People v. Long

• Decision Date: 29 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2010–485 W CR.,2010–485 W CR.
• Citation: 997 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Table)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Richard LONG, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Term

997 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Table)

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent

v.Richard LONG, Appellant.

No. 2010–485 W CR.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Dept., 9th and 10th Judicial Districts.

May 29, 2014.

Opinion

ORDERED that the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

On December 5, 2006, defendant was arraigned in the City Court of New Rochelle on a simplified traffic information charging him with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511[1][a] ) and an information charging him with disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20[3] ). The People announced their readiness for trial, and the case was adjourned for one day for the assignment of counsel. Subsequently, the action was transferred to the Justice Court of the Town of Eastchester, after the judges of the City Court of New Rochelle recused themselves. Following a jury trial in January and February 2010, defendant was convicted of the charged offenses.

On appeal, defendant contends that the judgment convicting him of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree should be reversed on the ground that the simplified traffic information is “jurisdictionally defective” because the complainant police officer was not the person who had completed the supporting deposition, and because the information fails to allege that defendant knew, or had reason to know, that his license had been suspended. Defendant further contends that both judgments of conviction should be reversed because the Justice Court made an improper Sandoval (People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371 [1974] ) determination and because his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.

A review of the simplified traffic information indicates that it is sufficient, since it designates the offense charged, substantially conforms to the form prescribed by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (see CPL 100.25 [1 ], 100.40[2]; Regulations of Commissioner of Motor Vehicles [15 NYCRR] § 91; People v. Tytutin, 39 Misc.3d 131[A], 2013 N.Y. Slip Op 50470[U] ), and provides the court with adequate information to establish that it has jurisdiction to hear the case (see People v. Fernandez, 20 N.Y.3d 44 [2012];People v. Key, 45 N.Y.2d 111, 116 [1976];People v. Ferro, 22 Misc.3d 7, 871 N.Y.S.2d 814 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008] ). Moreover, any alleged defects in the supporting deposition have been waived (see e.g. People v. Jennings, 69 N.Y.2d 103 [1986] ), inasmuch as defense counsel first, orally, moved for dismissal of the information in January 2010—after the trial had commenced (see CPL 170.30[2] ; 255.20[1] ). The absence of adequate factual allegations in a deposition in support of a jurisdictionally valid simplified traffic information is not a jurisdictional defect and can be waived if not timely raised (see People v. Key, 45 N.Y.2d at 116–117, 408 N.Y.S.2d 16, 379 N.E.2d 1147).

The Justice Court ruled that the People could cross-examine defendant regarding his 1982 attempted criminal impersonation conviction. The nature and extent of cross-examination is subject to the sound discretion of the trial court (see People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d at 374, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413). Defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the prejudicial effect of the evidence of his attempted criminal impersonation conviction so outweighed the probative value of this evidence on the issue of credibility that its exclusion was warranted (see id. at 378, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413;People v. Dahlbender, 23 A.D.3d 493 [2005] ).

In order to determine whether a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.20, the following factors must be considered: “(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason...