People v. Marshall

• Decision Date: 19 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 110765.,110765.
• Citation: 351 Ill.Dec. 172,950 N.E.2d 668,242 Ill.2d 285
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,v.Earl Lee MARSHALL, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

242 Ill.2d 285
950 N.E.2d 668
351 Ill.Dec. 172

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,
v.
Earl Lee MARSHALL, Appellant.

No. 110765.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 19, 2011.

[950 N.E.2d 670]

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Johannah B. Weber, Deputy Defender, and John H. Gleason, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Kevin W. Lyons, State's Attorney, of Peoria (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Katherine D. Saunders, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

[242 Ill.2d 287] OPINION Justice KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[351 Ill.Dec. 174] The issue presented in this case is whether, under section 5–4–3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5–4–3 (West 2008)), a trial court has the authority to order a defendant to submit a sample of his deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) for forensic analysis and [242 Ill.2d 288] indexing and to pay a $200 DNA analysis fee where that defendant has already submitted a DNA sample pursuant to a prior conviction and has paid a corresponding analysis fee. Defendant, Earl Lee Marshall, pleaded guilty to first degree murder in the circuit court of Peoria County. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a term of 33 years' imprisonment and specified that there “is the judgment for costs and mandatory assessments of DNA fee and testing.” The written sentencing order directed defendant to pay a $200 DNA assessment fee. On direct appeal following denial of defendant's motion to reconsider sentence, defendant argued that the trial court lacked

[351 Ill.Dec. 175 , 950 N.E.2d 671]

authority to order him to submit a DNA sample or pay the fee as his DNA was already on file. The appellate court found that defendant had forfeited this issue and that the trial court's order was not void because the order was authorized under section 5–4–3. 402 Ill.App.3d 1080, 342 Ill.Dec. 88, 931 N.E.2d 1271. We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).

BACKGROUND

After defendant was charged with first degree murder in June 2007, the State moved for an order directing defendant “to produce the buccal standard” for the purpose of DNA comparison analysis. At a hearing on that motion, the following exchange occurred:

“MR. GAST [Assistant State's Attorney]: Judge, we have a Motion for Samples. It's my understanding that the lab has found some blood samples that would be available for testing with the defendant's DNA, so therefore, we're asking pursuant to Supreme Court Rule for a sample to be taken from the defendant.

THE COURT: We'll hear from the defendant.

MR. TONER [Assistant Public Defender]: Judge, our understanding is that Mr. Marshall's DNA is already of record, so there would be no reason to take any further DNA.

THE COURT: Mr. Gast, any knowledge of that?

[242 Ill.2d 289] MR. GAST: I don't have any knowledge of that other than—is it a CODIS [Combined DNA Index System] sample?

MR. TONER: Yeah.”

The State reiterated its request for a buccal sample from defendant, and the court granted the motion.

On January 17, 2008, the parties appeared in court and defendant's counsel announced that an agreement had been reached whereby defendant would plead guilty as charged, and would be sentenced to imprisonment for a term capped at 33 years. Defendant pleaded guilty, the court accepted the plea and scheduled a sentencing hearing. Thereafter, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. At a hearing on the motion, the court heard testimony and argument before denying the motion.

The presentence investigation report (PSI) prepared for defendant noted, inter alia, that his DNA was “Registered.” The PSI further detailed defendant's 2002 guilty plea to a felony traffic offense in Woodford County case No. 01–CF–65, his three-year sentence, and noted: “He was received at the Illinois Department of Corrections on January 9, 2002. He was paroled out on November 27, 2002. The defendant was returned to the Department of Corrections as a parole violator on August 28, 2003. He was discharged from parole on October 16, 2003.” The PSI also reveals that on December 29, 2005, defendant pleaded guilty to a felony traffic offense in Tazewell County case No. 05–CF–264, and was sentenced to 24 months' probation and ordered to serve 180 days in the Tazewell County jail. His probation was terminated unsuccessfully on January 8, 2008. As stated, at defendant's June 23, 2008, sentencing hearing in this case, the court imposed a 33–year term of imprisonment and a mandatory assessment for DNA testing, which $200 fee was included in the written sentencing order entered by the court.

