People v. Mandez
| Decision Date | 12 November 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 97CA0035.,97CA0035. |
| Citation | 997 P.2d 1254 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Samuel V. MANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Barbara McDonnell, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Michael E. McLachlan, Solicitor General, Paul Koehler, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Kathleen A. Lord, Chief Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Opinion by Judge PLANK.
Defendant, Samuel Mandez, appeals a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of first degree felony murder. We affirm.
In 1992, when defendant was fourteen years old, a 78-year-old woman who lived alone was severely beaten and her throat was cut, resulting in her death.
During the resulting investigation, the police recovered approximately 40 finger and palm prints from the intact and broken glass, as well as the frame, of a basement window of the victim's house. Those prints did not match any then on file or of anyone the police investigated. One additional palm print, which belonged to the victim's son who had recently visited, was found in the home. Two burned matches were found, one just outside the broken window and the other inside on the basement floor.
The police found a baseball bat, a hammer, and a flashlight, each property of the victim, in a culvert near her home, along with shards of glass, a matchbook, and other items. Two of the glass shards were identified as pieces of the broken basement window and had dried blood consistent with that of the victim, and two other pieces of glass had a palm print that was ultimately determined to be from defendant. No usable fingerprints were recovered from any of the other items found in the culvert. On the leaves of a nearby bush, the police found small amounts of gold paint. The baseball bat and hammer were each covered with blood consistent with that of the victim, and the flashlight also had a small amount of blood on it.
Although the police investigated various leads, none of those suspects could be connected to the crime, and initially no one was charged.
In 1996, defendant's fingerprints were first entered into the state-wide fingerprint matching system and were identified as those on the victim's window. Defendant established that he and his grandfather had painted the exterior of the victim's home approximately eleven months prior to her death, and he claimed his fingerprints were placed on the window at that time.
The police investigation revealed that the matchbook had come from a business in Henderson, Nevada. Defendant had relatives there who he had, on occasion, visited and those relatives had visited his family in Colorado. The burnt matches found by police at the scene were consistent with those remaining in the matchbook, but they could not be conclusively identified.
Presentation of this evidence at trial resulted in the conviction at issue here.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence of his fingerprints, allegedly obtained in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights, which were used to identify the fingerprints on the victim's window. We disagree.
Defendant first contends that his fingerprints obtained during his incarceration in 1993 must be suppressed because his detention was illegal. We disagree.
Evidence must be suppressed if it is the fruit of an unconstitutional arrest or police detention. People v. Rodriguez, 945 P.2d 1351 (Colo.1997). However, evidence need not be suppressed if it is obtained in violation of a statutory provision unless it also amounts to a constitutional violation. See People v. McKinstry, 843 P.2d 18 (Colo. 1993)
(); People v. Shinaut, 940 P.2d 380 (Colo.1997) ().
In 1993, defendant, at that time still a juvenile, was briefly incarcerated in the Arapahoe County jail on a "courtesy hold" pending his return to Adams County at the request of the Division of Youth Services. During that brief incarceration, defendant's fingerprints were taken, and those fingerprints were entered in the state-wide computer system some years later. Those fingerprints first brought defendant to the attention of the officers investigating the victim's death.
Defendant's only challenge to the 1993 taking of his fingerprints is that various statutory provisions might have been violated in his transfer from a juvenile offender boot camp to jail. Accordingly, since no constitutional violation is asserted, we conclude that the exclusionary rule cannot apply to those fingerprints even if one or more statutory provisions were violated as defendant maintains. See People v. Shinaut, supra.
Defendant further contends that his fingerprints obtained as a result of his arrest on an outstanding warrant should have been suppressed. Again, we disagree.
A police request for identification and a brief retention of the identification document produced to determine if there exist outstanding warrants for the arrest of the person identified is not, without more, a detention and is not subject to constitutional scrutiny. People v. Paynter, 955 P.2d 68 (Colo.1998).
Here, in 1996, defendant was contacted by a police officer in the basement of a home where he was a visitor. It is undisputed that the police officer entered the home lawfully at the request of its owner and that the officer did not violate defendant's constitutional rights by contacting him or asking questions.
After concluding that there was no illegal activity occurring in the basement, the officer asked defendant for his identification and then contacted his dispatcher by radio for a warrant check. He retained defendant's identification card for approximately two to three minutes before learning that defendant had an outstanding arrest warrant for failure to appear in another jurisdiction.
The trial court found, with support in the record, that the police officer did not detain defendant until learning that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest.
The facts here are virtually indistinguishable from those of People v. Paynter, supra,
and thus, we conclude that it is dispositive of defendant's suppression claim.
Accordingly, there was no error in the trial court's ruling declining to suppress the fingerprint evidence obtained as a result of this arrest.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred when it allegedly allowed the prosecution more time for jury voir dire than he was allowed. Specifically, he calculates that the prosecution had 70 minutes of voir dire and that he had only 30. However, our review of the record reveals little to support defendant's contention. In the absence of a showing to the contrary, we presume the regularity of the proceedings, and accordingly, we perceive no error in the trial court's handling of voir dire. See Valdez v. People, 168 Colo. 429, 451 P.2d 750 (1969)
.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it declined to impose sanctions on the prosecution for an alleged discovery violation. We disagree.
The victim's son, accompanied by the prosecutors and a police officer, viewed the replacement window panes in the victim's house approximately one week before trial. As a result of that examination, the victim's son told the prosecutors that his earlier testimony about the manner in which the window locked had been incorrect, and he modified his position to state that the window locking mechanism was only on the outer window pane, at the outside edge of the sliding pane. The son's trial testimony on this point is consistent with the police photographs of the window introduced at trial.
Defendant became aware of this change in the son's testimony during the prosecution's direct examination at trial. The prosecution elicited from the son the reasons for the change in his testimony, and defendant moved for sanctions or a mistrial on the basis that the prosecution had breached its duty to disclose exculpatory information pursuant to Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(2). The trial court instructed the jury that the prosecution had not disclosed this information to defendant and that defendant was hearing the inconsistent testimony for the first time at trial. Defendant subsequently cross-examined the victim's son about the change in his testimony.
The prosecution has a duty to disclose to the defendant any exculpatory material or information in its possession or control pursuant to Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(2), as well as a continuing duty to disclose newly discovered exculpatory material or information pursuant to Crim. P. 16(III)(b).
If the prosecution fails to disclose evidence in violation of Crim. P. 16, the trial court must fashion a remedy that will "restore as nearly as possible the level playing field that existed before the discovery violation." People v. District Court, 808 P.2d 831, 837 (Colo.1991).
In fashioning its order, the trial court should impose the least severe sanction that will adequately remedy the violation. On appeal, we review the trial court's decision only to determine if the trial court abused its discretion by entering an order that is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Loggins, 981 P.2d 630 (Colo.App.1998). Here, the information at issue is not plainly exculpatory or inculpatory. However, whenever a prosecution witness' testimony changes significantly, that change is potentially exculpatory at least to the extent that it bears upon the witness' credibility. See CRE 611 (...
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