People v. Lofchie
| Decision Date | 01 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | B248383 |
| Citation | 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 579 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Michael LOFCHIE, Defendant and Respondent. |
See 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Contracts, § 651.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Clifford L. Klein. Affirmed. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA393121)
Jackie Lacey, District Attorney, Phyllis C. Asayama and Mathew Brown, Deputy District Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, Los Angeles, Gary S. Lincenberg and Benjamin D. Lichtman for Defendant and Respondent.
Crowel & Moring, and J. Daniel Sharp, San Francisco; University of California Los Angeles Office of Legal Affairs and Kevin S. Reed, Los Angeles; University of California Los Angeles Office of the General Counsel and Charles F. Robinson, Oakland, Karen J. Petrulakis, Stephen P. Morrell, Oakland, Mark Morodomi, Sacramento, and Elizabeth C. Yap as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
The issue presented in this case is whether a University of California 1 faculty member may be criminally prosecuted under Government Code section 1090 2 for participating in a decision to hire his wife as a program assistant for a four-week summer study abroad course. We conclude that he may not, and for reasons we discuss affirm the trial court's order dismissing the information under Penal Code section 995.
After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court granted Lofchie's motion to set aside the information. This appeal followed.
Lofchie and the Regents of the University of California (the Regents), to whom we granted leave to file an amicus brief, both argue that section 1090 does not apply to the University because it is not the “state” within the meaning of the statute, but rather a constitutionally created public trust subject to legislative control in only specifically enumerated areas that do not include internal hiring decisions. The Regents further contend University of California employees are already subject to internal conflict of interest policies, including policies that address conflicts of interest in decisions involving spouses and family members, and that the district attorney's expansive interpretation of section 1090 would render the statute an unconstitutional interference with university autonomy. Lofchie also contends the People forfeited the right to argue on appeal that he is a state employee because they took the opposite position in the trial court below; that Public Contract Code section 10516 supplants Government Code section 1090; and section 1090 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.
The People contend they did not forfeit any argument that the University of California is a state entity and Lofchie is an employee of the “state” within the meaning of section 1090. The People further contend article IX, section 9 does not exempt the University from regulation under Government Code section 1090, and Public Contract Code section 10516 does not preclude application of section 1090.
Lofchie argues that the doctrines of waiver and invited error preclude the People from pursuing this appeal because they expressly conceded in the trial court below that he is not a state employee. The doctrine of waiver precludes a party from changing its position and adopting a new and different theory on appeal because “ ‘ “to do so would not only be unfair to the trial court, but manifestly unjust to the opposing party.” ’ ” ( Saville v. Sierra College (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 857, 873, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 515.) ( Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 212, 285 Cal.Rptr. 99, 814 P.2d 1341.)
The People acknowledge that they took inconsistent positions in the proceedings below regarding Lofchie's employment status, at times conceding he is not a “state employee,” but rather a “public employee” subject to
section 1090. They argue, however, that both Lofchie and the trial court understood the People's position to be that University employees such as Lofchie are subject to section 1090, that Lofchie suffered no prejudice, and that there was no invited error on the part of the trial court.
We agree that there was neither prejudice nor invited error. Lofchie successfully opposed the People's arguments in the trial court below that section 1090 applied to him as either a “state employee” or a “public employee.” The trial court's memorandum of decision expressly rejects the People's argument that University of California employees should be included as employees of the “state” within the meaning of section 1090.
Finding no grounds for forfeiture, we address the merits of the parties' contentions.
Section 1090 provides:
“As used in this article, ‘district’ means any agency of the state formed pursuant to general law or special act, for the local performance of governmental or proprietary functions within limited boundaries.”
Section 1090 ( People v. Wong (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1450, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 384.) A contract is made for purposes of section 1090 if the public official ( People v. Sobel (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 1046, 1052, 115 Cal.Rptr. 532.) A public official can violate the statute even if he did not participate in the execution of the contract. ( Ibid.)
There are both civil and criminal remedies for violations of section 1090. Contracts made in violation of the statute may be voided by any party, except
the interested party. (§ 1092.) Persons who willfully violate section 1090 are subject to criminal sanctions, including a fine of up to $1,000, imprisonment in state prison, and disqualification from holding any office in the state. (§ 1097.) 4
The University of California is a public trust established pursuant to article IX, section 9.5 Article IX, section 9(a)(f) provides in pertinent part:
“(a) The University of California shall constitute a public trust, to be administered by the existing corporation known as ‘The Regents of the University of California,’ with full powers of organization and government, subject only to such legislative control as may be necessary to insure the security of its funds and compliance with the terms of the endowments of the university and such competitive bidding procedures as may be made applicable to the university by statute for the letting of construction contracts, sales of real property, and purchasing of materials, goods, and services....”
“[¶] ... [¶]
“(f) ... The university shall be entirely independent of all political or sectarian influence and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its regents and in the administration of its affairs....”
The California Supreme Court has recognized that “[a]rticle IX, section 9, grants the regents broad powers to organize and govern the university and limits the Legislature's power to regulate either the university or the regents.” 6 (
San Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 785, 788, 163 Cal.Rptr. 460, 608 P.2d 277 ( Labor Council ).) This constitutional grant of power to the Regents includes both quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers, according them “virtual autonomy in self-governance.” ( Regents of University of California v. City of Santa Monica (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 130, 135, 143 Cal.Rptr. 276.) ( Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 529, 540, 91 Cal.Rptr. 57, 476 P.2d 457.) “[P]olicies established by the Regents as matters of internal regulation may enjoy a status equivalent to that of state statutes [citation].” ( Regents of University of California v. City of Santa Monica, supra, at p. 135, 143 Cal.Rptr. 276; Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 321, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 320, 106 P.3d 976 [].)
Courts have recognized not only the broad powers accorded to the Regents to govern the University of California, but also the University's “general immunity from legislative regulation.” ( Labor Council, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 788, 163 Cal.Rptr. 460, 608 P.2d 277.) For example, courts have found the Regents and the University to be exempt from regulation under the state prevailing wage law ( id. at p. 787, 163 Cal.Rptr. 460, 608 P.2d 277; Regents of University of California v. Aubry (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 579, 591, 49...
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