In re Michele D.

• Decision Date: 16 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. S101922.,S101922.
• Citation: 29 Cal.4th 600,128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92,59 P.3d 164
• Parties: In re MICHELE D, a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michele D., Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Supreme Court

128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92

29 Cal.4th 600

59 P.3d 164

In re MICHELE D, a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michele D., Defendant and Appellant.

No. S101922.

Supreme Court of California.

December 16, 2002.

Superior Court, Los Angeles County; Armando V. Moreno, Temporary Judge.¹

Jeralyn Keller, Pasadena, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Carol Wendelin Pollack and Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorneys General, Chung L. Mar, Victoria B. Wilson and Jennifer A. Jadovitz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MORENO, J.

Penal Code section 207, subdivision (a) provides: "Every person who forcibly, or by any other means of instilling fear, steals, or takes, or holds, detains, or arrests any person in this state, and carries the person into another country, state, or county, or into another part of the same county, is guilty of kidnapping." We granted review to resolve the issue of what quantum of force, if any, must be shown to sustain a conviction for kidnapping when the victim is an unresisting infant or child. We conclude that the amount of force required to kidnap an unresisting infant or child is simply the amount of physical force required to take and carry the child away a substantial distance for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March, 2000, Michele D. (hereafter minor), then 15 years old, was invited by her friend, Dawn S, to live with Dawn's family, which included Dawn's 12-monthold daughter, Cameron. Minor and Dawn had become acquainted nearly a year earlier. Minor's home life had been a deeply troubled one, and Dawn, who had experienced her own difficulties while growing up, felt empathetic towards her. Minor was pregnant when she moved in with Dawn's family, but in early March she suffered a miscarriage.

On March 16, 2000, minor, Dawn, and Cameron took a bus to Pic 'N' Save in West Covina to do some shopping. They arrived at the store at around 5:30 p.m. Cameron was in a stroller, which both Dawn and minor took turns pushing. Minor was still bleeding heavily from her miscarriage and appeared to Dawn to be disturbed, emotionally hurt, and tearful. Once inside the store, the two women separated, with minor taking Cameron. After about an hour they ran into each other. Minor asked Dawn if she would pay for some toothpaste and mouthwash for minor. Dawn agreed. Minor went to get the items, still pushing Cameron in her stroller.

When minor failed to return after an hour, Dawn became concerned and went looking for her. She found Cameron's empty stroller abandoned in the middle of an aisle. Inside the stroller were minor's purse and a baby bottle. Dawn went to the store's information booth and asked if anyone had seen minor. No one had. Dawn had not given minor permission to take Cameron from the store and panicked. While she tried to reach her husband, someone from Pic `N' Save called the police. Dawn's husband and a West Covina police officer, Detective Michael Ferrari, both arrived at Pic `N' Save. Dawn and her husband followed Ferrari to the West Covina police station.

Meanwhile, James Lynch, who worked for Penske Jaguar, located approximately a mile and a half from Pic `N' Save, was preparing to leave work. It was now about 7:00 p.m. He noticed a woman with a baby. She was walking down the street into an area to which only employees had access. Lynch notified the dealership's security guard, Edward Anaya, Jr.

Anaya found minor and Cameron in front of the dealership. He expressed his concern that she had been observed behind the dealership in a dark alleyway that was off-limits to nonemployees. Minor told him she was just trying to get a ride to Fullerton. He noticed her eyes were red, as if she had been crying, and she seemed upset. Anaya thought she might be a victim of domestic violence and took her into the dealership to talk to her and see if he could help her. Ultimately, Anaya called the police.

Detective Ferrari was notified of Anaya's call while en route to the police station. Ferrari continued to the police station, where he met Dawn, who then rode with him to Penske Jaguar. Dawn identified minor and took custody of Cameron. Cameron was taken to a hospital where she was examined and found to be uninjured.

