People v. Lucynski
| Citation | 509 Mich. 618,983 N.W.2d 827 |
| Decision Date | 26 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 162833,Calendar No. 2 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Allan LUCYNSKI, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Mark E. Reene, Prosecuting Attorney, and Eric F. Wanink, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Bernard A. Jocuns, Jr., for defendant.
David Rudoi for the Michigan Association of OWI Attorneys, amicus curiae.
Doug Lloyd, Kym L. Worthy, Detroit, John P. Wojtala, and Timothy A. Baughman, Detroit, for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan, amicus curiae.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from being subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures. While police officers generally need a warrant to search or seize someone, there are recognized exceptions to this general rule. If an officer has at least a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, based on articulable facts, then a temporary warrantless seizure is constitutional. Terry v Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20-27, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). Reasonable suspicion can be based on a mistaken belief that someone violated the law, so long as that mistake is objectively reasonable. Heien v North Carolina , 574 U.S. 54, 60-63, 66, 135 S Ct 530, 190 L Ed 2d 475 (2014).
When a defendant challenges the constitutionality of an alleged seizure, there are two questions that must be answered. First, when was the defendant seized by the officer, if at all? And second, at that moment, was the seizure constitutional? In this case, to determine whether a seizure was constitutional, we also must determine whether the officer's interpretation of the applicable statute, MCL 257.676b(1), was correct, and if not, whether the mistake was objectively reasonable.
The officer in this case claimed that he followed defendant because he believed that defendant committed a traffic violation that would have justified the subsequent seizure, questioning, search, and arrest of defendant. The district court held that there was no traffic violation, that the seizure was unconstitutional, that defendant would not be bound over for operating while intoxicated (OWI), and that the unlawfully obtained evidence must be suppressed. The prosecution argued that a "reasonable mistake" occurred as to the traffic violation, that suppression of the evidence was not required, and that the bindover decision was incorrect. The Court of Appeals agreed and further held that defendant had not been seized until after he made incriminating statements, and thus the district court erred.
Accordingly, we must decide when defendant was seized and if, at that moment, the officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime or, if not, whether the officer's mistaken belief was objectively reasonable. First, we hold that defendant was seized under the Fourth Amendment when the officer blocked the driveway and defendant's path of egress with a marked patrol car because, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave or to terminate the interaction. Second, the "impeding traffic" statute at issue, MCL 257.676b(1), is only violated if the normal flow of traffic is actually disrupted. Third, the officer's mistaken reading of this unambiguous statute was not objectively reasonable, and thus no reasonable mistake of law occurred.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that Court to determine whether application of the exclusionary rule was the appropriate remedy for the violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
On a brisk January morning, Tuscola County Sheriff's Deputy Ryan Robinson was traveling westbound on Old State Road in rural Wisner Township when he observed two cars stopped in the middle of the road from some distance away.1 At the preliminary-examination hearing, Robinson testified that the vehicles were facing opposite directions with the drivers’ windows next to one another and that the drivers appeared to be talking to one another with their windows down. One of the vehicles, a red Chevrolet Cobalt, was defendant's car. Robinson did not observe any narcotics activity and did not hear what the drivers said, but he testified that he thought a drug transaction might have occurred. Even though there were no other vehicles on Old State Road at the time, Robinson testified at the preliminary-examination hearing that he believed the vehicles were impeding traffic in violation of MCL 257.676b. Robinson also testified that he saw both cars begin moving when he was approximately 800 feet away, he did not have to slow down or avoid either vehicle, and he did not observe any erratic driving.
Robinson testified that he followed defendant's car "with the intention to stop the red Cobalt for impeding traffic." Robinson followed defendant in a marked patrol vehicle and turned onto the same one-lane driveway that defendant had entered, parking a few feet behind defendant's car and blocking the only path of egress. While a single lane was cleared within the driveway, the surrounding area was covered with several inches of snow. Neither the siren nor the emergency lights on Robinson's vehicle were activated by the officer.
