People v. Marshall

• Citation: 269 Cal.Rptr. 269,50 Cal.3d 907,790 P.2d 676
• Decision Date: 17 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. 25438 and S009001,Nos. S004713,C,s. S004713,25438 and S009001
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 790 P.2d 676 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ryan Michael MARSHALL, Defendant and Appellant. In re Ryan Michael MARSHALL on Habeas Corpus. rim.

Page 269

269 Cal.Rptr. 269

50 Cal.3d 907, 790 P.2d 676

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ryan Michael MARSHALL, Defendant and Appellant In re Ryan Michael MARSHALL on Habeas Corpus.

Nos. S004713, Crim. No. 25438 and S009001.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

May 17, 1990.

Rehearing Denied July 18, 1990.

Michael R. Snedeker (court-appointed), Snedeker & Smith, and Lisa Short, Oakland, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White and Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Ward C. Campbell and Roger E. Venturi, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

Defendant Ryan Michael Marshall was charged under the 1978 death penalty law (Pen.Code, § 190.1 et seq.) with murdering Silva Teague (id., § 187), robbing her (id., § 211) and burglarizing her residence (id., § 459). As to the murder, the special circumstances of felony-murder-robbery (id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)) and felony-murder-burglary (id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(vii)) were alleged. As to each offense, the use of a firearm was also alleged. (Id., § 12022.5.) Defendant pleaded not guilty and denied the allegations. Trial was by jury. The jury found defendant guilty as charged and found the allegations to be true. It subsequently fixed the penalty at death. The court entered judgment accordingly.

The cause in number S004713 [Crim. No. 25438] is before us on automatic appeal from the judgment of death. (Pen.Code, § 1239, subd. (b); see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11.) The cause in number S009001 is here on petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.) On defendant's motion we have consolidated the appeal and the habeas corpus proceeding for purposes of oral argument and decision.

As will appear, we conclude that the appeal must be rejected and the judgment affirmed, and that the petition for writ of habeas corpus must be denied.

I. APPEAL (No. S004713 [Crim. No. 25438] )

A. The Facts

The evidence introduced at the guilt phase was based largely on two confessions defendant made to officers from the Tulare Sheriff's Department. It tells the following tale.

On the night of January 22, 1985, defendant and two companions, Christopher Scott Seaman and John Leroy Calhoun, met at the Showbiz Pizza Place in Visalia. Defendant was 18 years old, and Seaman and Calhoun were evidently about the same age; defendant had known Calhoun for some time but Seaman only about a week. The trio planned to become mercenaries for the so-called Karen National Liberation Army in Myanmar, formerly Burma, in what they viewed as a struggle against communism. Seaman owned weapons, the others did not. At their meeting, Seaman told defendant and Calhoun that he knew where they could get guns for their venture. With his guidance, the trio developed a plan: Alva Teague, a childhood friend of Seaman, collected guns and kept them in his bedroom at the home of his father and mother, Louis and Silva Teague, in a rural area outside Visalia; after 3 o'clock in the afternoon no one (Seaman said) would be home; they could take the weapons and make a clean getaway. The trio styled the enterprise a military-like "mission." Authority ran from Seaman, who was "commanding the mission" as its "leader"; through Calhoun, who was "senior" to defendant; down to defendant himself.

Evidently on January 23, Seaman, Calhoun, and defendant went to the Teague residence, surveyed the premises, and then departed. About 3 p.m. that same day, they returned; Seaman and Calhoun had driven in Seaman's Jeep while defendant had ridden on his motorcycle; each was dressed in military-like garb. On their arrival, the trio saw an automobile on the property and realized that someone might be at home. They discussed the matter and through a "general consensus" made an apparently tacit "commitment" to kill whomever they might find within in order to eliminate any potential "witnesses." Their plan was as follows: defendant would go in and secure the premises, and was handed a .357-caliber magnum handgun belonging to Seaman for that purpose; Calhoun would follow; and Seaman would remain outside as a lookout.

As defendant approached the house he gazed within and noticed a middle-aged woman, later identified as Silva Teague, sitting at a coffee table. He knocked on the door, she answered, he asked if "John" was home, she said no, he put his arm in the doorway, she slammed the door on his arm, but he forced his way in. Once inside, defendant held Teague on a couch with his handgun.

