People v. Mann

• Decision Date: 01 May 1975
• Docket Number: No. 10,10
• Citation: 395 Mich. 472,236 N.W.2d 509
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert MANN, Defendant-Appellant. ,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 509

236 N.W.2d 509

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert MANN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10, May Term, 1975.

395 Mich. 472, 236 N.W.2d 509

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 18, 1975.

Donald A. Burge, Pros. Atty. by Stephen M. Wheeler, Chief of App. Div., Kalamazoo, for plaintiff-appellee.

Daudert & Barron by Michael O'N. Barron, Kalamazoo, for defendant-appellant.

T. G. KAVANAGH, Chief Justice.

Defendant was arrested for larceny in a building, M.C.L.A. § 750.360; M.S.A. § 28.592, after walking out of a store in Kalamazoo with a box containing a tape recorder, unconcealed, under his arm. Defendant testified that he saw a friend (Van Johnson) in the store who was overburdened with packages. The friend handed the box to defendant and asked him to carry it out to his car, and then give him a ride home. When defendant left the store, he was apprehended, could not produce a sales receipt for the tape recorder and was arrested. The friend did not testify at trial.

Defendant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

On appeal to this Court defendant alleges that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on aiding and abetting when neither party had requested such an instruction, that theory had not been advanced at trial, and there was no opportunity to argue the matter to the jury.

The gist of defendant's argument is not that the instruction given on aiding and abetting incorrectly stated the law, but rather that no instruction on aiding and abetting was justified by the evidence and the trial judge did not inform counsel before closing arguments that such instruction would be given. Therefore, defendant had no opportunity to rebut that charge, or to submit instructions on aiding and abetting. Defense counsel objected to the instruction immediately, but that objection was overruled.

The prosecution argues that it was defendant's own testimony and defense counsel's closing argument which justified the aiding and abetting instruction. It is contended that by testifying that Van Johnson had handed him the tape recorder, defendant himself provided evidence of a concert of action.

To counter appellant's contention that the error consisted of not informing counsel before closing argument of the court's intention to instruct on aiding and abetting, the prosecution alleges that it was in fact defendant's closing argument that necessitated the instruction. Defense counsel argued to the jury that Van Johnson might have stolen the tape recorder, if it was stolen at all, and that defendant did not know anything about it. That possibility, according to defense counsel's argument to the jury, 'should be ruled out before you can find Robert Mann guilty of anything'.

The prosecution contends that such a statement was an incorrect statement of the law, leaving the jury with the belief that if they found that Johnson stole the recorder, they would be required to acquit the defendant. This argument, the prosecution claims, Required the court to correct that erroneous impression, and tell the jury that they could find that the two acted in concert and thereby still convict defendant of larceny.

M.C.L.A. § 768.29; M.S.A. § 28.1052 states:

'It shall be the duty of the judge to control all proceedings during the trial * * *. The court shall instruct the jury as to the law applicable to the case * * *.'

If the instruction given correctly states the law as applied to the case, the fact that counsel objects to its being given does not control. People v. Chamblis, 395 Mich. 408, 236 N.W.2d 473 (1975). 'Neither the defense nor the prosecution has the option of precluding the court from carrying out this duty (of correctly instructing on the law) in hopes of forcing an 'all or nothing' verdict.' Id.

Michigan has, by statute, abolished all common-law distinctions between principals and accessories. M.C.L.A. § 767.39; M.S.A. § 28.979 states:

'Every person concerned in the commission of an offense, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or abets in its commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall be punished as if he had directly committed such offense.'

A person who aids and abets is guilty as a principal.

Defendant argues that it was not the theory of the prosecution nor the defense that defendant was an accessory, but rather that defendant himself committed the offense. That same argument was made in 1892 in People v. Wright, 90 Mich. 362, 51 N.W. 517 (1892), wherein the defendant claimed that the court erred by instructing on aiding and abetting, when the information was for the offense of keeping a bawdy house. The Court held:

'Our statute * * * provides that one who aids or abets in the commission of a felony may be indicted, tried, and punished as principal * * *. The charge of keeping a bawdy-house may be supported by proof that the respondent aided or assisted others in the commission of the offense.' Id. at 364, 51 N.W. at 517.

A case which dealt with a similar contention was People v. McKeighan, 205 Mich. 367, 171 N.W. 500 (1919). Appellant in McKeighan alleged that the information was insufficient because it charged him only as a principal, and thus he was not given notice of the exact nature of the charge, as the proofs indicated his involvement was as an accessory. The Court held that the information was sufficient to warrant conviction, stating: 'He who aids and abets is now a principal'. Id. at 371, 171 N.W. at 501.

Defendant in the instant case alleges that there was not sufficient evidence of a crime on the part of another to warrant an instruction on aiding and abetting. In People v. Palmer, 392 Mich. 370, 378, 220 N.W.2d 393, 397 (1974), we reaffirmed the rule that a person may be prosecuted for aiding and abetting without regard to the conviction or acquittal of the principal. '(Aiding and abetting) comprehends all words or deeds which may support, encourage or incite the commission of a crime.' The conviction of the principal is not necessary to convict an accessory. What must be proven, however, is that the crime was committed by someone, and that the defendant either committed or aided and abetted the commission of that crime.

Just as in other areas of jury instruction regarding which offenses might be considered by the jury, there must be evidence on the record to support such a charge. In this case, defendant himself hypothesized that Van Johnson might have stolen this tape recorder. If the jury believed that, they would not be required to acquit the defendant. Rather they could find that defendant and Johnson acted in concert and thus defendant would still be guilty of the offense. There was evidence on the record to support such a conclusion and thus the court properly instructed to that effect.

In People v. Murray, 72 Mich. 10, 16, 40 N.W. 29, 32 (1888), this Court said:

'Without any requests from counsel it is the duty of the circuit judge to see to it that the case goes to the jury in a clear and intelligent manner, so that they may have a clear and correct understanding of what it is they are to decide, and he should state to them fully the law applicable to the facts. Especially is this his duty in a criminal case. In this case it was not so done. Too much reliance is often placed upon counsel by the court in this respect for requests; but this should not be done. The court must do its duty in a criminal case, whether counsel do so or not. It is to the court that the accused has a right to look to see that he has a fair trial.'

We also reject defendant's contention that it was not proper to give the instruction without first informing counsel so that closing arguments might be shaped accordingly. In this case, counsel were not informed of the proposed instruction until After closing arguments were completed.

GCR 1963, 516.1 states:

'.1 Request for Instructions. At or before the close of the evidence, any party may, or at any time the Court reasonably directs, the parties shall, file written requests that the Court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the request. A copy of such requested...