People v. Mateo

• Citation: 551 N.W.2d 891,453 Mich. 203
• Decision Date: 31 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 9,Docket No. 96079,9
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raul I. MATEO, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 891

551 N.W.2d 891

453 Mich. 203

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raul I. MATEO, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 96079.

Calendar No. 9.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Oct. 12, 1995.

Decided July 31, 1996.

[453 Mich. 205] Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Richard Thompson, Prosecuting Attorney, Joyce F. Todd, Chief, Appellate Division, and Thomas R. Grden, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Pontiac, for the people.

State Appellate Defender by Robyn B. Frankel, Detroit, for defendant.

[453 Mich. 206] Donald Martin, President, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, Lansing, for Amicus Curiae, Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.

David A. Moran, Detroit, for Amicus Curiae, Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan.

OPINION

BOYLE Justice.

We granted leave in this case to determine the standard of review on appeal of preserved error that does not involve a constitutional claim. We hold that M.C.L.A. § 769.26; M.S.A. § 28.1096 does not impinge on this Court's authority to determine practice and procedure and does not require a literal definition of miscarriage of justice. On direct review, the reviewing court is not to apply the standard for preserved constitutional error of harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, People v. Anderson (After Remand ), 446 Mich. 392, 521 N.W.2d 538 (1994).

The statute is consistent with the view of the Court in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). Under our statute, as under federal law, a reviewing court is not to find nonconstitutional preserved error harmless simply because it concludes the jury reached the right result. Disregarding errors that do not affect substantial rights, the reviewing court is to examine the record as a whole and the actual prejudicial effect of the error on the factfinder in the case at hand. People v. Lee, 434 Mich. 59, 450 N.W.2d 883 (1990). Where the error asserted is the erroneous admission of evidence, the court engages in a comparative analysis of the likely effect of the error in light of the other evidence.

Because in this case the Court of Appeals correctly found overwhelming evidence of guilt, it does not affirmatively appear that there has been a miscarriage of justice. People v. Straight, 430 Mich. 418, 424 N.W.2d 257 (1988). Given that the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, it is unnecessary to reach the question of the level of confidence the reviewing court must have in the harmlessness of preserved error. The government has briefed only the Kotteakos standard, and the defendant has briefed only the Chapman standard. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). While the highly probable standard may represent the appropriate test for the reasons discussed below, on an issue of such overriding importance to the jurisprudence of the state, formal adoption of this standard should not be undertaken without further assistance from the bench and bar. ¹ The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

I

On the date the events giving rise to this case took place, defendant, Raul Mateo, was living with Alva Lulgjurflj and their three children. Jose Cantu, Lulgjurflj's brother and the victim in this case, was temporarily living with them at the time.

Cantu testified that he and defendant got into an argument in the early morning hours on January 12, 1990. Cantu had apparently made a comment regarding whether defendant was going to move out of the house and defendant took offense. After a brief verbal exchange, defendant left the room and returned with a pistol, placed it against Cantu's head, and threatened to "blow [his] brains out." Cantu managed to knock the pistol from defendant's hand and pushed him out of the room. Defendant soon returned with a knife in each hand and repeatedly slashed Cantu in the head and arm.

Cantu managed to escape and ran to a nearby gas station. Maria Cantu, Jose Cantu's mother, testified that her son called her, told her that Mateo had cut him, that she picked him up from the gas station and took him back to her home and then to the hospital. The fact that the victim was cut was also supported by the hospital records. Two police officers also testified without objection that Cantu's sister had identified Mateo as the assailant.

Defendant was charged with assault with intent to murder, ² felonious assault, ³ and as a second felony offender. ⁴

At trial, defendant presented an alibi through Crystal Blair, a former girlfriend, who testified that defendant was with her during the time the attack took place. Defendant did not testify. The prosecutor cross-examined Blair about certain phone conversations Blair had with another former girlfriend of defendant, Jennifer Brecht. Blair denied having conversations about defendant with Brecht. The prosecutor then called Brecht who, over objection, testified that Blair had called her and warned her that defendant was "very violent."

