People v. Macerola

• Decision Date: 07 June 1979
• Citation: 391 N.E.2d 990,417 N.Y.S.2d 908,47 N.Y.2d 257
• Parties: , 391 N.E.2d 990 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Joseph T. MACEROLA, Jr., Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Michael Harry LETKO, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 908

417 N.Y.S.2d 908

47 N.Y.2d 257, 391 N.E.2d 990

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Joseph T. MACEROLA, Jr., Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Michael Harry LETKO, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 7, 1979.

E. Stewart Jones, Jr., Troy, for appellant Joseph T. Macerola, jr

Thomas J. Neidl, Albany, for appellant Michael Harry Letko.

Sol Greenberg, Dist. Atty. (George H. Barber, Albany, and F. Patrick Jeffers, Glenmont, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JASEN, Judge.

The issue presented for our determination on these appeals is whether defendants were deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by reason of counsel's joint representation of defendants at trial. While we had thought the applicable legal principles firmly established by prior decisions of this court, the circumstances of this case compel us to elaborate further on the safeguards which must be employed to ensure that a defendant is afforded adequate legal representation.

The pertinent facts are as follows: Defendants Macerola and Letko were charged in a three-count indictment with the crimes of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law, § 140.25, subd. 1, par. (b)) and assault in the second degree (Penal Law, § 120.05, subd. 1) as a result of events occurring during the evening hours of March 31, 1976, at the Governor's Motor Inn in the Town of Guilderland. The indictment alleges, in substance, that defendants knowingly and unlawfully entered the Motor Inn with intent to commit the crime of assault, and that defendants did assault the proprietor and his wife, inflicting serious physical injury.

Defendants, represented by an attorney retained by both, were jointly tried. The jury rendered a verdict finding both defendants guilty of the crimes of burglary in the second degree and two counts of assault in the third degree. ¹ On appeal, the Appellate Division, finding no evidence in the record upon which defendant Letko's burglary conviction could be sustained, modified the judgment of conviction by reversing so much thereof as convicted Letko of burglary in the second degree and vacated the sentence imposed thereon, and, as modified, otherwise affirmed the convictions as to both defendants. Defendants were granted leave to appeal to this court from the orders of the Appellate Division.

It is the contention of the defendants that they were deprived of their constitutionally guaranteed right to the effective assistance of counsel by reason of their representation by the same attorney at trial. ² Due to the failure of the Trial Judge to ascertain on the record whether each defendant was cognizant of the potential risks inherent in the simultaneous representation of codefendants at trial and due to the conflict which existed between the defenses sought to be established by each defendant, we now reverse the orders of the Appellate Division and order a new trial.

It is indisputable that one accused of committing a crime is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. Such right is guaranteed by both the Federal and State Constitutions, and by State statute (U.S.Const., 6th Amdt.; N.Y.Const., art. I, § 6; CPL 210.15, subd. 2), and courts must remain ever vigilant in their duty to ensure that a defendant receives effective legal representation. As we have recognized, effectuation of this duty may be significantly impaired where one attorney "simultaneously represents the conflicting interests of a number of defendants." (People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 312, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769, 773, 342 N.E.2d 550, 553, citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680.)

While the joint representation of multiple defendants is certainly not per se violative of one's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel (People v. Gonzalez, 30 N.Y.2d 28, 34, 330 N.Y.S.2d 54, 59, 280 N.E.2d 882, 885, cert. den. 409 U.S. 859, 93 S.Ct. 145, 34 L.Ed.2d 105; Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426), we have charged the trial court, in cases where codefendants are represented by a single attorney, with the weighty responsibility of determining whether "the defendant's decision to proceed with his attorney is an informed decision." (People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 313, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769, 774, 342 N.E.2d 550, 553-554, Supra.) The rationale for imposing such duty is obvious. It is all too apparent that the respective interests of each defendant which must be zealously safeguarded are oftentimes at odds, making crucial decisions by defense counsel during the entire criminal proceeding all the more difficult, and, at times, precluding certain defense strategies. For example, an attorney may be less than willing to engage fervently in plea negotiations to obtain a lesser charge for one defendant if to do so would require that defendant to testify against the other defendants, or to call a defendant to testify on his own behalf when his testimony may be detrimental to other defendants whom the attorney represents. (See, generally, Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 Minn.L.Rev. 119, 125-135.)