Calhoun then entered, armed with a .22-caliber carbine given him by Seaman, and exchanged weapons with defendant. Calhoun told defendant to make Teague lie down in the hallway; defendant complied. Calhoun began to gather weapons from Alva's bedroom. He told defendant to move Teague into the bathroom and make her lie face down on the floor; again defendant complied. At what defendant assumed was Seaman's direction, Calhoun gave him an "order" to kill Teague by moving an index finger across his throat.

Defendant "executed" his victim by firing four rounds from the carbine. "I put the flash suppresser [sic ] on the base of the skull, the neck, and I tilted it back just a little bit for the angle so I'd come through right about the bridge of the nose--so I'd get a clear trajectory through her brain." "I didn't want to hurt her. I didn't want her to feel any pain. I wanted it to be over before she even knew it happened, so I made sure that I had a clear trajectory through the brain."

Calhoun and defendant gathered up three rifles, a shotgun, a handgun, ammunition, ammunition clips, an ammunition belt, and other items, and then left the house. They had found, but did not take, a single-shot .22 caliber rifle and a couple of air-rifles--because, defendant said they would be useless for fighting in the jungle.

Seaman, Calhoun, and defendant decided to flee the country in Seaman's Jeep. Defendant sold his motorcycle to the Visalia Cycle Center to obtain money for the escape. They set out for Mexico.

The following day, January 24, the trio was arrested outside of Needles. Defendant soon began to experience and express remorse for the killing. In his view, Seaman "coerced [him and Calhoun] pretty much" to "go in and remove the weapons from the house": "he was the one who came up with the idea--he was, information, uh, major instigator, well, without him nothing would have ever happened."

The defense presented no evidence on the issue of guilt.

At the penalty phase, the prosecution did not introduce any evidence. The defense offered the testimony of defendant's mother and grandmother, and of persons who knew him or his family. That testimony painted the following picture.

Defendant's father and mother lived together unmarried. She became pregnant; he went to jail; and she gave birth to defendant. About two years later, defendant's father returned; a few months after that, defendant's mother left because of his father's drinking and physical abuse, and she took defendant with her. The following years were happy; defendant was bright, enthusiastic, personable, good, and helpful.

All began to change in defendant's seventh year. His father returned. A year later, his parents married. His father was violent, explosive, and sadistic; he physically and verbally abused defendant and his mother, and demanded that they obey his orders immediately and fully; they feared him. Defendant began to withdraw within himself, and eventually developed hypertension and peptic ulcers; he also began to escape through fantasy. In spite of all, he remained good and helpful. Indeed, on one occasion he saved another child from drowning. But he was shadowed by the cloud cast by his father: he was sad and depressed.

Early on, defendant became interested in the military and weaponry. In his teenage years, his interest grew and became virtually obsessive. And at 17 he enlisted in the army after his mother gave permission. In military service he was happy. But after a short time, he suffered an injury and was honorably discharged. Returning home, he was lost. He drifted for a little while. He began to talk about becoming a mercenary. And then ensued the events that were the subject of the trial.

Defendant himself took the stand. He expressed remorse for the killing: "I feel a great deal of remorse. It was a terrible thing. And if it could be changed, if it was within my power, I would change it." He admitted he did not begin to experience remorse immediately after the crime. He explained: "Everything happened really very fast. I would say that I was almost--it was an automatic reaction. I was given an order. I followed the order explicitly. It wasn't until later on that I had time to think about what carrying out that order meant in terms of my life, in terms of other people's lives, in terms of that family, in terms of the friends and relatives of both sides." He said that in jail he read a good deal and studied German, and that if he was allowed to live he hoped to continue his education.

B. Guilt Issues

Denial of Motion to Suppress

Defendant's sole contention as to guilt is that the court erred when it denied a motion he made to suppress certain statements, including his two confessions. In the motion he argued that the first confession, which he made to officers on the night of his arrest in Needles, was involuntary and hence inadmissible: it was involuntary as a matter of law because he had invoked his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona- § az Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and any waiver of that right was ineffective; it was also involuntary as a matter of fact because he was impaired through deprivation of medication prescribed for hypertension. He argued that the second confession, which he made to officers four days later, was also involuntary and hence inadmissible: it was involuntary as the "tainted fruit" of the first assertedly...