People v. Macklin

• Decision Date: 07 March 1994
• Citation: 608 N.Y.S.2d 509,202 A.D.2d 445
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Michael MACKLIN, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 509

608 N.Y.S.2d 509

202 A.D.2d 445

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Michael MACKLIN, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

March 7, 1994.

Gary E. Eisenberg, Monroe, for appellant.

William V. Grady, Dist. Atty., Poughkeepsie (Dana Lucas, of counsel), for respondent.

Before BRACKEN, J.P., and LAWRENCE, O'BRIEN and SANTUCCI, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Hillery, J.), rendered October 30, 1990, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and statements made by him to law enforcement authorities. Justice Bracken has been substituted for former Justice Eiber (see, 22 NYCRR 670.1[c].

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law and the facts, that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress statements to law enforcement authorities is granted, the plea is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Dutchess County, for further proceedings on the indictment.

The defendant contends that his questioning at police barracks for approximately six hours before being given Miranda warnings was custodial in nature, and, therefore, that all statements made by him prior to and after being read his Miranda rights should be suppressed (see, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694). We agree.

In applying the standard of whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have believed he was in police custody (see, People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 256 N.E.2d 172, cert. denied 400 U.S. 851, 91 S.Ct. 78, 27 L.Ed.2d 89), the factors to be considered include the amount of time the individual spent with the police, whether his freedom of action was significantly restricted, the location of the questioning and atmosphere under which he was questioned, his degree of cooperation, whether he was apprised of his constitutional rights, and whether the questioning was investigatory or accusatory in nature (see, People v. Bailey, 140 A.D.2d 356, 358, 527 N.Y.S.2d 845). Upon consideration of these factors, we find that an innocent person in the defendant's circumstances would not have believed he was free to leave the presence of the police.

The defendant initially agreed to accompany a State Trooper to the barracks for questioning at around 11:00 P.M. on March 10, 1987, and he was thereafter questioned continuously by several different State Troopers for six hours before being apprised of his constitutional rights at around 5:30 A.M. the next morning. As the questioning progressed, an innocent person in the defendant's position would have believed that he was a suspect and was not free to leave. His explanation of the wounds on his hands was met with scepticism, and the troopers informed the defendant that he fit the description of someone they were looking for, and that they were attempting to verify his alibi. After initially assuring the defendant that he would be provided with a ride home from the barracks, the troopers subsequently ignored his statements that he had to go to work in the morning and did not offer him transportation home.

Moreover, it is apparent that the troopers had...