People v. Martinez
| Decision Date | 27 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | D074288 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HECTOR MARTINEZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert F. O'Neill, Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with directions.
Janice R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Julie L. Garland Assistant Attorneys General, Steve Oetting and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The question we are presented with is whether Proposition 57 applies to the defendant in this case—a juvenile at the time of his offense and convictions—so as to entitle him to a transfer hearing in the juvenile court before his resentencing in adult court. Under People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299 (Lara), Proposition 57 applies to all juveniles charged directly in adult court whose judgment was not final at the time of its enactment. (Lara, at pp. 303-304.) At the time Proposition 57 was enacted, this defendant's case was pending review in the California Supreme Court, which thereafter pursuant to People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu) directed that his first degree murder conviction be vacated and, if not retried by the People, reduced to second degree murder with attendant resentencing. This appeal follows the trial court's order declining to grant Martinez a transfer hearing and its imposition of a new sentence on his second degree murder conviction.
We conclude that Martinez is entitled to the benefit of Proposition 57 before being resentenced in adult court. We reject the People's arguments to the contrary. We further conclude the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion in resentencing Martinez in accordance with the California Supreme Court's directions. Thus, we conditionally reverse Martinez's convictions and remand the case to the juvenile court to conduct a juvenile transfer hearing under Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th 299. If the juvenile court determines it would have transferred Martinez to adult court, the adult court must reinstate the convictions and resentence Martinez on all counts. If the juvenile court finds it would not have transferred the matter, the court will treat the convictions as juvenile adjudications and impose an appropriate disposition. (Id. at pp. 310, 313.)
The underlying facts have been summarized in our prior decisions as well as in In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216, thus we need not repeat them here. They are not necessary to resolve this appeal.
In 2010, a jury convicted Hector Martinez of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a); count 1), assault with a semi-automatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count 2), and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3). It found true allegations that Martinez was a principal in the commission of murder and that a principal used a firearm to cause great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); that he was vicariously armed during the course of the murder (§ 12022, subd. (a)), and that he committed all three offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). In January 2011, the trial court sentenced him to 50 years to life plus six years: 25 years to life for count 1 plus 25 years to life for the firearm use enhancement and six years for count 2. It stayed punishment on count 3 and the other enhancements under section 654.
We affirmed Martinez's convictions in March 2013. (People v. Martinez (Mar. 5, 2013, D058929) [nonpub. opn.] (Martinez I).) In May 2013, the California Supreme Court denied Martinez's petition for review "without prejudice to any relief to which . . . Martinez might be entitled after this court decides [Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155]." (See In re Martinez, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1220.) This court issued the remittitur in Martinez'scase the next day, May 23, 2013. Martinez did not thereafter seek a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.
After the high court decided Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155, Martinez sought unsuccessfully to recall the remittitur in his appeal. He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in this court, which we denied in an unpublished opinion (In re Martinez (May 15, 2015, D066705 [nonpub. opn.]) (Martinez II)) concluding sufficient evidence supported his conviction under a direct aiding and abetting theory. (See In re Martinez, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1220.) In September 2015 the California Supreme Court granted Martinez's petition for review.2
The following year, while Martinez's review petition was pending in the California Supreme Court, the voters passed Proposition 57, the "Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016." (People v. Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 304.)
In December 2017, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in Martinez's case, holding that a defendant attacking his conviction for Chiu error through a habeas petition as Martinez did was in the same position as a defendant raising the error on directappeal, and that Martinez's " 'first degree murder conviction must be reversed unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury based its verdict on the legally valid theory that defendant directly aided and abetted the premeditated murder.' " (In re Martinez, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1225.) It reversed and remanded the matter with directions that this court grant Martinez habeas corpus relief and vacate his first degree murder conviction. (Id. at p. 1227.) It ordered the trial court, if the prosecution elected not to retry Martinez, to enter a judgment reflecting a second degree murder conviction and to sentence Martinez accordingly. (Ibid.)
In March 2018, Martinez moved to remand his case to juvenile court for a fitness hearing in light of Proposition 57, arguing he was entitled to its application in his case because it was before the trial court on remand. The People responded that Proposition 57 did not apply to Martinez because his judgment was final. Pointing out that a writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on a final judgment (see In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 452), the People argued Martinez had exhausted his direct appeal and "[a]llowing defendants pending a writ of habeas corpus to demand retroactive applications would have the absurd effect of encouraging defendants to make unmeritorious claims to take advantage of the beneficial change in the law and would fundamentally undermine the finality of a majority of serious criminal matters in California."
At the ensuing hearing on Martinez's motion, the People announced they would not be retrying Martinez on the first degree murder count. Martinez counsel argued in part that the court was to broadly construe Proposition 57, and because Martinez's first degree murder conviction was vacated and he had not yet been resentenced on the seconddegree murder conviction, he was entitled to a fitness hearing under its provisions. Ruling the "decision is final at this point in time," the trial court denied Martinez's motion for a fitness hearing.
In June 2018, the court sentenced Martinez to 40 years to life plus six years.3 Martinez timely appeals from the judgment and order denying his motion to transfer his case to juvenile court.
Effective November 9, 2016, Proposition 57 eliminated prosecutors' ability to file charges against juveniles directly in criminal court. "Certain categories of minors—16-and 17-year-olds who violated any felony criminal statute, and 14-and 15-year-olds who committed enumerated serious offenses, including murder—could still be tried in criminal court, ' "but only after a juvenile court judge conduct[ed] a transfer hearing to consider various factors such as the minor's maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and whether the minor can be rehabilitated." ' " (People v. Superior Court (T.D.) (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 360, 368, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S257980, quoting Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 305-306.) The "most obvious goal" of theelectorate was to broaden the number of minors who could potentially stay within the juvenile justice system where the emphasis is on rehabilitation, rather than punishment, for such offenders. (B.M. v. Superior Court of Riverside County (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 742, 754; review granted Jan. 2, 2020, S259030, see Lara, at p. 309; People v. Vela (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1107.) The text of Proposition 57 provides in part that it "shall be broadly construed to accomplish its purposes." (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57, §§ 4.1, 5, pp. 141, 145; see also T.D., at p. 370.) The intent behind the act was in part to protect and enhance public safety and save money by reducing wasteful spending on prisons.4
In Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th 299, the California Supreme Court observed: (Id. at p. 303, citing Welf. & Inst. Code,§ 707, subd. (a).) Lara held that ...
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