People v. Maldonado, 135.
| Decision Date | 01 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 135.,135. |
| Citation | 18 N.E.3d 391,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 04878,24 N.Y.3d 48,993 N.Y.S.2d 680 |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jose MALDONADO, Appellant. |
24 N.Y.3d 48
18 N.E.3d 391
993 N.Y.S.2d 680
2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 04878
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent
v.
Jose MALDONADO, Appellant.
No. 135.
Court of Appeals of New York.
July 1, 2014.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, Appellate Advocates, New York City (Joshua M. Levine of counsel), for appellant.
Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn (Diane R. Eisner, Leonard Joblove and Victor Barall of counsel), for respondent.
OPINION OF THE COURT
RIVERA, J.
In this appeal, we conclude that the evidence was legally insufficient to support defendant's conviction for depraved indifference murder because the circumstances of this high-speed
vehicular police chase do not fit within the narrow category of cases wherein the facts evince a defendant's utter disregard for human life. Accordingly, we modify the Appellate Division's order by reducing defendant's conviction to manslaughter in the second degree.
I.
Police pursued defendant Jose Maldonado through the streets of Greenpoint, Brooklyn, a mixed commercial-residential neighborhood, soon after he stole a minivan from outside its owner's residence. This five-minute, midday chase led to defendant's fatal collision with a pedestrian and his prosecution and conviction for depraved indifference murder. Defendant concedes that the evidence established his reckless driving but argues that it only supports a conviction for manslaughter in the second degree. Thus, in this appeal, we are only concerned with whether the proof at trial evinced the statutorily required mental state to sustain his conviction for depraved indifference murder.
It is undisputed that defendant consistently drove well above the 30 miles per hour speed limit and violated numerous traffic rules as he attempted to evade capture by the police. The chase began when defendant ran a red light, accelerated through intersections, and went the wrong way down two one-way streets. The police followed with lights and sirens activated as defendant drove towards Manhattan Avenue, a major thoroughfare and commercial hub. Defendant turned onto the avenue where, according to witnesses, there was heavy vehicular and pedestrian traffic. As he drove north, defendant swerved into the southbound lane to pass slower vehicles and avoid congestion, and then shifted back into the northbound lane. Witnesses estimated that he was driving 40 to 50 miles per hour.
A few blocks up Manhattan Avenue, defendant ran a second red light and narrowly avoided hitting a pedestrian in a crosswalk. According to witnesses, defendant did not brake or slow down. Instead, he accelerated north and again swerved across the double-yellow lines into the southbound lane to avoid slower moving vehicles. A driver going south testified that defendant did not slow down when he entered the opposing lane of traffic. As a consequence, the driver had to swerve to the side of the road to avoid a collision. Once clear of congestion, defendant swerved back into the northbound lane.
A block later, defendant ran a third red light and struck a woman in a crosswalk. The victim hit the passenger side of the
minivan's windshield with such force that her body landed more than 100 feet down the avenue. She died at the scene. At that point, the police stopped following defendant to render aid to the victim.
Defendant continued accelerating north on Manhattan Avenue, again swerving into the southbound lane. A driver headed south testified that defendant sped towards him at a rate of about 50 to 70 miles per hour. As a result, he had to swerve
into the northbound lane to avoid a head-on collision with defendant. After the driver swerved, defendant's escape routes
were apparently blocked by cars in both the north and southbound lanes.
The chase ended a few blocks from where defendant struck the pedestrian, when defendant crashed the minivan into a parked car to avoid hitting other vehicles. The impact pushed the parked car over the cars parked behind it. Defendant, still trying to escape capture, ran out of the minivan and down a nearby street, followed by the driver who had just swerved to avoid a collision with defendant and a group of pedestrians who witnessed the crash. The group caught up with defendant and tackled and held him until the police arrived and put him under arrest.
