People v. Lund
| Citation | 46 N.E.2d 929,382 Ill. 213 |
| Decision Date | 11 March 1943 |
| Docket Number | No. 26853.,26853. |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. LUND. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Harold G. Ward, Judge.
Anna Lund was convicted of larceny, and she brings error.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.T. J. Sullivan and Frank R. Sullivan, both of Springfield, for plaintiff in error.
George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen., and Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago (Edward E. Wilson, John T. Gallagher, Melvin S. Rembe, Richard B. Austin, and Alexander J. Napoli, all of Chicago, of counsel), for defendant in error.
Plaintiff in error, Anna Lund, was tried in the criminal court of Cook county on an indictment containing two counts, the first count charging the larceny on May 17, 1941, of five slips, each of the value of $1.95, and three slips, each of the value of $1.69, and the second count, in addition to the same charge of larceny, alleging three prior convictions of petty larceny. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty, but by leave of court withdrew it and moved to quash the second count of the indictment. The motion was overruled and defendant renewed her plea of not guilty. The jury found that she was guilty of larceny as charged in the indictment; that the value of the property stolen was $11.50; that defendant, under the name of Anna Lund, had theretofore been convicted of petty larceny; and that the age of the defendant was then about thirty-two years. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were made and overruled, and defendant was sentenced to the reformatory at Dwight for a period of one to three years, with the recommendation of a minimum of one year and a maximum of two years. She brings the record here by writ of error for review.
The motion to quash attacks the second count of the indictment as defective in the following particulars: (a) it does not allege that defendant was a person over the age of eighteen at the time of the prior convictions of petty larceny; (b) it does not allege the former convictions were and are still ‘subsisting;’ and (c) it appears on the face of the indictment that more than three years have elapsed from the date of the alleged prior convictions.
Paragraph 393 of chapter 38, Illinois Revised Statutes 1941, upon which the second count is based, provides: ‘In case of a second conviction of the offense of petty larceny by any person over the age of eighteen years, the punishment shall be by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not less than one year and not exceeding three years.’ The second count charges that the defendant had previously been convicted of petty larceny three times, but does not allege that she was over the age of eighteen years at the time of such prior convictions.
A criminal or penal statute, by well settled principles of law, is to be strictly construed in favor of the accused and nothing is to be taken by intendment or implication against him beyond the literal and obvious meaning of such statute. The object in construing criminal and penal as well as all other statutes is to ascertain the legislative intent. The rules as to strict or liberal construction are of value only as assisting in finding the real meaning of the statute. There is no need of construction to ascertain the meaning of a statute where the language is clear and unambiguous and the intention of the law-making power is manifestly apparent therefrom. If a statute creating or increasing a penalty or punishment be capable of two constructions, undoubtedly that which operates in favor of the accused is to be adopted. A statute authorizing a more severe punishment to be inflicted upon one convicted of a second or subsequent offense is highly penal and should be strictly construed and not extended in its application to cases which do not, by the strictest construction, come under its provisions. 24 Corpus Juris Secundum p. 1144, Criminal Law, § 1959. Nevertheless,...
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