Body-camera footage of the encounter that followed was introduced at the preliminary-examination hearing. Robinson, upon pulling into the driveway behind defendant, started to exit his car prior to putting the car in the parked position. When Robinson exited his patrol car, defendant was standing next to the driver's side door of the Cobalt facing Robinson. Robinson immediately asked whether defendant lived there, and defendant responded that it was a friend's house as he walked toward the deputy. Robinson asked what defendant was doing on the road, to which defendant replied, "Just talking about fishing." During this period, defendant had moved to put his hands in his pockets, and Robinson ordered him not to do so; defendant complied with the directive. Robinson then said, "I didn't know if maybe there was a drug deal going on, and that when I ran the plate it [came] back to" an address in Reese, Michigan. Defendant denied any drug transaction and said that Reese was where he lived and that he worked just up the road. After confirming the name of the homeowner, Robinson asked defendant if defendant had his driver's license, to which defendant replied in the negative; upon Robinson's further questioning, defendant responded that he did not have a valid driver's license. This all occurred within the first two minutes of Robinson pulling into the driveway.
The possibility of a citation for impeding traffic was never mentioned during Robinson's encounter with defendant. However, Robinson testified that because he smelled the odor of marijuana and alcohol emanating from defendant and noticed that defendant's eyes were bloodshot, he proceeded to investigate whether defendant was intoxicated. Defendant admitted to smoking marijuana about 20 minutes earlier and to consuming alcohol during the day. Defendant then consented to a search of his vehicle, and Robinson found both marijuana and an open container of alcohol inside. Robinson performed several field-sobriety tests, and based upon those tests, defendant was arrested.2 No "impeding traffic" citation was issued, but defendant was charged with operating while intoxicated (OWI), driving with a suspended license, and having an open container of alcohol in the vehicle.
Robinson testified at defendant's preliminary-examination hearing to the facts outlined earlier. However, Robinson conceded on redirect examination that his "initial thought was that there, there may have been a drug deal or something going on, because it was a rural area and no one was around." While the deputy knew of drug exchanges in rural areas, he knew of none on Old State Road. He also acknowledged that it is not uncommon for people to stop their vehicle, roll down their window, and talk with acquaintances on rural roads.
Defendant's attorney asked to submit briefing to challenge the validity of the stop under MCL 257.676b and to argue that the evidence obtained by the police should be excluded. The prosecution countered that the evidence was sufficient and that, based on the facts and the statute at issue, the officer had sufficient probable cause to initiate the stop. Additionally, the prosecution argued that a reasonable mistake of law or fact does not mandate the suppression of evidence under United States Supreme Court precedent.
The district court allowed briefing and later held that the prosecution failed to prove that Robinson had sufficient cause to initiate the stop. The court held that the prosecution had presented nothing more than "an inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or hunch" that was legally insufficient to believe that a drug transaction had transpired. As to the alleged impeding-traffic violation under MCL 257.676b(1), the court held that the statute could not be violated without a showing that "real, not imagined, traffic was actually impeded or obstructed in some way by a person or a vehicle." No evidence of such impediment was presented by the prosecution, and thus the court determined that the traffic stop was invalid. Accordingly, the court held that all evidence obtained from the stop would be inadmissible in any proceeding moving forward, and it dismissed the OWI charge. The court did not address the prosecution's reasonable-mistake-of-law argument.
The prosecution sought leave to appeal in the Tuscola Circuit Court, which was denied. The prosecution then sought leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals granted the prosecution's application, limiting the issues to those raised in the application....
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People v. Lewis
...mandated, however, a Fourth Amendment violation does not always require application of the exclusionary rule. People v Lucynski, 509 Mich. 618, 657 (2022); Gates, 462 U.S. at 223. Pursuant to the exception to the exclusionary rule, if law enforcement officers act in reasonable and good-fait......