[242 Ill.2d 290] On June 24, 2008, defendant filed, through counsel, another motion to withdraw his guilty plea; a motion to reconsider sentence claiming the 33–year term of imprisonment was excessive; and an

[351 Ill.Dec. 176 , 950 N.E.2d 672]

amended motion to reconsider sentence, reiterating that the sentence was excessive, but also arguing that the trial court had erred in refusing to admit evidence of the decedent's mental health history. Defendant later filed a pro se supplemental motion to withdraw the guilty plea wherein he claimed that he was not guilty and that he pleaded guilty due to his fear of the real killer. Following a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's supplemental motion to withdraw the guilty plea. At that same hearing, the court also denied the amended motion to reconsider sentence. Defendant appealed.

On appeal, defendant argued for the first time that because he had previously submitted a specimen of blood, saliva, or tissue, the circuit court lacked the statutory authority to order him to submit another such sample, and to pay the $200 DNA analysis fee, as part of his sentence in this case. The appellate court rejected this argument, concluding that considering the language of section 5–4–3 and the fact that the legislature put in place a process to expunge DNA from the database, “we cannot agree with defendant's reading of the statute that a court lacks the authority to order a defendant to give DNA and pay the $200 analysis fee more than once.” 402 Ill.App.3d at 1083, 342 Ill.Dec. 88, 931 N.E.2d 1271. The panel also found the issue forfeited and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. 402 Ill.App.3d at 1083–84, 342 Ill.Dec. 88, 931 N.E.2d 1271.

ANALYSIS

Section 5–4–3 of the Code provides, in essential part, as follows:

“§ 5–4–3. Persons convicted of, or found delinquent for, certain offenses or institutionalized as sexually dangerous; specimens; genetic marker groups.

[242 Ill.2d 291] (a) Any person convicted of, found guilty under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for, or who received a disposition of court supervision for, a qualifying offense or attempt of a qualifying offense, convicted or found guilty of any offense classified as a felony under Illinois law, convicted or found guilty of any offense requiring registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act, found guilty or given supervision for any offense classified as a felony under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, convicted or found guilty of, under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, any offense requiring registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act, or institutionalized as a sexually dangerous person under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, or committed as a sexually violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act shall, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, be required to submit specimens of blood, saliva, or tissue to the Illinois Department of State Police in accordance with the provisions of this Section * * *.

* * *

(j) Any person required by subsection (a) to submit specimens of blood, saliva, or tissue to the Illinois Department of State Police for analysis and categorization into genetic marker grouping, in addition to any other disposition, penalty, or fine imposed, shall pay an analysis fee of $200.” 730 ILCS 5/5–4–3(a), (j) (West 2008).

As is apparent from its title, the primary purpose of section 5–4–3 is the creation of a criminal DNA database of the genetic identities of recidivist offenders. See People v. Garvin, 219 Ill.2d 104, 119, 301 Ill.Dec. 423, 847 N.E.2d 82 (2006); People v. Rigsby, 405 Ill.App.3d 916, 917, 346 Ill.Dec. 113, 940 N.E.2d 113 (2010). Prior to his conviction herein for first degree murder, defendant had twice been convicted of a felony that would require him to

[351 Ill.Dec. 177 , 950 N.E.2d 673]

provide a DNA sample and to pay the corresponding analysis fee. The record reveals that, at the time of his sentencing in this case, his DNA was “Registered” in CODIS. Defendant therefore argues that the trial court erred in requiring him to submit an additional DNA sample and ordering him to pay an additional $200 [242 Ill.2d 292] analysis fee in connection with his present conviction. As in Rigsby, the fundamental question presented here is whether section 5–4–3 should be read “to require submission of multiple and duplicative DNA samples and payment of additional analysis fees from an offender who has already submitted DNA samples pursuant to a prior conviction and has paid a corresponding analysis fee.” Rigsby, 405 Ill.App.3d at 917, 346 Ill.Dec. 113, 940 N.E.2d 113. Because the question is one of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. People v. Williams, 239 Ill.2d 503, 506, 347 Ill.Dec. 677, 942 N.E.2d 1257 (2011); People v. Beachem, 229 Ill.2d 237, 243, 321 Ill.Dec. 793, 890 N.E.2d 515 (2008).

The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of our legislature. Beachem, 229 Ill.2d at 243, 321 Ill.Dec. 793, 890 N.E.2d 515. “This inquiry ‘must always begin with the language of the statute, which is the surest and most reliable indicator of...