Defendants, however, often unschooled in the nature of criminal proceedings, may not always sense when a conflict of interest does exist or perceive how such conflict may run counter to the effectiveness of his attorney's representation. Thus, before the formal commencement of trial, it is the responsibility of the Trial Judge, independent of the attorney's obligation to inform his clients of any conflicting interests which may hinder his representation, ³ to "ascertain, on the record, whether each defendant (represented by the same attorney) has an awareness of the potential risks involved in that course and has knowingly chosen it." (People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d, at pp. 313-314, 379 N.Y.S.2d p. 775, 342 N.E.2d p. 554, Supra ; see, e. g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 Supra ; United States v. Wisniewski, 2 Cir., 478 F.2d 274, 285; People v. Coleman, 42 N.Y.2d 500, 508-509, 399 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188-189, 369 N.E.2d 742, 745-746; People v. Rivera, 62 A.D.2d 767, 770, 406 N.Y.S.2d 301, 303; People v. Kerr, 61 A.D.2d 762, 402 N.Y.S.2d 192; People v. Allini, 60 A.D.2d 886, 889-890, 401 N.Y.S.2d 520, 524-526; ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge, § 3.4.) While a defendant may choose to retain his attorney, ⁴ such choice may be made only after the defendant is informed of the possible ramifications which joint representation might spawn when conflicting interests arguably exist. Only after sufficient admonition by the trial court of the potential pitfalls of joint representation can it be said that a defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel is adequately safeguarded. If such admonition does appear on the record, appellate courts are able to determine whether a defendant's decision to retain his attorney is indeed an informed choice.

Here, however, the record is devoid of any indication that the Trial Judge, by proper inquiry, ⁵ took the necessary precautions to ensure that the defendants perceived the potential risks inherent in joint representation. Thus, because of this absence of a proper inquiry on the record, we are unable to ascertain whether the defendants' decision to proceed with their attorney was knowingly and intelligently made, or whether they merely acquiesced out of ignorance to their joint representation. Although this omission by the Trial Judge was error, there remains for our consideration whether such failure to inquire mandates that defendants' convictions be vacated and a new trial ordered.

Insofar as joint representation of codefendants is not per se violative of the constitutional guarantee to the effective assistance of counsel (see, e. g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426, Supra ), there exists no compelling reason to adopt a rule which would automatically equate the trial court's failure to undertake proper precautionary measures with an error of constitutional magnitude requiring reversal in every instance. There may always exist those cases in which joint representation of multiple defendants is, without doubt, justified, and the court's neglect in admonishing codefendants of the potential risks entailed in joint representation would not deprive, without more, a defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. However, where a Trial Judge has failed to make satisfactory inquiry and a defendant can demonstrate that a conflict of interest, or at least the significant possibility thereof, did exist, a new trial must be ordered for "(t)he right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial." (Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 467, 86 L.Ed. 680, Supra ; see People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 312, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769, 773, 342 N.E.2d 550, 553, Supra ; United States v. Lawriw, 8 Cir., 568 F.2d 98, 104-105, cert. den. 435 U.S. 969, 98 S.Ct. 1607, 56 L.Ed.2d 60, reh den. 436 U.S. 951, 98 S.Ct. 2860, 56 L.Ed.2d 794; United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 3 Cir., 478 F.2d 203, 209-211.)

In this case, the record reveals that there was indeed a conflict of interest which endangered each defendant's right to receive advice and assistance from an attorney whose paramount responsibility is to that defendant alone. Defense counsel found himself in a very awkward position at trial in that by attempting to establish a separate defense for each defendant, he was, by implication, incriminating the other defendant. Thus, to establish Macerola's defense to the assault charges, it was necessary for counsel to attribute the responsibility for the physical...