People v. Martin

• Decision Date: 07 December 2017
• Docket Number: 108215
• Citation: 156 A.D.3d 956,66 N.Y.S.3d 572
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Corey MARTIN, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

156 A.D.3d 956
66 N.Y.S.3d 572

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Corey MARTIN, Appellant.

108215

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: October 16, 2017
Decided and Entered: December 7, 2017

66 N.Y.S.3d 573

Amanda FiggsGanter, Albany, for appellant.

P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Vincent Stark of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Garry, J.P., Egan Jr., Rose, Mulvey and Rumsey, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Mulvey, J.

156 A.D.3d 956

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Lynch, J.), rendered December 3, 2015, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.

Following a traffic stop of a vehicle in which defendant was a passenger at approximately 10:30 p.m. on June 18, 2014, defendant provided a false name and was arrested for false personation. A search of defendant's person after his arrest disclosed a quantity of cocaine and his parole identification card, and a computer search reflected that there was an outstanding bench warrant for his arrest. He was thereafter charged by indictment with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and fourth degrees. After a suppression hearing, defendant's motion, as relevant here, to suppress the tangible evidence seized from his person was denied. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and was sentenced to the agreed-upon prison term of 4½ years followed by three years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals, challenging only the denial of his motion to suppress the physical evidence.

We affirm. Initially, while defendant signed a written waiver of appeal, he expressly reserved his right to appeal from the suppression ruling and, thus, he is entitled to raise that challenge (see People v. Gonzalez, 97 A.D.3d 985, 985, 947 N.Y.S.2d 919 [2012] ). Addressing the merits, we give great weight to County Court's credibility and factual determinations and find that the court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress (see People v. Wynn, 149 A.D.3d 1252, 1254, 52 N.Y.S.3d 136 [2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1136, 64 N.Y.S.3d 686, 86 N.E.3d 578 [2017] ). The court credited the testimony of a narcotics detective who, with others, had been conducting surveillance of a street he described as a "hotbed of narcotics activity." The

156 A.D.3d 957

detective observed a series of vehicles drive up in front of one house; as each vehicle arrived, one of the

66 N.Y.S.3d 574

men on the porch would walk over to the car, lean in the window and briefly interact with the driver, and the vehicle would then drive away. The detective opined, based upon his training and experience, that narcotics activity was occurring. He then observed the subject vehicle pull up and stop in front of the house, at which time a person later identified as defendant approached the vehicle, spoke with the passenger and entered the back seat of the vehicle, which then pulled out in a "hasty manner" without using a signal. The detective followed in his unmarked vehicle as the subject vehicle circled the block; the detective observed defendant lean into the front seat and interact with the front-seat passenger, and the detective then conducted a traffic stop. As the detective observed the driver commit a traffic violation (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 ), he was "authorized to stop the vehicle on that basis, regardless of any other underlying motivation" ( People v. Wynn, 149 A.D.3d at 1254, 52 N.Y.S.3d 136 ; see People v. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d 130, 133, 8 N.Y.S.3d 237, 30 N.E.3d 880 [2015] ; People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 349, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 [2001] ).

The detective then approached the vehicle, identified himself as a detective and, upon his request, the driver provided the requested documents. When asked, the driver indicated that they had "just gone and gotten some food," which was inconsistent with the detective's observations during surveillance, and that she was dropping a "friend" off, gesturing to defendant. Defendant was unable to provide any identification and gave a name and date of birth, but indicated that he did not know his Social Security number and became "extremely nervous." When asked, the driver, who had represented that defendant was her friend, said that she did not know defendant's real name and supplied only his street name. At this point, the detective asked the vehicle occupants to exit the vehicle and separated them for further inquiry. This request was permissible, as "a police officer may, as a precautionary measure and without particularized suspicion, direct the occupants of a lawfully stopped vehicle to step out of the car" ( People v. Garcia, 20 N.Y.3d 317, 321, 959 N.Y.S.2d 464, 983 N.E.2d 259 [2012] ).

Defendant again provided a name and date of birth, and the detective called a patrol vehicle to verify this information as he did not have access to an operable computer. The detective advised defendant that it was illegal to misrepresent his identity to police and observed that defendant was "extremely nervous," "pulled to the back" of the vehicle and began moving about in

156 A.D.3d 958

an "erratic" manner. Perceiving that defendant had provided a false name and was a flight risk, the detective placed him in handcuffs. At the initial level of the police encounter, the detective was authorized to request basic information from defendant (see People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 [1976] ; see also People v. Garcia, 20 N.Y.3d at 322, 959 N.Y.S.2d 464, 983 N.E.2d 259 ; People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 184, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 590 N.E.2d 204 [1992] ). To that end, the encounter was brief—lasting just four to five minutes before defendant was handcuffed (a total of only eight minutes before his formal arrest)—the questions related to his identity and were not accusatory, and there is no suggestion of "harassment or intimidation" ( People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 189, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 590 N.E.2d 204 ). As the traffic stop was "reasonably related in scope, including its length, to the circumstances which justified the...