrapped in a blanket. The family called 911 and waited for emergency personnel to arrive.
Fire department paramedics responded to the scene. S.D. "appeared to be passed out, and right next to a loud freeway." A paramedic pulled back the sheet and found that S.D.'s underwear was partly pulled down. The paramedic spoke to S.D., and she slowly became more responsive. S.D. told the paramedic she had been at a bar the night before and recalled she had lost her cell phone there. She said a man had approached her, told her he knew where the phone was, and said she should come with him. S.D. did not remember how the night ended or how she came to be in the parking lot. The paramedic suspected S.D. had been sexually assaulted, and he arranged to have her transported to a hospital where she could be examined and treated.
Police officers responded as well. One officer tried to speak to S.D., but she had a difficult time answering questions. S.D. did not understand where she was or what was going on. Her eyes were "very glassy," and she had a dazed look.
The officer eventually accompanied S.D. to the hospital. S.D. became more coherent as time passed. She explained to the officer that she had been at a bar called "Rudy's" the night before and had lost her cell phone. A stranger came up to her and said he knew who had her phone. The stranger appeared to call someone on his own cell phone, and then he suggested they get a drink. They went up to the bar, and S.D. drank some sort of brown liquid in a whiskey glass.
At the hospital, nurses collected blood and urine samples and performed a sexual assault examination on S.D. S.D. told one of the nurses she had pain in her vagina, and she thought it was likely she had had sexual intercourse.
But, S.D. said, "I don't remember a single thing." The nurse noted various bruises, abrasions, and other physical indicators which were consistent with S.D.'s belief that she had vaginal intercourse, but not necessarily indicative of sexual assault. S.D.'s blood test showed a blood-alcohol level of 0.18 percent. Her urine test, converted to blood-alcohol equivalent, reflected a value of 0.23 percent. Testing also revealed the presence of the prescription drug Xanax
in S.D.'s urine. S.D. was not prescribed Xanax and had no memory of ever taking it.2
Meanwhile, a police detective made an emergency request to S.D.'s cell phone company and obtained the location of her cell phone, which was within a few yards of Rudy's. The detective went to Rudy's, met with the owner, and recovered the phone. The owner and the detective also reviewed surveillance video from inside the bar. (There were no security cameras outside the bar.) Using the video footage, police detectives were able to single out the man who interacted with S.D. They matched the footage to the man's drink purchases and credit card receipts. The receipts identified the man as Rodney Lewis, the defendant here.
At trial, S.D. testified about her memory of the night. She was working at the time as an au pair in a city south of Palo Alto. She was 22 years old. S.D.'s employers had gone on vacation, so she invited a young man over for dinner. They shared a bottle of wine, and after dinner S.D.'s date suggested they go out somewhere. They took a taxi to Rudy's, and S.D.'s date ordered drinks. S.D. thought her drink was too strong, like "pure alcohol," so she only drank around a third of it. S.D. and her date went to the dance floor. At some point, S.D. realized she had lost her phone and walked around the bar looking for it. She felt "somewhat tipsy" but in control. Lewis approached S.D. and asked what she was doing. S.D. said she had lost her phone. Lewis told S.D. his friend had found a phone. Lewis said he would call the friend, and he put his own phone to his ear. (Lewis's cell phone records do not reflect any calls at that time.) Lewis suggested they have a drink while they waited for Lewis's friend to return. S.D. remembered walking up to the bar, but nothing else from that evening. Her next memory was from the following day at the hospital.
S.D.'s date generally corroborated S.D.'s testimony. They had dinner, shared a bottle of wine, and went to Rudy's. He bought a drink for each of them. Each drink was essentially four shots of liquor with a small amount of soda. He recalled that S.D. lost her cell phone, they were separated, and they met up again after S.D. met Lewis. S.D.'s date was becoming intoxicated, and he lost sight of S.D. He remembered looking for S.D. and eventually leaving Rudy's. He took a taxi back to S.D.'s house, but she was not there, so he slept in his car.
The surveillance video depicts most of the time S.D., her date, and Lewis spent at Rudy's. Lewis arrives...
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