People v. Mathews

• Decision Date: 17 April 1979
• Docket Number: Cr. 9412
• Citation: 91 Cal.App.3d 1018,154 Cal.Rptr. 628
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Anita MATHEWS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 628

154 Cal.Rptr. 628

91 Cal.App.3d 1018

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Anita MATHEWS, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 9412.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

April 17, 1979.

Hearing Denied June 27, 1979.

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, Ezra Hendon, Chief Asst. State Public Defender, Laurance S. Smith and Tom Lundy, Deputy State Public Defenders, for plaintiff and respondent.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Asst. Atty. Gen., James T. McNally and Susan Rankin Bunting, Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendant and appellant.

EVANS, Associate Justice.

Defendant, Anita Mathews, appeals from a judgment entered following her conviction of the voluntary manslaughter ¹ of Donald Silva (Pen.Code, § 192), and discharging a firearm at a vehicle (Veh.Code, § 23110, subd. (b)), as charged in count two. The jury also found defendant used a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5 during the commission of both crimes. Defendant was acquitted of the attempted murder of Darelle Ghormley, as charged in count three.

The charges against defendant arise from an incident occurring on December 13, 1976, in which defendant, while unsuccessfully attempting to kill Darelle Ghormley, fatally injured Donald Silva.

The record discloses defendant and Ghormley had dated on two or three occasions in November 1976. Their activities were mostly limited to Ghormley visiting defendant at her house where he had sexual relations with her. Ghormley testified that on the last of these dates, he took defendant to his house where he and two friends had sexual intercourse with her.

On the day of the fatal shooting Ghormley, a passenger in a car driven by decedent Donald Silva, had occasion to stop at defendant's house. Defendant, with the assistance of Joe Waters, was in the process of moving out of the house; as defendant and Joe Waters were walking to Waters' car, she observed Ghormley in a car driven by Silva. Upon recognizing Ghormley, she momentarily froze, but quickly returned to Waters' vehicle. Ghormley had heard rumors that defendant had publicly accused him of having raped her; and when he saw defendant, he asked Silva to leave in order to avoid any possible trouble.

Defendant returned to Waters' car and declared, " '(t)hat's him' " and told Richard Grigg, a passenger in the Waters' car, to get out. Defendant and Waters then got into Waters' car and pursued the Silva vehicle. When Silva stopped at a red light, the Waters' vehicle drove alongside on Silva's passenger side. Ghormley testified that he noticed a shotgun extending through the vent window on the driver's side of the Waters' automobile and told Silva, " 'They got a gun, jump on it' " and then ducked onto the floor, and heard successive gunshots and felt pieces of glass and buckshot in the back of his hair and along his neck. After the shots Ghormley looked up and observed that Silva had suffered what turned out to be fatal head injuries.

Defendant's version of the incident was somewhat different. She testified that after seeing Ghormley, she wanted to leave, but that Waters insisted on following Ghormley's car; and as Waters pulled alongside the other car, Ghormley began rolling down the car window and pointed a gun at her. Waters' testimony confirmed the existence of Ghormley's gun.

Following the shooting, defendant and Waters were apprehended in Truckee, California. After her arrest defendant gave a statement to Sacramento County Sheriff's detectives in which she admitted socializing with Ghormley, but denied she had been raped by Ghormley, or that he had stolen drugs from her, or that she had shot at anyone.

At trial defendant admitted the act of killing Silva. Her defense to the charges centered around her contention that the sexual incident in November 1976, involving Ghormley and his two friends, was not a consensual act but was instead a brutal rape, following which she suffered what was characterized as a "rape trauma syndrome." Upon this premise, she introduced psychiatric testimony tending to prove that when she saw Ghormley at her house, the "rape trauma syndrome" caused her to experience a genuine fear for her life, precipitating her subsequent actions. The psychiatric testimony also attempted to establish that as a result of the syndrome, defendant was unable to form the mental state necessary for malice aforethought.

On appeal defendant first contends the trial court should have instructed the jury Sua sponte that a homicide is justified under the doctrine of self-defense where the act of self-defense, though directed towards the unlawful aggressor, inadvertently results in the death of an innocent bystander.

