B.M. v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 01 October 2019
• Docket Number: E072265
• Citation: 40 Cal.App.5th 742,253 Cal.Rptr.3d 426
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: B.M., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest.

40 Cal.App.5th 742

253 Cal.Rptr.3d 426

B.M., Petitioner,

v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent;The People, Real Party in Interest.

E072265

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Filed October 1, 2019

OPINION

SLOUGH, J.

This case concerns the validity of a recent law that raises the minimum age at which a juvenile can be tried in criminal court. The new law amends a provision of the "Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act" (Proposition 57), which the voters approved in 2016 with the express goals of reducing prison spending, emphasizing rehabilitation for youth offenders, and limiting prosecutorial authority over the decision to try a minor as an adult. To advance these goals, Proposition 57 eliminated prosecutors' ability to directly file charges against minors ages 14 to 17 in criminal court, requiring them instead to seek the juvenile court's permission by way of a transfer hearing.¹ Proposition 57 authorized legislative amendments that are "consistent with and further [its] intent." (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) (Ballot Pamp.) text of Prop. 57, § 5, p. 145.) In 2018, the Legislature enacted the law at issue here, Senate Bill Number 1391 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1012, § 1) (SB 1391), which eliminates prosecutors' ability to seek transfer hearings for 14 and 15 year olds, effectively raising the minimum age a child can be tried as an adult from 14 to 16.

The change affected B.M.'s prosecution for murder. SB 1391 became effective after the Riverside County District Attorney had filed a wardship petition against the then 15-year-old and had moved to transfer her to criminal court. While the transfer motion was pending, the juvenile court (respondent Riverside County Superior Court) ruled the new law is invalid because it does not further what it identified as Proposition 57's goal of giving judges the authority to transfer 14 to 17 year olds to criminal court. B.M. filed a petition for a writ of mandate arguing the court misinterpreted Proposition 57's purpose in declaring SB 1391 invalid. We agree.

The juvenile court's error was to interpret Proposition 57's transfer hearing requirement as a purpose in and of itself, instead of a means to further the purpose of limiting prosecutorial charging discretion. As we explain, we conclude SB 1391 furthers each of Proposition 57's express purposes, including the one concerned with limiting prosecutorial discretion. We will therefore grant B.M.'s petition for a writ of mandate and direct the juvenile court to vacate its order declaring SB 1391 invalid.

IFACTS

The voters approved Proposition 57 in November 2016. On April 6, 2018, the Riverside County District Attorney filed a wardship petition against B.M., alleging she had committed special circumstances arson-murder. ( Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code; Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(H).) Along with the petition, the district attorney requested a transfer hearing, arguing B.M. was unfit for the juvenile justice system.

B.M.'s case was continued for several months, and meanwhile in September 2018, the Legislature passed and the Governor approved SB 1391, which eliminated prosecutors' ability to seek transfer hearings for 14 and 15 year olds. The Legislature declared SB 1391 "is consistent with and furthers the intent of Proposition 57." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1012, § 3.) In his signing statement, the Governor acknowledged raising the transfer age to 16 would mitigate the consequences for 14 and 15 year olds who had committed "very serious crimes," but concluded rehabilitating those young offenders is a more important aim than punishment. (Sept. 30, 2018, Gov. ltr to Senate.) "There is a fundamental principle at stake here: whether we want a society which at least attempts to reform the youngest offenders before consigning them to adult prisons where their likelihood of becoming a lifelong criminal is so much higher. [¶] My view is that we should continue to work toward a more just system that respects victims, protects public safety, holds youth accountable, and also seeks a path of redemption and reformation wherever possible." (Ibid. )

At a hearing in October 2018, B.M.'s counsel, the Riverside County Public Defender, moved to dismiss the pending transfer motion under SB 1391. The district attorney opposed, arguing the new law is an invalid legislative amendment because it conflicts with Proposition 57's intent to authorize judges to transfer 14 to 17 year olds to criminal court. After supplemental briefing and a bifurcated hearing on the issue, the juvenile court agreed with the district attorney and ruled SB 1391 is invalid. The court concluded Proposition 57's intent "is explicit in its own language when it says that 14- and 15-year-olds can be prosecuted for murder in the adult court upon motion of the People and granting of that motion by the courts." It further concluded SB 1391 conflicted with that intent by eliminating prosecutors' ability to file transfer motions for those juveniles. The court found the Legislature's declaration that SB 1391 is consistent with Proposition 57's intent "conclusory," and found the Governor's signing statement "equally unpersuasive."

IIANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review the juvenile court's interpretation of Proposition 57 and SB 1391 de novo. ( People v. Health Laboratories of North America, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 442, 445, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 618 ["The interpretation of a statute and the determination of its constitutionality are questions of law"].) Where voter initiatives like Proposition 57 are concerned, the California Constitution limits the power of the Legislature to "undo[ ] what the people have done" ( Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v. Quackenbush (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1484, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 342 ) by requiring voter approval of any law amending or repealing an initiative, unless the initiative itself allows legislative amendment. ( Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c).) Proposition 57 contains such an allowance, permitting legislative amendments that are "consistent with and further [its] intent." (Ballot Pamp., supra , text of Prop. 57, § 5 at p. 145; see Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1251, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12, 906 P.2d 1112 ( Amwest ) ["It is common for an initiative measure to include a provision authorizing the Legislature to amend the initiative without voter approval only if the amendment furthers the purpose of the initiative"].) As our Supreme Court explained in Amwest , "[s]uch a limitation upon the power of the Legislature must be strictly construed, but it also must be given the effect the voters intended it to have." ( Amwest , supra , 11 Cal.4th at pp. 1255-1256, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12, 906 P.2d 1112.)

Thus, when determining whether a legislative amendment furthers an initiative's intent, we must apply "a strong presumption of constitutionality [to the] Legislature's acts" and uphold the amendment "if, by any reasonable construction , it can be said that the statute furthers the purposes" of the initiative. ( Amwest , supra , 11 Cal.4th at pp. 1253, 1256, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12, 906 P.2d 1112, italics added.) We also bear in mind the well-established separation of powers principle that "[c]ourts should exercise judicial restraint in passing upon the acts of coordinate branches of government; the presumption is in favor of constitutionality, and the invalidity of the legislation must be clear before it can be declared unconstitutional." ( Dittus v. Cranston (1959) 53 Cal.2d 284, 286, 1 Cal.Rptr. 327, 347 P.2d 671.) Legislative findings are entitled to "great weight" and "will be upheld unless they are found to be unreasonable and arbitrary." ( Amwest , at p. 1252, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12, 906 P.2d 1112.)

This is especially true where the Legislature has directly considered the constitutional issue and found the amendment consistent with the voter initiative, as it has here. " ‘Although the ultimate constitutional interpretation must rest, of course, with the judiciary (see Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-180 ), a focused legislative judgment on the question enjoys significant weight and deference by the courts.’ " ( Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 151, 193, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 770, 375 P.3d 887.)

B. Historical Background

Proposition 57 was not approved in a vacuum. To understand its purpose, it's helpful to place the initiative in historical context. (See Amwest , supra , 11 Cal.4th at p. 1257, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12, 906 P.2d 1112 [reviewing history of insurance rate regulation "[i]n order to determine the purposes of Proposition 103"].)

1. Differences between the juvenile and criminal justice systems

Whether a minor remains in the juvenile justice system or is tried as an adult in criminal court "has potentially major consequences." ( People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 306, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22 ( Lara ).) While a minor "convicted of serious crimes in adult court can be punished by a long prison sentence, juveniles are generally treated quite differently, with rehabilitation as the goal." ( Ibid. )

"A ‘juvenile court’ is a separate, civil division of the superior court. (§ 246.) A prosecutor charges a minor with an offense by filing a juvenile petition, rather than a criminal complaint. (See §§ 653.7, 655.) Minors ‘admit’ or ‘deny’ an offense, rather than plead ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty.’ (§ 702.3.) There are no ‘trials,’ per se, in juvenile court, rather there is a ‘jurisdictional hearing’ presided over by a juvenile court judge. ( § 602.) The jurisdictional hearing is equivalent to a ‘bench trial’ in a criminal court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.780.) Although a juvenile court judge adjudicates alleged law violations, there are no ‘conviction[s]’ in juvenile court. (§ 203.) Rather, the juvenile court determines—under the familiar beyond [a] reasonable doubt...