At the precinct, defendant admitted that he stole the mini-van, exceeded the speed limit, and swerved into oncoming traffic as he fled the police. In explaining his driving, defendant said he tried to avoid hitting cars and pedestrians, and that he did not know the neighborhood well and drove down the oneway streets by mistake. Defendant said he was lost when he ended up on Manhattan Avenue, and that he was avoiding cars as he evaded the police. According to defendant, he was going against traffic and looking in his rearview mirror for the police immediately before he struck the victim. When he looked forward again, defendant said he saw the victim and that he thought he “hit the girl in the hand or something.” When he saw more people and traffic two blocks later, defendant decided to crash into the parked car to avoid hurting anyone else. He also expressed remorse for his actions.
Defendant was charged with numerous crimes arising from the theft of the minivan and the death of the pedestrian, including murder in the second degree (depraved indifference murder) (Penal Law § 125.25[2] ), manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.15[1] ), criminally negligent homicide (
Penal Law § 125.10 ), unlawful fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in the third degree (Penal Law § 270.25 ), unlawful fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in the first degree (Penal Law § 270.35 ), grand larceny in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 155.30[8] ), and criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 165.45 [5 ] ). At trial, defendant moved at the close of the People's case and again after defense rested, for dismissal of the depraved indifference murder charge on the ground that the People failed to establish the requisite mental state. In support of the motions, he argued that the evidence showed he repeatedly swerved to avoid hitting pedestrians and cars, indicating that his driving was merely reckless. Supreme Court denied the first motion, reserved judgment on the second and submitted, over defendant's objection, a charge of depraved indifference murder to the jury along with other relevant charges.
The jury found defendant guilty of depraved indifference murder, unlawful fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in the first degree, and grand larceny in the fourth degree. After the verdict, defendant renewed his motion for a trial order of dismissal for depraved indifference murder. Supreme Court denied the motion, finding the evidence in this case comparable to that in People v. Gomez, 65 N.Y.2d 9, 489 N.Y.S.2d 156, 478 N.E.2d 759 (1985), and similarly sufficient to support a conviction of depraved indifference murder. Supreme Court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 20 years to life.
Defendant appealed, asserting legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence challenges
to his depraved indifference murder conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed (see People v. Maldonado, 100 A.D.3d 657, 952 N.Y.S.2d 901 [2d Dept.2012] ). A Judge of this Court granted
defendant leave to appeal (21 N.Y.3d 1044, 972 N.Y.S.2d 541, 995 N.E.2d 857 [2013] ).
II.
A.
A person is guilty of depraved indifference murder when, “[u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, [such person] recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person” (Penal Law § 125.25 [2 ] ). Depraved indifference is a culpable mental state which “is best understood as an utter disregard for the value of human life” (People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 296, 819 N.Y.S.2d 691, 852 N.E.2d 1163 [2006] [internal quotation marks
omitted] ). Thus, “a depraved and utterly indifferent actor is someone who does not care if another is injured or killed” (id. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). Due to the wanton nature of this mens rea, “depraved indifference murder properly applies only to a small, and finite, category of cases where the conduct is at least as morally reprehensible as intentional murder” (People v. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d 202, 207, 811 N.Y.S.2d 267, 844 N.E.2d 721 [2005] ).
A defendant who knowingly pursues risky behavior that endangers others does not necessarily evince depraved indifference by engaging in that conduct. As we have explained, “[a] person who is depravedly indifferent is not just willing to take a grossly unreasonable risk to human life—that person does not care how the risk turns out” (People v. Lewie, 17 N.Y.3d 348, 359, 929 N.Y.S.2d 522, 953 N.E.2d 760 [2011] ). “The element of depraved indifference to human life comprises both depravity and indifference, and has meaning independent of recklessness and the gravity of the risk created” (People v. McMillon, 31 A.D.3d 136, 139, 816 N.Y.S.2d 167 [2d Dept.2006], lv. denied 7 N.Y.3d 815,...
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