People v. Martin
Decision Date | 21 September 1977 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 29424 |
Citation | 78 Mich.App. 518,260 N.W.2d 869 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gary Stewart MARTIN, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward R. Wilson, App. Chief, Asst. Pros. Atty., Robert M. Morgan, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellant.
O'Connor & Frontczak, P. C., by Thomas H. O'Connor, Troy, for defendant-appellee.
Before RILEY, P. J., and BASHARA, and MAHINSKE, * JJ.
The plaintiff appeals from an order quashing the warrant for defendant's arrest and dismissing the charge of receiving stolen property in excess of $100. M.C.L.A. § 750.535; M.S.A. § 28.803. The trial judge based his order on testimony taken at the preliminary examination and a motion to quash the warrant.
Sergeant Philip Schultz, of the Detroit Police Department, testified that an anonymous informant advised him that defendant was driving a stolen 1965 red Chevrolet Impala bearing Michigan license number VMP 515. A check of the Secretary of State's computer system showed the license to be registered to another vehicle.
The informant further advised Sergeant Schultz that defendant had driven the auto to a bar in southwest Detroit. Officers Schultz and Richard Clayton went to the bar and observed the auto in the bar parking lot. They entered the bar and the bartender directed them to the defendant. The officers identified themselves to defendant and indicated that they were interested in talking with him. Defendant voluntarily accompanied them outside, while telling the officers "you have to advise me of my rights".
Sergeant Schultz pointed to the red Chevrolet and asked defendant if he owned that car. Defendant responded that he did. Immediately thereafter Sergeant Schultz advised defendant of his Miranda 1 rights.
The trial judge ruled that the officer should have advised defendant of his Miranda rights prior to asking any questions because the investigation had focused on him, and that the investigation was a custodial one as defined by the Supreme Court.
At first blush, it would seem that we are bound to follow the mandate of People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 224 N.W.2d 867 (1975), amplified in People v. Ridley, 396 Mich. 603, 242 N.W.2d 402 (1976). In Reed the Michigan Supreme Court held that where the investigation has focused on a suspect prior to questioning, it is error to admit into evidence responses to questions asked prior to the issuance of a Miranda warning. Ridley, supra, 2 agreed that the so-called "Reed and Miranda " test applied, but found that the investigation had not yet "focused" to the point of requiring Miranda warnings.
At the outset we must review the tenets of the doctrine set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Law enforcement officials had taken the defendant into custody and interrogated him at a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. Justice Warren, speaking for the majority stated:
Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706.
Throughout Miranda the Court reiterated that its holding was limited to custodial interrogations only. When our Supreme Court adopted the "focus" test set forth in Reed, supra, it indicated that it was applying the Miranda doctrine, but it is difficult to reconcile that holding with the statements of the United States Supreme Court in Miranda. Further, the United States Supreme Court has clearly mandated that state courts may not impose greater restrictions on police activity, as a matter of Federal constitutional law, than those which the Court holds to be necessary under Federal constitutional standards. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975). A review of Michigan decisions including Reed, supra, and Ridley, supra, reveals that Federal constitutional standards were the only ones relied upon to limit police activity. Consequently, we conclude that Michigan must be guided by the United States Supreme Court interpretation in delineating Federal constitutional law.
It is clear that in the case at bar, the defendant was not placed in physical custody or under arrest at the time the lone question was asked outside the bar. Was his freedom of action so restricted as to necessitate that Miranda warnings be given before any questions were asked, even though the investigation had focused on him?
Two recent, and perhaps landmark, United States Supreme Court decisions provide the answer. In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976), internal revenue agents went to petitioner's home, explaining that they were assigned to investigate the possibility of tax fraud; a discussion ensued. The petitioner contended that Miranda principles should be extended to cover interrogations in non-custodial circumstances after a police investigation had focused on the subject. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, stating:
"The narrow issue before the Court in Miranda was presented very precisely in the opening paragraph of that opinion 'the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation.' 384 U.S., at 439, 86 S.Ct. at 1609, 16 L.Ed.2d at 704.
"Petitioner's argument that he was placed in the functional, and, therefore, legal, equivalent of the Miranda situation asks us now to ignore completely that Miranda was grounded squarely in the Court's explicit and detailed assessment of the peculiar 'nature and setting of * * * in-custody interrogation,' 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 707." Id. at 345-46; 96 S.Ct. at 1615-16, 48 L.Ed.2d at 7. (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted.)
Bearing even more directly on the facts of the instant case is Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). A home was burglarized. The owner indicated to state police that defendant was, in her opinion, the only possible suspect. Defendant was subsequently contacted and agreed to meet an officer at the state patrol office. The following facts are verbatim from the Court's opinion:
Id. at 493-494, 97 S.Ct. at 713, 50 L.Ed.2d at 718.
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the basis that the investigation had been held in a coercive environment. 3 The United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the investigation was neither coercive nor custodial. The landmark reasoning of the Court was as follows:
Id. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 719.
We do not gainsay that a rule similar to Miranda could be developed from our state constitution. However, the pertinent provision of our state constitution is identical to the Federal constitutional provision upon which Miranda and its succeeding interpretations are founded. 4 Thus, the question arises as to whether any significant purpose is to be achieved by adopting a policy that places greater constraints upon police investigative activity. If so, then a rule more stringent than the United States Supreme Court's "custody" standard is possible.
Miranda, its Federal constitutional basis, and the applicable provisions of our state constitution have but one objective to prevent one who is a subject of a criminal investigation from being compelled by government agents to give self-incriminating statements.
Only where the energies of law enforcement officers are diverted from the investigation process to the single-minded purpose of obtaining...
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