People v. Mack
| Decision Date | 19 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. C037421.,C037421. |
| Citation | 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 531,97 Cal.App.4th 1010 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Anthony Karl MACK, Defendant and Appellant. |
William M. Robinson, San Francisco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Jo Graves, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Stephen G. Herndon and Wanda Hill Rouzan, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this case we determine the appropriate measure and procedure for the award of conduct credits for time served in prison prior to the invalidation of a judgment of conviction.
A jury convicted defendant Anthony Karl Mack of second degree robbery committed in 1995 and he was sentenced to prison. A federal district court granted his writ of habeas corpus and directed that the judgment of conviction be vacated for failure to allow defendant to represent himself at his jury trial. Upon return to the trial court defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the second degree robbery and was awarded credit on his new sentence only for the actual days of prior prison custody. The trial judge declined to determine the standards by which conduct credits should be awarded for the time spent in prison and referred the matter to the California Department of Corrections (CDC) for its determination.
We shall conclude that, because his conviction was invalidated, defendant was required by statute to be placed in the same position as if no trial had been had. Pursuant to that policy defendant's time in prison custody must be treated as preconviction custody. Although no statute provides for conduct credits in this circumstance, defendant is entitled, by application of principles of equal protection, to conduct credits, measured by the standards of Penal Code section 4019, as if he had spent the prison time in local custody.1 However, section 4019 is limited by the 15 percent maximum credit provisions of section 2933.1 that apply when the defendant has been convicted, as here, of a felony offense listed in section 667.5. (§§ 2933.1, subds.(a), (c).) We further conclude the CDC is best situated to determine the conduct credits earned pursuant to these standards for the prereversal time spent in prison.
We shall direct that the case be remanded to the trial court to amend the judgment in accordance with this opinion.
A jury convicted defendant of second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), committed November 25, 1995, and found true two "strike" allegations (§ 667, subds.(b)-(i)) and a serious felony allegation (§ 667, subd. (a)). He was sentenced to state prison for 30 years to life.
On appeal to this court, defendant contended his motion to represent himself at trial was erroneously denied. We concluded the motion was properly denied as untimely and affirmed the judgment. (The People v. Anthony Karl Mack (Oct. 30, 1997, C023570) [nonpub. opn.].) The California Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for review.2
Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The district court adopted a magistrate's findings that defendant's request to represent himself in the trial court was timely and granted a writ of habeas corpus vacating (thus reversing) the defendant's conviction.
Upon return to the superior court, defendant, represented by the public defender, entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the second degree robbery and admitted one "strike" allegation, pursuant to which he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Defendant asked the trial court to award him in-prison conduct credits at a rate of one-half (§§ 2930 et seq.), or presentence conduct credits at a rate of one-third (§ 4019, subd. (b)), for the 1,675 days he had served in state custody.
The People responded that defendant was entitled to one third conduct credit for the time in local custody (§ 4019) and up to one fifth percent conduct credit for the time in state custody (§ 1170.12, subd. (a)(5)). The trial court agreed in part with the People, stating, Defendant responded that his prior sentence had been invalidated and his state confinement prior to the reversal of his conviction must be considered to be presentence time.
The trial court awarded defendant 159 days of custody credits and 78 days of conduct credits for the time spent in local custody. It awarded defendant 1,675 days of in-prison custody credits but declined to determine the standards by which conduct credits should be awarded. It referred the matter to the CDC.3
On appeal the defendant argues that his entitlement to conduct credits for the period served in prison prior to the invalidation of his conviction should be measured by the standards of section 4019 and the credits earned determined by the trial court. We agree, except as limited by section 2933.1.
The People argue that a court order advising CDC whether the three strikes law applies to its conduct credit calculations would intrude impermissibly upon CDC's administrative responsibilities. We disagree. The People have confused the CDC's administrative authority to determine the actual credits earned with the judicial authority to determine the legal measure by which such credits are to be determined.
We are directed by statute to view defendant's time in prison custody prior to the invalidation of the judgment of conviction as if he had not been convicted. "If a judgment against the defendant is reversed, such reversal shall be deemed an order for a new trial, unless the appellate court shall otherwise direct." (§ 1262.) "The granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial had been had." (§ 1180; see also 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Appeal, § 166, pp. 412-413; Odium v. Duffy (1950) 35 Cal.2d 562, 564, 219 P.2d 785; People v. Hogue (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1500, 279 Cal.Rptr. 647; People v. Pettaway (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1312, 1327-1328, 254 Cal.Rptr. 436; People v. Diaz (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 651, 665, 24 Cal.Rptr. 367; see also People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 40, fn. 10, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 25 P.3d 1103.) The invalidation of a judgment of conviction by habeas corpus, as here, sets the case at large as if the defendant had not been tried and convicted. (In re Crow (1971) 4 Cal.3d 613, 620, 94 Cal.Rptr. 254, 483 P.2d 1206.)
The dissent contends that section 1180 is limited to the trial stage of criminal proceedings and does not extend to proceedings following reconviction. (Dis. opn. at p. 540, citing to People v. Hogue, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d 1500, 279 Cal.Rptr. 647 [].) While section 1180 plainly includes trial proceedings, it beggars belief that a defendant who is by law placed in the same position as if no trial had been had may be treated differently on reconviction by virtue of the sentence served pursuant to the very conviction that had been invalidated and which gave rise to the application of section 1180. The dissent engages a nonsequitur in seeking policy support by reference to sections which tie presentence credits to a subsequent not a prior conviction. (Dis. opn. at p. 540; §§ 2933.1, 2933.2.) As seen in this case, section 2933.1 does apply to defendant's presentence time served in prison prior to the invalidation of his prior conviction and thus is not in conflict with the application of section 1180.4
For these reasons we view defendant's time in prison prior to the invalidation of his prior judgment of conviction as time spent in custody prior to conviction. This requires that we measure his entitlement to conduct credits accordingly.
We next consider how that may be done.
There is no statute which provides for conduct credits for time served in prison prior to the invalidation of a judgment of conviction.
Section 4019 provides for conduct credits for presentence time spent in a local facility.5 The three strikes law applies to prison custody only "if a defendant has been convicted of a felony ...." (§§ 667, subd. (c), 1170.12, subd. (a)(5)); (People v. Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 32, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 25 P.3d 1103.)
The only statute which expressly addresses the issue of credit for time served in prison prior to the invalidation of a judgment of conviction provides for credit upon a new commitment only for custody credits, the time actually served. (§ 2900.1.)6
The anomaly thus presented is that, although the defendant's prereversal time in prison must be viewed as if he had not been convicted, no statute provides for conduct credits in that circumstance.
Resolution of the anomaly requires that we supply a rule based on the manifest policy of the statutes to award presentence credit for presentence time by application of principles of equal protection of the laws.
If defendant's presentence, prereversal prison custody had been spent in a local facility he would have been entitled under section 4019 to conduct credits subject to the limitations of section 2933.1.
To treat defendant's prison time the same as if he had spent the time in local custody requires that we extend the statutes applicable to presentence custody to this circumstance pursuant to the equal protection principles announced in People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, 165 Cal.Rptr. 280, 611 P.2d 874.
Sage considered the resolution of a similar anomaly arising from the former limitations of section 4019. As the section then read, a person who spent time in jail prior to conviction was entitled to conduct credits only when subsequently sentenced in a misdemeanor proceeding. A felon...
To continue reading
Request your trial