Ferrari arrested minor and drove her to the police station. Minor waived her rights and spoke to Ferrari. She said that before leaving Pic `N' Save, she had told Dawn she was going outside to smoke and asked Dawn for money to buy a drink. She said Dawn gave her money and asked that she take Cameron outside with her. She told Ferrari she went outside, smoked a cigarette, and then boarded a bus with Cameron. Initially, she told Ferrari she was babysitting Cameron, but then admitted that she took Cameron with the hope she could raise the child herself. Ferrari observed that minor was very emotional during the interview, her moods alternating between anger, confusion, and inattentiveness.

On March 20, 2000, a petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that minor had violated Penal Code section 207, subdivision (a) by kidnapping Cameron.² It was further alleged, pursuant to Penal Code section 667.85, that the victim was under the age of 14 and had been kidnapped and carried away with intent to permanently deprive her parent of custody.³ At the hearing on the petition, the defense presented the testimony of Dr. Haig Kojian, a court-appointed forensic evaluator. Dr. Kojian reviewed minor's arrest report, the probation officer's report, and minor's medical records. He also interviewed minor. Additionally, after he submitted his report, he viewed her videotaped interrogation with Detective Ferrari. Dr. Kojian concluded that at the time of the incident, minor was suffering from depression and mood disorder. He attributed her depression to her miscarriage and a chronic history of emotional instability. Dr. Kojian also diagnosed minor as a substance abuser, but, because she was not under the influence of any substances at the time of the incident, ruled out substance abuse as a factor in her conduct.

The juvenile court sustained the petition and found the special allegation to be true. The court recommended that minor be confined at Penny Lane, a juvenile facility with special expertise in counseling troubled adolescents. Her maximum period of confinement was set at 13 years.

Minor appealed the order sustaining the petition. In the Court of Appeal, minor argued that the absence of any proof she had forcibly seized Cameron rendered the evidence insufficient to support her conviction.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged the general rule that "to sustain a conviction for kidnapping, the prosecution is required to prove the perpetrator used force or fear." However, the Court of Appeal held "that the abduction of a non-resisting infant or child without the knowledge or permission of the parent constitutes kidnapping. The fact that `force' as commonly used to mean the application of physical strength, violence, compulsion, or constraint, was not utilized does not alter this conclusion." The Court of Appeal based its conclusion "upon common sense, the promotion of justice and the presumed intent of the Legislature," finding it "to be inconceivable that the Legislature intended the physical taking of an infant in the manner described in these facts not to be the crime of kidnapping." We granted minor's petition for review.

DISCUSSION

Minor reiterates the argument she made below, that the word "force," as used in the kidnapping statute (Pen.Code, § 207 (hereafter section 207)), means a forcible seizure and this, in turn, requires something more than the mere quantum of physical force necessary to effect movement. Acknowledging that there is no definition of force for kidnapping in case law, she argues that the statute, originally enacted in 1872, was a codification of the common law crime, which required the forcible abduction of a person from his or her own country into another. She points out that the force requirement has remained unmodified in the intervening time and case law uniformly enunciates the requirement that "force or fear [is] a necessary element of kidnaping...." (People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 621, 205 Cal.Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126; People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808, 813-814, 129 Cal.Rptr. 438, 548 P.2d 1110; People v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 602, 114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058.) Finally, she relies on interpretations of the force requirement in the contemporaneously enacted robbery statute (Pen.Code, § 211), which has been construed to require "a quantum more than that which is needed merely to take the property from the person of the victim...." (People v. Wright (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 203, 210, 59 Cal. Rptr.2d 316.)

We agree that ordinarily the force element in section 207 requires something more than the quantum of physical force necessary to effect movement of the victim from one location to another. The conjoining of force with fear in section 207— "[e]very person who forcibly, or by any other means of instilling fear"—suggests as much. We conclude, however, that minor's conduct falls within the ambit of the statute. Even if force, as conventionally understood, was not used to effect Cameron's kidnapping, the minor's intent in carrying off the infant still renders her conduct kidnapping.

Principles of statutory construction and the application of those principles to the kidnapping statute in an analogous case, People v. Oliver (1961) 55 Cal.2d 761, 12 Cal.Rptr. 865, 361 P.2d 593 (Oliver), support this conclusion. In general, it is settled that the language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences that the...