People v. Manning
| Decision Date | 14 February 2001 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 224898. |
| Citation | 243 Mich. App. 615,624 N.W.2d 746 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tiya MANNING, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, for the people.
James L. Feinberg, Detroit, for the defendant.
Before O'CONNELL, P.J., and KELLY and WHITBECK, JJ.
The prosecution in this case appeals by leave granted from a trial court order granting defendant's Tiya Manning's motion to suppress an inculpatory statement that she gave to police officers while she was confined and awaiting arraignment. The trial court entered a stay of the proceedings pending the outcome of this interlocutory appeal. In this appeal, we must explore the "fit" between the Michigan Supreme Court's standards for the suppression of a confession following an arrest without a warrant in People v. Cipriano,1 and the United States Supreme Court's standards for the delay of a probable cause determination after an arrest without a warrant in Riverside Co. v. McLaughlin.2 We conclude that Riverside Co. does not supplant Cipriano and that, indeed, the two opinions dovetail. We further conclude that this Court's post-Riverside Co. decisions in People v. McCray3 and People v. Whitehead,4 while emphasizing Riverside Co. and not mentioning Cipriano, are not to be read as departing from Cipriano. We therefore reverse and remand.
The trial court set forth the pertinent facts of this case in its opinion and order granting defendant's motion to suppress:
In the early morning of June 15, 1999, Inkster Police responded to a drive by shooting on Florence Street. At approximately 1:08 a.m., defendant was arrested by Inkster Police in regard to a possible role in the homicide that resulted from the shooting. The defendant spent the night in a cell in the Inkster police headquarters and at about 5:30 a.m. on the morning of the fifteenth, defendant was read her rights by Sgt. Hill and gave a statement. On the morning of June 18, 1999, at about 10:20 a.m., defendant gave Detective Williams a note stating that she wished to talk to him without an attorney present. Defendant then gave another statement allegedly implicating herself in the homicide. Defendant wishes to have the second statement (June 18, 1999, 10:30 a.m.) suppressed.
The procedural aspect of the police investigation is somewhat involved. The Inkster Police Department is a comparatively small police department consisting of approximately 35-40 police officers of whom six are detectives. Of those six detectives, only one detective (Detective Hines) is specially designated for homicide cases. In 1999, twelve homicides occurred within the City of Inkster. The first officer in charge was Detective Abdallah, who was the on call officer on the night of June 14-15, 1999. Detective Abdallah went on vacation on the sixteenth and that morning Detective Williams was assigned to the case. Detective Hines was assigned to assist Detective Williams as it was his first homicide investigation. Detective Williams spent the morning of the sixteenth reviewing the case and that afternoon proceeded to have a warrant application typed to arraign the defendant. The application was completed on the morning of the seventeenth and both Detective Williams and Detective Hines went downtown to the prosecutor's office to have the warrant prepared. As this was Detective Williams' first trip to the homicide unit, Detective Hines went along.
The prosecution charged Manning with first-degree murder5 and two counts of assault with the intent to commit murder.6 Manning successfully moved to quash one of the assault counts. Manning thereafter filed a motion to suppress her statement and conduct a Walker hearing.7 Manning argued that because of the delay in arraignment, her statement was involuntary under the standard announced in Cipriano, supra.
Following the release of this Court's opinion in Whitehead, supra, Manning argued that both Whitehead and the United State Supreme Court's decision in Riverside Co., mandated that her statement be automatically suppressed because she was held for over eighty hours without arraignment.
In its analysis, the trial court made the following finding:
[T]here is nothing in this record which indicates that the detectives of the Inkster Police Department were motivated by a desire to gain additional information to justify Ms. Manning's arrest and nothing in this record indicates that Inkster detectives intentionally delayed in arraigning Ms. Manning in the hopes of eliciting an incriminating statement. Other than delay, there is nothing in this record which indicates that the factors cited in Cipriano, supra,
regarding the voluntariness of defendant's second statement taken on June 18, 1999, at 10:20 a.m. exists in this case.
Nevertheless, the trial court emphasized the length of the delay and concluded that Riverside Co. required it to suppress the statement regardless of its voluntary nature.
We must determine whether the trial court erred in finding that Manning's confession was involuntary solely on the basis of the length of delay between the time of her arrest and her arraignment. A trial court must view the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether a defendant's statement was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.8 This Court will not reverse the trial court's findings regarding those circumstances unless they were clearly erroneous.9 A finding is clearly erroneous if it leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.10 Resolution of this appeal also entails a question of law. We review such questions de novo.11
A proper understanding of the rather intricate issue of the intersection between the Fifth and Fourth Amendment requirements requires a threshold knowledge of Michigan pretrial criminal practice and procedure. Below, we briefly outline that process.
Before making an arrest, a peace officer generally obtains an arrest warrant from a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause. There are two predicates to the issuance of such an arrest warrant: (1) the presentation of a proper complaint alleging the commission of an offense and (2) a finding of "reasonable cause" to believe that the individual accused in the complaint committed that offense.12 The magistrate may base the finding of reasonable cause on the factual allegations of the complainant in the complaint, the complainant's sworn testimony, the complainant's affidavit, or the supplemental sworn testimony or affidavits of other individuals presented by the complaint or required by the magistrate.13 MCR 6.102(A) uses the phrase "probable cause" and MCR 6.102(B) states that a finding of probable cause "may be based on hearsay evidence and rely on factual allegations in the complaint, affidavits from the complainant or others, the testimony of a sworn witness adequately preserved to permit review, or any combination of these sources." Importantly, a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if a misdemeanor is committed in the officer's presence or if there is reasonable cause to believe a felony was committed and that the person arrested committed it.14
After a person is arrested without a warrant, the arresting officer must bring that person before a magistrate for arraignment "without unnecessary delay."15 At the arraignment, the magistrate determines whether there is probable cause to believe the person committed the crime. When a person is arrested without a warrant, therefore, no judicial officer has yet found that there was reasonable cause for the arrest. Thus, while all accused persons are "presumptively innocent until proven guilty," when a person is being held without a warrant or probable cause hearing, a judicial officer has not yet determined that there is even reasonable cause to believe the person committed a crime. Therefore, when Justice Scalia referred in his dissent in Riverside Co. to an "innocent arrestee," he was quite literally correct.16
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,17 prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const., Am. IV, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be...
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...clearly erroneous if it leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court has made a mistake." People v. Manning, 243 Mich.App. 615, 620, 624 N.W.2d 746 (2000). A statement obtained from a defendant during a custodial interrogation is admissible only if the defendant volunt......
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...v. Alaska, 935 P.2d 828, 834-35 (Alaska App.1997); Peterson v. Indiana, 674 N.E.2d 528, 538-39 (Ind.1996); Michigan v. Manning, 243 Mich.App. 615, 642, 624 N.W.2d 746, 759 (2000); Nebraska v. Nissen, 252 Neb. 51, 68, 560 N.W.2d 157, 171 (1997); New Jersey v. Tucker, 137 N.J. 259, 272, 645 A......
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...court must hold a Walker hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the issue of voluntariness. People v. Manning, 243 Mich.App. 615, 624–625, 624 N.W.2d 746 (2000). A defendant must file a motion to suppress in advance of trial. Id. at 625, 624 N.W.2d 746. In this case, defendan......
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...have likewise held that suppression of a statement is not per se required for a McLaughlin violation. See People v. Manning, 243 Mich. App. 615, 636-44; 624 N.W. 2d 746 (2000). Under both federal and Michigan law, any unnecessary delay in having a defendant arraigned before a magistrate or ......