People v. Marrero
Citation | 69 N.Y.2d 382,507 N.E.2d 1068,515 N.Y.S.2d 212 |
Parties | , 507 N.E.2d 1068, 89 A.L.R.4th 1001 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Julio MARRERO, Appellant. |
Decision Date | 02 April 1987 |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
The defense of mistake of law (Penal Law § 15.20[2][a], [d] ) is not available to a Federal corrections officer arrested in a Manhattan social club for possession of a loaded .38 caliber automatic pistol who claimed he mistakenly believed he was entitled, pursuant to the interplay of CPL 2.10, 1.20 and Penal Law § 265.20, to carry a handgun without a permit as a peace officer.
In a prior phase of this criminal proceeding, defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment upon which he now stands convicted was granted (94 Misc.2d 367, 404 N.Y.S.2d 832); then it was reversed and the indictment reinstated by a divided Appellate Division (71 A.D.2d 346, 422 N.Y.S.2d 384); next, defendant allowed an appeal from that order, certified to the Court of Appeals, to lapse and be dismissed (Oct. 22, 1980). Thus, review of that aspect of the case is precluded (People v. Corley, 67 N.Y.2d 105, 500 N.Y.S.2d 633, 491 N.E.2d 1090).
On the trial of the case, the court rejected the defendant's argument that his personal misunderstanding of the statutory definition of a peace officer is enough to excuse him from criminal liability under New York's mistake of law statute (Penal Law § 15.20). The court refused to charge the jury on this issue and defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. We affirm the Appellate Division order, 114 A.D.2d 1053, 495 N.Y.S.2d 160 upholding the conviction.
Defendant was a Federal corrections officer in Danbury, Connecticut, and asserted that status at the time of his arrest in 1977. He claimed at trial that there were various interpretations of fellow officers and teachers, as well as the peace officer statute itself, upon which he relied for his mistaken belief that he could carry a weapon with legal impunity.
The starting point for our analysis is the New York mistake statute as an outgrowth of the dogmatic common-law maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse. The central issue is whether defendant's personal misreading or misunderstanding of a statute may excuse criminal conduct in the circumstances of this case.
The common-law rule on mistake of law was clearly articulated in Gardner v. People, 62 N.Y. 299. In Gardner, the defendants misread a statute and mistakenly believed that their conduct was legal. The court insisted, however, that the "mistake of law" did not relieve the defendants of criminal liability. The statute at issue, relating to the removal of election officers, required that prior to removal, written notice must be given to the officer sought to be removed. The statute provided one exception to the notice requirement: "removal * * * shall only be made after notice in writing * * * unless made while the inspector is actually on duty on a day of registration, revision of registration, or election, and for improper conduct" (L.1872, ch. 675, § 13). The defendants construed the statute to mean that an election officer could be removed without notice for improper conduct at any time. The court ruled that removal without notice could only occur for improper conduct on a day of registration, revision of registration or election.
In ruling that the defendant's misinterpretation of the statute was no defense, the court said: ( Gardner v. People, 62 N.Y. 299, 304, supra). This is to be contrasted with People v. Weiss, 276 N.Y. 384, 12 N.E.2d 514 where, in a kidnapping case, the trial court precluded testimony that the defendants acted with the honest belief that seizing and confining the child was done with "authority of law". We held it was error to exclude such testimony since a good-faith belief in the legality of the conduct would negate an express and necessary element of the crime of kidnapping, i.e., intent, without authority of law, to confine or imprison another. Subject to the mistake statute, the instant case, of course, falls within the Gardner rationale because the weapons possession statute violated by this defendant imposes liability irrespective of one's intent.
The desirability of the Gardner-type outcome, which was to encourage the societal benefit of individuals' knowledge of and respect for the law, is underscored by Justice Holmes' statement: "It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not have known that he was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse at all would be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to make men know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales" (Holmes, The Common Law, at 48 [1881] ).
The revisors of New York's Penal Law intended no fundamental departure from this common-law rule in Penal Law § 15.20, which provides in pertinent part " § 15.20. Effect of ignorance or mistake upon liability.
This section was added to the Penal Law as part of the wholesale revision of the Penal Law in 1965 (L.1965, ch. 1030). When this provision was first proposed, commentators viewed the new language as codifying "the established common law maxim on mistake of law, while at the same time recognizing a defense when the erroneous belief is founded upon an 'official statement of the law' " (Note, Proposed Penal Law of New York, 64 Colum L Rev 1469, 1486 [1964] ).
The defendant claims as a first prong of his defense that he is entitled to raise the defense of mistake of law under section 15.20(2)(a) because his mistaken belief that his conduct was legal was founded upon an official statement of the law contained in the statute itself. Defendant argues that his mistaken interpretation of the statute was reasonable in view of the alleged ambiguous wording of the peace officer exemption statute, and that his "reasonable" interpretation of an "official statement" is enough to satisfy the requirements of subdivision (2)(a). However, the whole thrust of this exceptional exculpatory concept, in derogation of the traditional and common-law principle, was intended to be a very narrow escape valve. Application in this case would invert that thrust and make mistake of law a generally applied or available defense instead of an unusual exception which the very opening words of the mistake statute make so clear, i.e., "A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct * * * unless" (Penal Law § 15.20). The momentarily enticing argument by defendant that his view of the statute would only allow a defendant to get the issue generally before a jury further supports the contrary view because that consequence is precisely what would give the defense the unintended broad practical application.
The prosecution further counters defendant's argument by asserting that one cannot claim the protection of mistake of law under section 15.20(2)(a) simply by misconstruing the meaning of a statute but must instead establish that the statute relied on actually permitted the conduct in question and was only later found to be erroneous. To buttress that argument, the People analogize New York's official statement defense to the approach taken by the Model Penal Code (MPC). Section 2.04 of the MPC provides:
"Section 2.04. Ignorance or Mistake.
* * *
"(3) A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when * * * (b) he acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (i) a statute or other enactment" (emphasis added).
Although the drafters of the New York statute did not adopt the precise language of the Model Penal Code provision with the emphasized clause, it is evident and has long been believed that the Legislature intended the New York statute to be similarly construed. In fact, the legislative history of section 15.20 is replete with references to the influence of the Model Penal Code provision (see, Hechtman, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 39, Penal Law § 15.20, at 36; LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.1, n 95; Drafting a New Penal Law of New York: An Interview with Richard Denzer, 18 Buffalo L.Rev. 251, 252 [1968-1969] ). The proposition that...
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