Defendant was convicted as charged. Defendant appealed, alleging that Brecht's testimony was improper rebuttal on a collateral issue. The Court of Appeals agreed. In spite of the error, however, the Court went on to conclude that the evidence against defendant was "overwhelming" and that any error in admitting Brecht's testimony "was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." ⁵

Defendant, in propria persona, filed a delayed application for leave to appeal with this Court. The application was initially held in abeyance for People v. Dunn, 446 Mich. 409, 521 N.W.2d 255 (1994). Following release of that case, we granted leave, limited to "(1) whether the trial court erred in permitting witness Brecht to testify as a rebuttal witness, (2) what is the appropriate standard for determining when nonconstitutional error in admitting evidence is reversible, and (3) whether any error in the admission of the testimony of witness Brecht was error requiring reversal." ⁶

We agree with the Court of Appeals that, in these circumstances, extrinsic evidence of defendant's assaultive behavior was error. While the nature of Blair's relationship with the defendant was relevant to her credibility, and she had testified on direct examination that their relationship was good, it is unclear how any assaultive behavior in that relationship bore on Blair's credibility. People v. Figgures, 451 Mich. 390, 547 N.W.2d 673 (1996). The prosecutor does not argue that Blair's testimony was prompted by fear of the defendant, but, rather, contends that the testimony was directed to revealing facts of favoritism toward the defendant. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 105 S.Ct. 465, 469, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). While the scope of rebuttal is within the trial court's discretion, we find that extrinsic evidence of defendant's assaultive behavior was error. 1 McCormick, Evidence (4th ed), § 40, p. 137.

Finding preserved nonconstitutional error, we now discuss the proper standard for assessing the effect of the error.

A

The legislative framework for appellate resolution of this question has guided appellate review in criminal cases for almost fifty years. It is consistent with the Court's authority to regulate practice and procedure. Const. 1963, Art. 6, §§ 1, 5. ⁷

We are not required to decide whether our harmless error statute is a legislative attempt to supplant the Court's authority. ⁸ Correct construction of the statute does not dictate a literal reading of the term "miscarriage of justice." The legislative history of the former federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 391, adopted in the same time frame as the Michigan statute, indicates that review is to be rendered " 'without presuming that any error which may appear had been of necessity prejudicial to the complaining party.' " United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 458, 106 S.Ct. 725, 736, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986), quoting H.R. Rep. No. 913. This reflects the view of Secretary of War Taft that " 'no judgment of the court below should be reversed except for an error which the court, after hearing [sic] the entire evidence, can affirmatively say would have led [the jury] to a different verdict.' " Id. Likewise, our statute should not be construed to require actual innocence, but, rather, it should be viewed as a legislative directive to presume the validity of verdicts and to reverse only with respect to those errors that affirmatively appear to undermine the reliability of the verdict.

Given that there is no inherent conflict between the statute and the standard we create today for appellate review, we should (1) affirm that reversal is not required unless an error is harmful, and (2) clarify which of the conflicting standards used in past decisions by our state courts is correct.

B

In Michigan, the harmless-error rule is primarily embodied in statute, ⁹ with additional statements of the doctrine in our court rule ¹⁰ and evidentiary rule. ¹¹ The "miscarriage of justice" language in our statute, as well as the date of enactment, ¹² supports the conclusion that it was part of a general movement in state courts to adopt the approach of the English Judicature Act, rejecting reversals for technical errors. 3 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 26.6(a), pp. 257-258. The Judicature Act provided that the Court of Appeal was not to order a new trial on the basis of "the improper admission or rejection of evidence" or a misdirection of the jury "unless ... some substantial wrong or miscarriage has thereby been occasioned." Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error, (Ohio State Univ. Press, 1970), p. 10 and n. 22 (emphasis added). As Professors LaFave and Israel point out, "American appellate courts recognized that the newly adopted harmless error legislation, ... had a different frame of reference as to different types of rights." Id., p. 258. With regard to error of the type covered by the English Judicature Act, the American legislat...