Preliminary to any analysis of whether the court has a duty so to instruct Sua sponte is the question of whether that defense, under present circumstances, is even available. Research has disclosed no California case directly dealing with this issue. ² However, considered decisions of other jurisdictions have uniformly held that self-defense is available to relieve one of criminal responsibility where his legitimate act of self-defense results in the inadvertent death or injury of an innocent bystander. (See e. g. Annot. (1974) 55 A.L.R.3d 620 and cases cited.)

Generally, decisions so holding rest upon the common law theory of "transferred intent" which, in its principal application, establishes that one's criminal intent follows the corresponding criminal act to its unintended consequences. As the noted cases have held, the reasoning applies equally to carry the Lack of criminal intent to the unintended consequences and thus preclude criminal responsibility. The theory was explained in State v. Clifton (1972) 32 Ohio App.2d 284, 290 N.E.2d 921, 923, as follows: "Clearly, one who kills in self-defense does so without the mens rea that otherwise would render him culpable of the homicide. Therefore, if the act of taking the life of an assailant is not criminal does it become so when a stray shot kills a by-stander?

"It has been long accepted that if A shoots at B, intending to kill B, but instead the bullet strikes C, then A has committed a criminal act as to C. In such instance, the 'malice follows the blow' and the criminal intent of A to harm B is transferred to C.

"However, if A had no criminal intent with respect to B, as where A is exercising a lawful right to self-defense, none could exist as to C. It follows, then, that A in shooting C has not committed a criminal act, the essential of a mens rea being impossible of proof. The inquiry must be whether the killing would have been justifiable if the accused had killed the person whom he intended to kill, as the unintended act derives its character from the intended." ³

The common law doctrine of transferred intent is recognized and followed in California. (People v. Suesser (1904) 142 Cal. 354, 366-367, 75 P. 1093; People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 357, 112 Cal.Rptr. 321; People v. Siplinger (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 817, 825, 60 Cal.Rptr. 914; People v. Clayton (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 345, 349, 56 Cal.Rptr. 413; see 1 Witkin, Cal.Crimes (1963) Elements of Crime, § 61, p. 65.) We find nothing within the provisions of Penal Code section 197, ⁴ which codified in California the law of justifiable homicide, to preclude application of "transferred intent" to self-defense circumstances. Indeed, it has been held that section 197 codifies the common law and should be construed accordingly. (People v. Ceballos (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470, 478, 116 Cal.Rptr. 233, 526 P.2d 241; People v. Jones (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 478, 481, 12 Cal.Rptr. 777.) By reason of the foregoing cited authorities and analyses, we conclude that the doctrine of self-defense is available to insulate one from criminal responsibility where his act, justifiably in self-defense, inadvertently results in the injury of an innocent bystander.

We turn next to the question of whether under the facts of this case the court had a duty so to instruct Sua sponte.

"'It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (Citations.) The general principles of law governing the case are those principles Closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case.' " (Emphasis added; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 715, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 9, 518 P.2d 913, 921 quoting from People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531, 83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390; People v. Enriquez (1977) 19 Cal.3d 221, 228, 137 Cal.Rptr. 171, 561 P.2d 261.) Thus, while the duty extends to an obligation to instruct on defenses, including self-defense (Ibid.; People v. Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d 703, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913), "A trial court is not, absent a request therefor, required to instruct on specific points developed out of the particular facts presented at trial." (People v. Enriquez, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 228, 137 Cal.Rptr. at p. 175, 561 P.2d at p. 265.) Expressed another way, the court has no duty to instruct on points of law not relied upon by either the prosecution or the defendant and which, when placed in the context of the developments at trial, were inconsequential to a proper resolution of defendant's guilt.

Here, defendant's major emphasis at trial was directed towards her defense based upon the "rape trauma syndrome." Significantly, the prosecution did not contest the applicability of the "syndrome," either to diminished capacity or self-defense, but instead asserted the facts proved defendant was the intentional aggressor. Thus at trial, neither party contested the issue of whether defendant's perceived fear for her life was available to insulate her from liability for the death of Silva, an innocent third party. Each party...